Contents

Preface to the Revised Edition ix
Preface to the First Edition xiii

Introduction 1

1 Concepts of Indiscriminability 4
   1.1 Indiscriminability and Cognition 5
   1.2 Formal Features of Indiscriminability 10
   1.3 The Intentionality of Indiscriminability 14
   1.4 Direct and Indirect Discrimination 20
   1.5 Further Reflections 21

2 Logics of Indiscriminability 24
   2.1 Logical Apparatus 24
   2.2 The Non-Transitivity of Indiscriminability 34

3 Paradoxes of Indiscriminability 43

4 Concepts of Phenomenal Character 48
   4.1 Presentations of Characters 50
   4.2 Presentation-Sensitivity 54
   4.3 The Identity of Characters 62

5 Logics of Phenomenal Character 65
   5.1 Maximal M-Relations 65
   5.2 Ignorance and Indeterminacy 73
   5.3 Matching the Same Experiences 82
Contents

6 Paradoxes of Phenomenal Character 88
   6.1 The Paradox of Observational Predicates 89
   6.2 The Paradox of Phenomenal Predicates 93
   6.3 The Failure of Observationality 99
   6.4 Sorites Arguments and Necessary Ignorance 103

7 Generalizations 109
   7.1 Maximal \( M \)-Relations as Minimal Revisions 109
   7.2 Examples 114
   7.3 Necessary Conditions for Personal Identity 116
   7.4 Sufficient Conditions 121
   7.5 Close Relations 123

8 Modal and Temporal Paradoxes 126
   8.1 A Modal Paradox 126
   8.2 Two Temporal Paradoxes 135
   8.3 Comparisons 142

9 Criteria of Identity 144
   9.1 Forms 144
   9.2 Functions 148

Appendix Maximal \( M \)-Relations and the Axiom of Choice 154

Notes (to the First Edition) 158
Additional Notes (to the Revised Edition) 165
References (to the First Edition) 171
Additional References (to the Revised Edition) 176
Index 179