CHAPTER ONE

The Multiple Kingdoms of Britain and Ireland: The ‘British Problem’

ALLAN I. MACINNES

The ‘British Problem’ in the seventeenth century is as much historiographic as historic. The Whig tradition of progressive empiricism, grounded on the ‘Glorious Revolution’ (1688–91), dominated the historiography of Britain and Ireland as multiple kingdoms well into the twentieth century. The recent concerns of the ‘new British histories’ with the Stuart court and baronialism, with religious establishments and with the resolution of divergence through institutional union, have verged not so much on revisionism as neo-Whiggery. Indeed, the primacy accorded to national identities, civil wars and, above all, state formation seriously questions whether the ‘new British histories’ have marked a distinctive shift in focus away from Whiggish concerns with nation building. For the problematic nature of ‘New British Histories’ is rooted in an overwhelmingly insular and introspective historiography.

Within the closed ambit of England, Scotland and Ireland as multiple kingdoms, comparative history has tended towards multifarious discussions on identity. Seemingly divergent identities within the multiple kingdoms have been resolved constructively by multi-polar or multi-layered approaches (Kidd 1998: 321–42), which carry added resonance when applied to the wider Stuart world of the seventeenth century. But such wider contextualizing must take account of apocalyptic visions as well as baronial politics, commercial networks as well as confessional allegiances, representational images as well as written texts. The ‘new British histories’ have given particular focus to the civil wars ‘in’ and ‘of’ the three kingdoms during the mid-seventeenth century (Pocock 1996: 172–91), albeit Irish links to Spain and France have questioned the validity of this insular construct (cf. Ohlmeyer 1993). However, the Scottish Covenanters, as later the Commonwealth, viewed the civil wars as a fight ‘for’ the three kingdoms. From this perspective, civil wars within the British Isles were part of the wider European theatre of the Thirty Years’ War (cf. Murdoch 2001). Through the Covenanting Movement, which emerged in opposition to the prerogative rule of Charles I throughout the British Isles, the Scots adopted a proactive role in promoting federative alliances with the United Provinces and Sweden as well as England between 1640 and 1645. Covenanting Scotland, as the new Israel, was preparing the ground for not just European but global reordering once the forces of godliness had vanquished those of the Antichrist (Williamson 1989: 7–30).
The ‘new British histories’, no less than their Whig predecessors, have tended to view political unification as part of a grand narrative, if not a manifest British destiny. State formation in early modern Europe, driven by sustained geopolitical competition, was characterized by the emergence of regimes which were absolutist or constitutional and supported by infrastructures that were bureaucratic or patrimonial (Ertman 1997: 6–34). While the composition of early modern states can be explained in terms of these four variables, the actual process of state formation was achieved usually by one of two methods described either as acquisition and association (Elliot 1992: 48–71) or conquest and coalescence (Greengrass 1991: 1–24). Thus, England had effectively absorbed Cornwall and Wales by 1543 through parliamentary incorporation, administrative cohesion in church and state, and the political if not the cultural integration of the ruling elites. However, Ireland, despite being declared a subordinate kingdom in 1541, was not incorporated into a composite English kingdom. Successive Tudor monarchs failed to effect conquest and achieved little integration outwith the Pale. The limited advent of the Protestant Reformation in Ireland further compounded this failure (Ellis 1995: 40–63). The alternative ‘new British’ narrative of state formation has cast the multiple kingdoms on a transitional stage from a composite England to a unified kingdom of Britain and Ireland marked by parliamentary incorporation, administrative and religious uniformity, and elite integration. The accession of James VI of Scotland to the English throne in 1603 paved the way for the United Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707, to which Ireland was added in 1801 (cf. Murdoch 1998).

Yet the move from regal union to parliamentary union in the seventeenth century was neither inevitable nor seamless. The English parliament rejected full union with Scotland in 1607 and 1670, and overtures for Irish political incorporation in 1703 (cf. Smyth 2001). For their part, the Scottish Estates resisted incorporating overtures in 1689 and 1702, albeit, like the Irish parliament, they were forced into an unwanted union at the behest of the English Commonwealth in 1651, repackaged as the Protectorate from 1654. During the Restoration era, Scottish moves towards commercial union initiated in 1664 were rebuffed in 1668. A similar English initiative never got off the drawing board in 1674.

II

The determination of James VI of Scotland to project himself as James I of Great Britain and Ireland laid the foundations for the Stuarts viewing themselves as an imperial British dynasty, not just as rulers of multiple kingdoms. This dynastic resolve had firm intellectual roots in his ancient and native kingdom, not least because tangible British harmony enabled the Scots to counter traditional English claims to suzerainty. Indeed, aspirations for union, which were given a particular fillip by the Protestant Reformation in both Scotland and England, had a long pedigree founded on the concept of empire that had exclusive sovereignty within the British Isles (Mason 1998: 242–69). At the same time, traditional English dominance of the three kingdoms, characterized by the interchangeability of Britain for England, was a contemporaneous historiographic problem rooted in medieval myth refocused by Renaissance scholarship.
The anglocentric dominance of British history rested on Norman–Welsh myth-making of the twelfth century. The construct of Britain was derived from Brut, the epic Trojan hero who moved to Rome before progressing through Gaul from where he and his followers settled the whole of the British Isles. Although Britain was divided up among the successors of Brut during the first millennium BC, anglocentric dominance was reasserted under Roman occupation. Constantine the Great, who spread Christianity throughout the Roman Empire and transferred the capital from Rome to Byzantium at the outset of the fourth century AD, was both born and acclaimed emperor in Britain. Following the fall of Rome, the Britons were subject to invasions from Picts, Scots and Saxons that forced them to the margins in Wales and Cornwall. However, King Arthur had led a British revival in the early sixth century, which expanded his dominion throughout the British Isles and into France. Successive conquests by the Saxons, Danes and Norsemen tied epic British heroism to the march of civility as institutionalized through kingship, the common law and post-Reformation Protestantism. This mythical perception of Britain was reinforced by Welsh antiquarians, keen to identify Wales as the enduring heartland of the original Britons, as well as by English chroniclers like Raphael Holinshed during the sixteenth century. The construct of a territorially expansive Britain was rationalized by the antiquarian William Camden, in his final version of Britannia prepared in 1607 (Woolf 1990: 55–64, 115–25).

Camden’s concept of Britain underwrote English claims to be an exclusive empire, that the English were an elect Protestant nation with a Christian tradition under an Erastian episcopacy unbeholden to Rome, and that its civilizing mission had been refined by conquest and invasion. Thus, London, the old Roman foundation, was now the metropolitan capital of a composite British Empire whose territories encompassed the Anglo-Saxon heptarchy as well as Wales and Cornwall. This composite empire could not only lay claim to Ireland but also to that part of Scotland formerly held by the Picts. Though barbarians, they were not of Gothic strain, as alleged for the Irish and the Scots, but actually Britons who had lived outwith the boundaries of Roman civilization; the classical demarcation which ensured that such Gothic influences as the Saxons, Danes and Norsemen enriched rather than destroyed Britain. These northern boundaries, which were settled at the Forth–Clyde division of Scotland, conformed to the division between the ancient Scottish kingdom of Alba and the Saxon kingdom of Northumbria. Following his accession to the English throne, the founder of the Stuart dynasty’s imperial vanity was certainly enhanced by the notion that he was the fabled heir to both Constantine the Great and King Arthur, as well as the more prosaic Tudors. At the same time, the repeated print runs of Camden’s Britannia throughout the seventeenth century fuelled rather than dispelled English claims to superiority over Scotland and Ireland as well as Wales.

That the multiple kingdoms were actually an imperial composite was illustrated graphically by the cartographer John Speed, whose Theatre of the British Empire, first published in 1611, remained the template for the subsequent mapping of Britain and Ireland for much of the seventeenth century. Following Camden, England was depicted as a composite kingdom based on the Anglo-Saxon heptarchy. Scotland was also a composite of the Scots, the Picts and the Isles; Ireland of its four provinces of Munster, Leinster, Connacht and Ulster together with Meth; even Wales had a tripartite division of North, South and Powys. Subsequent abridged versions of his
maps, though purportedly depicting Britain and Ireland as multiple kingdoms, still adhered to the basic structure of a composite empire. The barbarous, if noble, representation of a male Britannia was refined by Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans in the guise of classical heroes (Moreland and Bannister 2000: 213–16). The composite representation of Camden and Speed, which effectively appended Scotland, Ireland and the rest of the British Isles onto detailed topographical descriptions of the English and Welsh shires, was accorded international recognition by the leading Dutch cartographer, Wilhelm Blaeu. His map of Britannia was published posthumously in 1645 (Goss 1990: 72–3).

While James I glorified in portraying himself as Constantine redivivus, he also brought into play Scottish origin myths to consolidate his shaping of a composite British Empire (Mason 1987: 60–84). Largely the product of the Wars of Independence in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, these Scottish myths borrowed heavily from the Irish origin mythology, the first to be articulated within the multiple kingdoms from the eleventh century. In contrast to the Roman imperial element, which the English shared with other aggressive northern powers in early modern Europe, such as the Swedes and the Lithuanians (Rowell 2000: 65–92), the Scottish myths stressed civic origins. Cathelus of Athens, having sojourned to Egypt, married Scotia, daughter of the Pharaoh, shortly before Moses led the Israeli exodus. In the wake of the Pharaoh’s destruction in the Red Sea, Cathelus and Scotia wandered to Iberia, from whence their heirs moved to Ireland and then to Scotland, where an autonomous kingdom was established in 330 BC under Fergus son of Ferchar, a contemporary of Alexander the Great. Around AD 403, having overcome an alliance of the Romans and the Picts which temporarily forced their return to Ireland, Fergus son of Earc re-established the kingdom of the Scots which was expanded under Kenneth MacAlpine in 843 to include that of the Picts. Despite continuing English hostility, their descendants went on to consolidate the borders of Scotland from the Solway to the Tweed in the eleventh century. This legend not only underwrote Scottish pretensions to the longest unbroken line of kings in Europe, but also the imperial aspirations of their Stewart monarchy. For Achaius, the sixty-fifth king of Scots, was leagued in friendship, not clientage, with Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Emperor, around 790; a league which had laid the foundation of the ‘auld alliance’ between Scotland and France that was consolidated by the Wars of Independence. The advent of the Reformation gave added significance to the legend, for the spread of Christianity from the Scots to the Picts by Columba and his followers during the sixth century was viewed as proto-Presbyterianism untrammeled by an Erastian episcopate or by Rome.

Fergus MacEarc, who actually ruled around AD 500, was the first authentic king of Scots. His designation as fortieth in line from Fergus MacFerchar was a fabrication notably embellished by Hector Boece in his Scotorum Historiae of 1527, when Anglo-Scottish relations had degenerated towards the real prospect of English conquest of Scotland. Six years earlier, Boece’s fellow countryman and Sorbonne scholar John Mair had proposed an alternative strategy offering permanent resolution for Anglo-Scottish conflict. His Historia Maioris Britannia discounted the mythical origins of both countries, rejected English claims to superiority and distanced him from his country’s xenophobia towards England. Mair was an eloquent advocate of British union through dynastic alliance, as that between James IV of Scotland and Margaret
Tudor of England in 1503, an alliance that eventually brought their great-grandchild James VI to the English throne. James VI was notably indebted to Mair’s imperial vision of a composite British Empire. However, this vision requires wider international contextualizing, not least for Spanish copyright on the sole status of superpower having established an Iberian world empire when the Stuarts commenced their British dynasty (McGinnis and Williamson 2002: 70–93).

Mair was the principal Iberian apologist within the three kingdoms. However, the main opponents of world empire within the three kingdoms were also Scots, especially John Knox from a biblical and apocalyptic British perspective and George Buchanan as an exponent of aristocratic republicanism. Both viewed post-Reformation Scotland as a virtuous commonwealth that should be open to wider federative arrangements to counter universal monarchy. Buchanan had firmed up Boece’s fabricated line of kings in order to demonstrate the capacity of the Scottish Commonwealth to remove tyrannical monarchs. This right of resistance to monarchy, which upheld trusteeship over sovereignty in De Iure Regni (1579), made the book a ready target for proscription by successive Stuarts. The foremost classical humanist within the three kingdoms in the sixteenth century had afforded an incisive critique of hierarchic kingship that was to prove receptive to Scottish Covenanters and British Whigs as the seventeenth century unfolded (Mason 1994: 3–16).

When seeking a distinctive counterpoint to the composite delineation of Great Britain by Camden and Speed, Dutch typographers and cartographers turned to Buchanan, supplemented by Boece. In 1627 Bonaventure and Abraham Elzevirus published at Leiden a topographical compilation, Republica, sive Status Regni Scotiae et Hiberniae. Their selective representation, together with a summative history of the ‘auld alliance’ with France, underlined Scotland’s status as a commonwealth independent of England. For Ireland, however, the evidence drawn predominantly from Camden and Speed was loaded in favour of its status as an English dependency. This differentiation was sustained by the publication of Joan Blaeu’s Grand Atlas in which Scotland was covered in book 12 of the edition first published in Amsterdam in 1654. (Ireland, though recognized as a distinct European entity in book 13, was published as a supplement.) The accompanying topographical sections were prepared primarily by Sir Robert Gordon of Straloch, an Aberdeenshire laird firmly wedded to the Graeco-Egyptian origins of the Scots, to the antiquity of the Scottish kingdom and to the emphatic rebuttal of Camden (Goss 1990: 84–5). Neither Blaeu nor his contributors to the volumes for all three kingdoms had ready access to the one work of Renaissance scholarship that served as a corrective to both the antiquarian pretensions of the Scots and the hegemonic claims of the anglocentric Britons. Foras Feasa ar Éirinn by Séathrúin Céitinn (Geoffrey Keating) was a history purged of fable but written in Irish around 1634 and subsequently circulated in manuscript only.

Keating’s refutation of the kingship line fabricated by Boece and Buchanan was part of his wider rejection that Irish kings were ever dependent on Arthur or any other king of the Britons. Ireland was never part of any foreign dominion prior to the incursion of the Normans from England at the behest of the papacy in the twelfth century. At the same time, his underlying historical purpose was to demonstrate that Ireland was not a barbaric backwater requiring civilization through conquest. In the common classical Gaelic tradition both the native Irish and the Scots who migrated from Ireland were designated the Gael and all other inhabitants and invaders within
Britain and Ireland were deemed the *Gall*. The Gael was associated with epic heroism, scholarship and fidelity and the Gall with the foreign and alien cultures that had come initially through the Gallic sojourns of Brutus and were perpetuated in Britain by the invasions of the Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans. Thus, Camden’s civilizing mission of the Britons against the Irish and Scottish Goths was turned on its head. The Irish were comparable to any nation in Europe in relation to valour, learning and steadfastness in the Catholic faith. But Keating, as befitting a descendant of an Old English family, was also concerned to ensure that due place was given to the contribution of the *Sean-Gallaibh* (‘old-foreigners’: the Old English who came in from the time of Henry II) as well as the Gaelic Irish in sustaining Catholicism. Both groups should be designated *Eircannaigh*, that is, the Catholic Irish in contrast to the *Nua-Gallaibh*, effectively the Protestant settlers who arrived as New English under the Tudors and as New British under the Stuarts. Nonetheless, this Catholic nation building remained located within the contexts of Britain and Ireland as multiple kingdoms. Although validating the national dynamic that gave rise to the Irish Confederation of Catholics during the 1640s, Keating was primarily concerned to legitimize the Irish acceptability of the Stuart dynasty through such traditional mechanisms as providence, prophecy and legitimacy (Ó Buachalla 1987: 1–8). Indeed, these same mechanisms ensured that the Catholic Confederation sought *rapprochement* with Charles I as the legitimate king of Ireland throughout the 1640s (Clarke 2000: 35–55).

The shift from a Tudor to a Stuart dynasty in 1603 had been particularly welcomed in Ireland. Unlike the Tudors whose rights to Ireland were due to conquest, James could claim direct descent not only from Fergus MacEarc who had arrived from Ulster as first king of the Scottish Gaels, but also from the kings of the other provinces of Muster, Leinster and Connacht. His right to the high kingship of Ireland was endorsed theologically. Under the leadership of Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Armagh, the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland taught that James, despite his Protestantism, was *de iure* king of Ireland and entitled to temporal allegiance (Ó Buachalla 1996: 148–94). This allegiance was eagerly affirmed by the Irish parliament in 1613, notwithstanding the writings of continental Jesuits that a heretical monarch could be deposed at papal instigation; writings which moved James to a vigorous defence of his independent empire to which unequivocal allegiance was owed by all subjects, whether Catholic or Protestant. Plantations in Ulster and Connacht dashed the hopes of Irish Catholics that allegiance to the Stuart dynasty would be reciprocated by liberty of conscience. Nonetheless, Keating and other clerical agents of the Counter-Reformation endorsed the aims of the Catholic political elite for an accommodation with the crown to ensure that Ireland would be treated as an equal partner – not as a confessionally disadvantaged, satellite kingdom – within a composite British Empire (Clarke 1978: 57–72).

III

Non-anglocentric sensibilities were partially accommodated on the flags, seals and emblems projecting the Stuarts as an imperial British dynasty. Thus, the maps drawn by Speed and reproduced subsequently for the Blaeu family were embossed with a composite imperial emblem representing the multiple kingdoms of Britain and
Ireland as well as the Stuarts’ inherited English claim on France: the royal standard featured three English lions set against three French lilies on both the top left and bottom right quarters; the lion rampant of Scotland was placed on the top right and the Irish harp on the bottom left (Goss 1990: 90–1). Conversely, rather than retain the Scottish Stewart as the founding surname of the first encompassing British dynasty, James I took over the Francophile adaptation of Stuart first patented by his mother, Mary Queen of Scots. His first issue of coinage proclaimed him as Emperor of Great Britain.

As a firm advocate that monarchy was divinely interposed between God and civil society, James I of Great Britain viewed dynastic consolidation as the first step towards perfect union under an imperial monarchy. Such a union opened up the prospect of British leadership in a Protestant Europe battling to resist Antichrist in the form of the papacy and the whole panoply of the Counter-Reformation. This imperial vision of godly monarchy could draw on traditional English claims to be an empire free from papal control and, simultaneously, counter Presbyterian claims to the autonomy of the Scottish Kirk (Wormald 1991: 36–54). Albeit warranted discreetly in his capacity as monarch of multiple kingdoms rather than a composite British empire, the Authorised Version of the Bible produced under the imprimatur of King James in 1611 endorsed his imperial vision of godly monarchy and his resolve that English should be the prescribed language of Reformed civility throughout his dominions.

British union was endorsed with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the Protestant episcopate in the multiple kingdoms (Jenkins 1995: 115–38). James Thornborough, bishop of Bristol, viewed the providential reunification of the British Empire under a godly monarch as an occasion of great happiness that would be perfected by the eventual merging of the constituent identities of England and Scotland into a composite British nation. Confidence in the ultimate victory of the godly over Antichrist, which inspired Calvinists throughout Britain, stood in marked contrast to Protestant perceptions in Ireland, that in the last few days Antichrist was at its strongest and the godly were threatened with their greatest sufferings and persecution (Ford 1987: 194–242). Accordingly, the imperial vision of a godly monarchy was endorsed as a matter of urgency by James Ussher, who became the Anglican primate in Ireland as archbishop of Armagh. His work on biblical chronology reputedly undermined the mythic line of Scottish kings and in the process Buchanan’s staunch advocacy of a contractual rather than an organic bond between monarchy and civil society (Ferguson 1998: 138–9). But Buchanan’s vibrant intellectual legacy, manifest in the contractual interpretation of fundamental law favoured by the Scottish Estates in 1604, resurfaced in the National Covenant of 1638.

Having ridiculed any supposition in the English parliament that Scotland should be garrisoned like a Spanish province, James I rather tactlessly made comparisons with Sicily and Naples, which provoked the Scottish Estates to temper their support for a British empire if it resulted in their governance by a Viceroy or Deputy. The more obvious, albeit implicit, exemplar was not Spain’s Italian provinces but the English dependency of Ireland. On the same occasion James had interpreted the fundamentals of *jus regis* to apply only to laws governing his succession, but the Scottish Estates insisted *jus* fundamentally related to the whole framework of government for the kingdom. Without *jus*, the key to civility as the natural bond of human society, Scotland could not be an independent kingdom. Such fundamental law, issued
usually with the consent of the political nation or sustained by immemorial custom, was differentiated from specific acts, statutes or customs made in different societies by the magistrates or ruler that, as lex regis, were alterable when required for the common welfare. The integral distinction between jus as a universal and lex as a relative concept was grounded in civil (or Roman) law. Its principal propagator was Sir Thomas Craig of Riccarton, the leading Scottish jurist and one of the joint parliamentary commissioners charged to negotiate the actual terms for union from 1604. As close agreement was apparent on the fundamentals of jus in both Scotland and England, Riccarton contended that there need be no insurmountable obstacle to the harmonizing of civil and common laws. James had admonished the English parliament in 1607 that the civil framework of government in Scotland should not be sacrificed by an imperial construct in which English common law would invariably predominate (Levack 1994: 213–40).

Despite Riccarton’s promptings on the joint commission, perfect union tended to be interpreted on the English side as the full integration of both government and laws. The more gradualist position in favour of political and commercial integration also came under sustained attack from vested legal and mercantile interests in the English parliament of 1606–7. The English had been required, when extending their authority in Ireland as later when arguing for closed seas around the king’s British dominions, to temper common law with civil law. Nonetheless, there was a marked aversion to accepting any innovative arrangement for union that neither accorded supremacy nor deferred ultimately to common law, the basis of their parliamentary privileges, religious liberties and rights of property (Peck 1996: 80–115). Four years of fitful negotiations by the joint commissioners foundered on the back of English concepts of political hegemony and parliamentary supremacy.

The strained resolution of Calvin’s Case under English law in 1608 accorded common nationality to all born within Britain since the regal union. In promoting this objective as attorney general for England, Sir Francis Bacon argued before the House of Commons that the benefit of conceding naturalization to the Scots was the undoubted association of the multiple kingdoms on English terms: that is, by assimilation through the spread of the common law rather than an accommodation with the civil law of Scotland (Wormald 1993: 154–8). In establishing the jus imperium of the Stuarts, James had propounded such an accommodation, which leavened the relativism of common law with Scottish legal fundamentalism. Bacon was arguing for an expansion of the composite English kingdom, not the creation of a composite British empire. The spread of the common law to Scotland would enhance the security of England by making permanent the ‘auld alliance’ with France. In arguing that British civility was tied strategically to English security, he was underscoring the case made by Camden’s antiquarian associate Sir John Davies, as Attorney General for Ireland, that the imposition of the common law would reduce that kingdom to obedience and cut off the threat of invasion from Spain (Pawlish 1985: 55–64, 84–100). Indeed, for Bacon, having Scotland united and Ireland reduced through the common law was the constitutional bedrock of English greatness as an elect kingdom capable of global expansion.

The extent to which non-anglocentric interests could be accommodated within the English body politic was the historic nub of the British problem (Macinnes 1999b: 33–64). The Stuart jus imperium was exclusive in asserting sovereignty free from the
interference of the papacy or other foreign power, but inclusive in the organic sense of involving not just England, but also Scotland and Ireland. The proponents of English greatness through the supremacy of the common law placed contractual emphasis on rights, liberties and privileges which were applicable to all freeborn Englishmen, but which were exclusively English at the expense of differing Scottish legal traditions or Irish customs. Both these perspectives were underwritten by antiquarianism that derived from Britannic legend. However, the formative role of the Anglo-Saxons in the constitutional history of England led Camden’s associate, Sir Henry Spelman, to play down British continuity from the Romans to the Normans. The rehabilitation of the Anglo-Saxon contribution, which could be represented chronologically rather than mythologically, led Richard Verstegan (alias Rowlands) to stress the positive civilizing influence of the post-Roman Goths in shaping the nebulous but ancient constitution of England (Kidd 1999: 77–87). Both the Britannic perspective favoured by the Stuarts and the Gothic perspective favoured by common lawyers and parliamentarians were undoubtedly anglocentric. But only the Stuarts, whose imperial vision ensured that Britain was always something more than England, sought a meaningful accommodation with the other constituent multiple kingdoms. For the English common lawyers who regulated government and parliamentarians who voted supply, Britain was England. The British problem, thus identified as rival Britannic and Gothic perspectives, remained a recurrent feature linking political thought to the political process throughout the seventeenth century.

IV

The Britannic perspective favoured by James I and continued by his son Charles I faced several obstacles. The rejection of full union in 1607 meant that there was no formal British executive or legislative to effect public policy for all three kingdoms; albeit the bedchambers of the early Stuarts afforded a measure of informal policy coordination which ensured that neither James nor Charles was uncounseled in British affairs (Russell 1994: 238–56). At the same time, the lack of a unified legal system required patents for honours to be issued separately for England, Ireland and Scotland which, in turn, inhibited the creation of a British aristocracy, notwithstanding the growing tendency of courtiers to hold titles in more than one kingdom. Despite the continuing hostility of the English parliament to the designation ‘Great Britain’ in its dealings with the crown, James I was notably intent on demonstrating his *jus imperium* by land and sea through foreign, frontier and colonial policies.

Treaties and marriage alliances were contracted on behalf of the crown of Great Britain and Ireland, not England; a pattern maintained by Charles after 1625 and only broken by the emergence of the Covenanting Movement in Scotland. With respect to the conduct of diplomatic affairs, James rationalized his ambassadorial service. Scots were accorded primacy in the crown’s dealings with Scandinavia and Northern Europe, while Russia and the rest of Europe remained the leading preserve of English diplomats; a division of labour also sustained until the emergence of the Covenanting Movement (Murdoch 2000: 44–89). Simultaneously, the espionage service became British. Sir James Hay, the Scot who headed the espionage service under James I, was ennobled in England as earl of Carlisle. Likewise, Charles I furthered the Britannic perspective of the Stuarts – not the process of anglicization
(Brown 1999: 238–65) – by awarding Scottish titles to English career diplomats such as Walter Aston, created Lord Forfar. Military contingents, licensed initially for Bohemia in 1620 and Germany in 1625 and then recruited formally for Danish and Swedish service in 1627 and 1631, intervened in the Thirty Years’ War as British expeditionary forces. Although the forces raised were predominantly Scottish and were led respectively by two Scottish courtiers, Robert Maxwell, 1st earl of Nithsdale and James Hamilton, 3rd marquis of Hamilton, they served willingly under British command.

Concerted executive action in London, Dublin and Edinburgh led to the implementation of four projects to civilize frontier areas: on the Anglo-Scottish Borders, Ulster, the adjacent western seaboard in the Highlands and Western Isles and in the Northern Isles of Orkney and Shetland. The cross-border policing of the Middle Shires which commenced in 1605 was reputed a pronounced success within four years; yet border disturbances were a continuous, if localized, feature over the next three decades. The plantation of Ulster, though not formally launched as a British endeavour on the forfeited estates of exiled Gaelic lords until 1610, had actually commenced on escheated lands in the east of the province at the behest of Scottish adventurers in 1606. The paramount need to promote economic recovery after decades of continuous warfare ensured that there was limited displacement of the native Irish outwith the ranks of the landed classes. The Gaelic lord, Randal Mac-Donnell of the Glens, ennobled as viscount Dunluce in 1618 (later as earl of Antrim), became a planter in East Ulster. The Scottish Catholic recusant James Hamilton, 1st earl of Abercorn, took his Irish title as viscount Strabane from his plantation in West Ulster. Their participation in the showpiece endeavour of frontier policy suggests the inclusion as much as the marginalization of Ireland in the Stuart empire (Canny 1991: 35–66).

The essence of frontier policy within Scottish, as Irish, Gaeldom was not to promote expropriation but primarily to expedite the pace at which the clan elite on the western seaboard would become assimilated into Scottish landed society. At the same time, James had clearly pointed the way for political advancement in Scotland and Ireland through acceptance of his British vocabulary. The principal beneficiary of the crown’s offensive on the western seaboard was the house of Argyll which was to the fore from 1607 in using the term ‘North British’ for Scotland and ‘British’ for colonists settling in Ulster. The British influence at court of Archibald Campbell, 7th earl, had been cultivated from 1604 by Richard Burke, 4th earl of Clanricarde, the head of the prominent Old English family, later an acclaimed if absentee governor of Galway opposed to the plantation of Connacht (Macinnes 1996: 56–87).

The annexation of Orkney and Shetland in 1612 was partly an extension of frontier policy, in that culturally distinctive Shetland customs were eradicated in favour of the standardized administration of common laws throughout Scotland. There was undoubted imperial symmetry in the imposition of Scots law over the Northern Isles to complement the imposition of the common law throughout Ulster. However, there was a wider imperial concern in annexing islands mortgaged to Scotland by the Danish–Norwegian crown in the mid-fifteenth century. Residual territorial claims on the Northern Isles gave Christian IV, the brother-in-law of James, the opportunity to claim exclusive jurisdiction over fishing in the northeastern Atlantic and to license access of English and Scottish whaling ventures to Greenland and Arctic waters.
Above all, the consolidation of the territorial waters around the British Isles into the Stuarts’ imperial dominions served as a practical rebuttal to the claims from *mare liberum* articulated by the Dutch jurist Grotius (alias Hugo de Groot) in 1609. It is also noteworthy that James preferred to rely on two Scottish jurists, William Wellwood and Craig of Riccarton, to sustain his intellectual case for *mare clausum* around his British empire (Fulton 1911: 338–75).

As the Americas were ‘beyond the line’ of international regulation in the first half of the seventeenth century, colonial policy was especially amenable to a British projection (Armitage 1997: 34–63). During the initial phase of American colonization there was a declared preference both within governmental and entrepreneurial circles for an identifiable Scottish venture to expand the colonial dominions of the Stuart monarchy. Thus, New England was to be complemented by a New Scotland to bolster the British cause against the French in North America. At the same time, Nova Scotia offered a distinct British alternative to Ulster, in which Scots law was utilized to implement and direct plantations at the former French base of Port Royal and in Cape Breton from 1627. Albeit the latter plantation produced the first pamphlet published in America extolling the virtues of British colonialism, Scottish entrepreneurs had one manifest disadvantage. Their interests were deemed expendable when their commercial aspirations conflicted with international diplomacy. Five years after the initial settlements, Charles I withdrew his support as the price of peace exacted by Louis XIII of France for abortive British efforts to relieve the Huguenots in La Rochelle (Reid 1981: 20–51).

Despite its abandonment as a plantation by 1634, the proprietal model under which Sir William Alexander of Menstrie (later earl of Stirling) was authorized to colonize Nova Scotia became the favoured means for promoting colonies outwith Virginia and Massachusetts. Thus, Barbados and the Leeward Islands were assigned under the proprietary control of the 1st earl of Carlisle from 1629. Although these Caribbean colonies were certainly English in terms of government, the character of their settlement can be viewed as British. Carlisle’s principal factor was his Scottish kinsman, Peter Hay of Hayston. Scots also featured in the London merchant syndicate favoured with leases of the best land in Barbados. The designation of a Scotland district on that island would suggest that place names related as much to settlers’ backgrounds as to geographic features; likewise more than English settlement is indicated by the subsequent naming of parishes in the Caribbean after the constituent saints of the British Isles (Dunn 1972: 49–53).

Notwithstanding his continuance of his father’s foreign, frontier and colonial policies, the Britannic perspective of the Stuarts tilted in a distinctive anglocentric direction under Charles I, a direction first signalled in Scotland by his promotion of social and administrative uniformity through his proved ill-conceived, technically complex and financially unproductive Revocation Scheme. His supplementary pursuit of economic uniformity through tariff reform induced recession in Scotland by 1635. At the same time, his common fishing policy provoked an outcry against Charles’s use of his British imprimatur, which the privy council in Edinburgh deemed particularly prejudicial since no union had as yet been negotiated with England (Macinnes 1991: 49–76, 108–13). As a further point of departure from his father, Charles preferred to rely on English lawyers, most notably Sir John Borough and John Selden, to uphold his *jus imperium* over the seas surrounding the British Isles. There were, however,
two representational difficulties. All maps accompanying the texts of Camden and Speed, as those by Blaeu and other Dutch cartographers, only recognized the waters of the Channel as ‘the British Seas’. Moreover, contemporaneous English maps were Dutch engraved, with the result that Dutch ships were depicted as sailing freely around the British Isles on open rather than closed seas! (Moreland and Bannister 2000: 217–23.)

The common fishing was an integral aspect of British uniformity associated with William Laud’s promotion of ‘thorough’ in church and state. Above all, the author- ization of religious uniformity by Charles under the direction of his archbishop of Canterbury unleashed pent-up dissatisfaction in Scotland that culminated in the termination of his prerogative rule in all three kingdoms. Religious and constitutional protest was not so much a reaction against misunderstood congruity (Morrill 1994: 209–37) as a concerted rejection of the perceived imposition of anglicization, Counter-Reformation and authoritarianism. Scotland, like Ireland, was being used as a political laboratory for the perfection of ‘thorough’ prior to its more rigorous enforcement in England. While Laud made no formal claims to ecclesiastical or political superiority, the court’s endorsement of British uniformity provoked the National Covenant of 1638. The willingness of the emergent Covenanting Movement to effect revolution through warfare, not only offered a radical corrective to imperial monarchy, but also initiated the one momentous Scottish check to the prevailing Britannic and Gothic perspectives in the seventeenth century.

V

The National Covenant established a written constitution that prioritized parliamentary supremacy within a religious and constitutional compact between God, king and people. It made a fundamental distinction between the office of the monarch and the person of the king which sustained loyalty to the house of Stuart, but not necessarily to Charles I. Buchanan’s anti-imperial notions of an aristocratic republic were also given force by the most radical aspect of the National Covenant: the oath of allegiance and mutual association. This oath, which was a positive act of defiance in reserving loyalty to a covenanted king, upheld the corporate right of the people to resist a lawful king who threatened to become tyrannical. Such resistance was to be exercised by the natural leaders of society through a centralized governmental structure that was dominated by the nobility but included representatives from the gentry, burgesses and clergy. As the corporate embodiment of the national interest, the Covenanting Movement, which was as much oligarchic as aristocratic or even baronial, reduced the power of the Stuart monarchy in Scotland to that of a cipher by 1641 (Macinnes 2000: 191–220).

Reinforced ideologically by French and Dutch advocates of the right to resist from the later sixteenth century, the Covenanting Movement was supported militarily and materially by Sweden from whose service Scottish forces were released to form Europe’s second national army (Grosjean 2000: 115–38). Adapting the Swedish model, the Covenanters created an army serviced by a centralized state structured to enforce ideological commitment, military recruitment and financial supply within Scotland and to seize the political initiative throughout the multiple kingdoms by direct intervention in England and Ireland. Implemented during the Bishops Wars of
1639–40, this structure provided a model for revolution in the other two kingdoms and remained in operation until 1651, when overtaken by the no less organized, if somewhat derivative, New Model Army effected in 1645, which later brought Oliver Cromwell to power in England. The Covenanting determination to effect the reconfiguration of the multiple kingdoms by replacing regal with confederal union was notably supported by John Pym, the parliamentary leader in the House of Commons, and formalized by the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, which exported Scottish constitutional fundamentalism to England and Ireland. In effect, the Solemn League represented an extension of confessional confederation to achieve common spiritual and material aims while maintaining distinctive national structures in church and state.

At the same time, the Solemn League and Covenant signposted a British confederal commitment by Scottish Covenanters and English parliamentarians to win the War for the Three Kingdoms, a commitment initially welcomed by Marchamont Nedham in his first edition of *Mercurius Britannicus* that August. In strategic terms, British unity entailed convergence of public policy rather than institutional incorporation; albeit one British institution did arise out of the Solemn League and Covenant. The short-lived Committee of Both Kingdoms, which projected itself internationally from 1644–6 as *Concilium Amborum Magnae Britanniae*, served as the co-ordinating confederal agency for British union charged to channel diplomatic dealings between the Covenanters and the parliamentarians (Macinnes and Ohlmeyer 2002: 15–35). To effect this diplomatic remit, redefined in November 1645 to include oversight of the war in Ireland as well as military collaboration in England, the committee would have required to operate as a federal executive – a role the increasingly Gothic English parliament was palpably not prepared to concede, as evident from the distinction it drew between supplies for the British and the Scottish forces fighting against the Catholic Confederates (Adamson 1995: 128–59).

The making of peace within the multiple kingdoms marked a further step away from confessional confederation. English intransigence, and internal divisions between the New Model Army and parliament, compounded tensions between the parliamentarians and Covenanters that were aggravated by the endemic hostility generated in the north of England by Scottish occupations during the 1640s (Scott 1999: 347–75). However, the Covenanting Movement was itself divided over continued intervention in England prior to the complication of Charles I handing himself over to its army in 1646. A radical element advocated withdrawal from England and alignment with Sweden against Christian IV of Denmark to open up trade through the Baltic Sound. The driving force behind British confederation, Archibald Campbell, marquis of Argyll, attempted to transcend such divisions in a celebrated speech to the Grand Committee of Both Houses in June 1646. The imperative of confederal action was maintained steadfastly. The English parliament should not negotiate unilaterally with Charles I, and the Scottish armies in England and Ireland should be supplied promptly.

Escalating public indebtedness, as well as the patent mistrust engendered by Charles I, were primary considerations moving Argyll and his associates to transfer the king from the custody of the Covenanting army to the English parliament for £400,000 sterling in January 1647. This transfer revived the Movement’s conservative element that covertly concluded the Engagement with Charles I to defend and
restore monarchical authority. The Engagement, which was the first Scottish-initiated effort to promote incorporating union, was terminated at Preston after a disastrous invasion of England in September 1648 (Macinnes 1999a: 43–55). The Covenanting Movement having effectively conceded the political initiative within the British Isles, Marchamont Nedham reported the resultant period of political transition through the pages of *Mercurius Pragmaticus*. With support from Oliver Cromwell, the radical Covenanters staged a successful revolt that culminated in the exclusion of the Engagers from public office.

News of the execution of Charles I, on 30 January 1649, sundered this collaboration. The immediate proclamation of Charles II not just as King of Scots but as King of Great Britain and Ireland, reasserted the international identity of the house of Stuart within the context of confederal union. Charles II was duly obliged to subscribe both the National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant prior to his coronation on 1 January 1651. However, his proclamation provoked the Cromwellian occupation of Scotland after the parliamentary forces had taken full advantage of the factional disarray among royalists and Catholic Confederates to conquer Ireland. With the Cromwellian forces triumphant in all three kingdoms by the autumn of 1651, enforced union all round was marked first by the Commonwealth, then the Protectorate of England, Scotland and Ireland. The deliberate avoidance of Great Britain for this incorporation denoted an emphatic rejection of both the Stuart vision of empire and the confederal conception of multiple kingdoms united by covenanting (Hirst 1996: 192–219).

The emergence of the New Model Army in England had not only marked a shift away from reliance on provincial forces, but also constituted a key moment in the establishment of an assertive English national consciousness (Wheeler 1999: 191–7). This sense of identity was enhanced through the conquest of Ireland and Scotland, conquests necessitated by the refusal of both kingdoms to accept the accomplishment of an English republic through regicide. Whereas the Irish were viewed as uncivilized and deluded, the Scots were chided as misled, even false, brethren who had strayed from the path of godliness. A sense of English superiority seems to have resonated throughout the New Model Army, particularly as the mutinous soldiers in 1647 viewed themselves as freeborn Englishmen placed between the people and parliament to mediate for justice and righteousness. While most of the English forces had accepted the invasion of Ireland in 1649, the Levellers had contended that this was a tyrannical measure of the type they had fought against in the civil wars. Others in the Army considered that England was not fully settled as a republic. With the quashing of Leveller mutinies and a formidable force of Covenanters and royalists uniting in a patriotic accommodation to support Charles II, there were few dissenting English voices to the invasion of Scotland in 1650 (Barber 1995: 195–221).

In projecting an exclusive Englishness, Cromwell went further than Elizabeth Tudor in pushing the frontiers of English hegemony to include all three kingdoms. Indeed, his regime’s recourse to Borough and Selden to assert dominion over the British seas surrounding the multiple kingdoms, his imposition of Navigation Laws in 1651, his treaties of commercial confederation with Northern European powers, his waging of the First Dutch War in 1652–4 and his seizure of Jamaica in 1655, denote Cromwell as England’s Gothic emperor (Woolrych 1986: 274–311). Propagandists with integrity such as John Milton and those without such as George Waller, claimed
that the Commonwealth, as later the Protectorate, was the true heir to British loyalty
originally vested in the Stuarts and then in the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643.
The refusal of the Irish and the Scots to accept the regicide were manifesttions of
their selfish sectional interests that ran against the commonweal to which England
alone remained providentially committed. No matter their aggressive behaviour as
conquerors, which Marchamont Nedham glossed over in Mercurius Politicus, repub-
lican commentators were shielded from self-criticism by the godly reason with which
the English under Cromwell had reconstructed themselves not just as a superior but
as a chosen people (Barber 1998: 174–201).

VI

The restoration of Charles II produced a constitutional settlement in all three
kingdoms, which revived the Stuarts’ jus imperium, but ruled out the confederal
conception of Britain and Ireland united by covenanting. The supplanting of confes-
sional by commercial politics was signposted by the imposition of the English
Navigation Laws (1660, 1671, 1681) and the resurgence of European mercantilism.
Although its political independence had been regained formally, Scotland, like Ire-
land, operated effectively as a satellite state over the next three decades. The Scottish
and Irish parliaments, like the Caribbean colonies, awarded a substantive annuity
from their excise to Charles II for life, an award that obviated the need for regular
parliaments to vote supply. While the continuity of military governors-general and
colonial administration has been well attested with respect to Ireland (Webb 1979:
329–466), Scotland became a training ground for the oppressive use of the militia as
well as regular forces. The ruling regime, most notably under James Maitland, duke
of Lauderdale, manufactured and exploited a climate of disorder over religious dissent
in the Lowlands and purported banditry among the clans, to promote the beginnings
of a military-fiscal state that served as a model for absolutism on the cheap through-
out the Stuart dominions (Macinnes 1996: 122–58). The revival of the Stuart
concept of British imperialism was more proclaimed than implemented, however.
Proposals for an incorporating union instigated by Charles II in October 1669 were
but one in a series of political diversions to facilitate secret dealings for an alliance with
Louis XIV of France.

In reality, restored Stuart rule over the multiple kingdoms represented a comprom-
ise between Britannic and Gothic perspectives. The former was highlighted by the
Dutch academic Rutgerius Hermannides in his Britannia Magna of 1661, which
chronicled English hegemony over Scotland and Ireland. The latter was articulated
forcibly by the Swedish jurist Samuel von Pufendorf who, in his Introduction to the
History of the Principal Kingdoms and States of Europe, came to view England as a
composite monarchy with Scottish and Irish dependencies. Charles II was carrying on
the mantle of Cromwell in maintaining English greatness through dominion over the
seas and the promotion of commerce. John Ogilby, a Scot who made his reputation as
a theatrical impresario in Ireland, stage-managed the coronation of Charles II as King
of England in 1661. Triumphal arches built by the city of London celebrated Britain’s
monarchy by buttressing loyalty to the Stuarts with the commercial clout of the
metropolis flanked by Edinburgh to the right and Dublin to the left. During the
actual ceremonial, the interests of Scotland and Ireland were discreetly represented by
the respective presence of Lauderdale and James Butler, 1st duke of Ormonde (Montaño 1995: 31–51). Subsequently moving on to cartography, Ogilby financed through public subscriptions a detailed survey of the main roads of England and Wales, which was published under the rubric of Britannia in 1675 (Moreland and Bannister 2000: 157–8). The anglocentric appropriation of Britain was further evident in the defence of the restored Erastian episcopacy bolstered by the purity of Anglican tradition and untainted by popery. The instigator of renewed claims for the spiritual and temporal supremacy of the English monarchy throughout the British Isles was William Prynne who, after a career as a religious and political agitator, was reconciled to Anglicanism at the Restoration (Lamont 1996: 119–45).

The prospect of Charles II being succeeded by his brother James, duke of York – an avowed Catholic intent on using his prerogative powers to remove penal restrictions on his co-religionists throughout the multiple kingdoms – instigated a further round of hegemonic Anglicanism. In vindicating Erastian episcopacy and the royal supremacy, William Lloyd, bishop of St Asaphs and William Stillingsfleet (the future bishop of Worcester) were essentially attempting to reconcile Anglican advocates of non-resistance, who had become identified with the Tories in the course of the Exclusion Crisis of 1679–81. At the same time, they were serving notice to the future James II, under sustained attack from Whig proponents of a contractually limited monarchy, that passive obedience should not be taken as political endorsement (Harris 1993: 9–27). However, their associated dismissal of the mythical progenitors of Fergus MacEarc provoked outrage in Scotland led by the Lord Advocate, Sir George MacKenzie of Rosehaugh, and the polymath Sir Robert Sibbald, for whom the unrivalled antiquity of the Scottish kings was the bedrock of Scottish independence. The Irish joined in this controversy. Roderic O’Flaherty, a dispossessed landowner, rebutted the Scottish interpretation of classical Irish sources and argued that Ireland, no less than Scotland, should be an independent kingdom in the Stuarts’ empire of the British Isles (Ferguson 1998: 144–72). Unfortunately, James continued to view Ireland as a political dependency despite his wholesale reliance on Catholic Ireland’s support in his struggle against William of Orange from 1688 to 1691.

As duke of York, James had played a key public role in upholding a Britannic perspective. The association of the Levellers with the ‘Norman yoke theory’ of arrested English constitutionalism had served to associate the Gothic with popular insurrections and civil wars at the Restoration. Nonetheless, the imposition of the Navigation Laws and the rise of London to global significance had facilitated a Gothic mercantilism as well as the English appropriation of the British Empire by cartographers like Richard Bloome (alias Nathaniel Crouch). Giving added force to the debate over the Stuarts’ jus imperium was the changing intellectual context. In contrast to the situation that prevailed in the aftermath of the union of the crowns in 1603, this debate was conducted primarily within the context of political economy rather than jurisprudence (Pincus 1998: 705–36). James was instrumental in using the prerogative powers his dynasty claimed by divine right to suspend or dispense with laws restricting Scottish and Irish participation in English ventures, whether in the Americas or the East Indies. The pressing of Scots into service in the Royal Navy and the conscription of Scots seamen to serve in the Second (1666–7) and Third (1672–4) Dutch Wars against their main commercial partner further encouraged a laxity in applying trading prohibitions. Having been awarded New York as a propri-
tery colony on its wrestling from the Dutch in 1664, James had been an assiduous and tolerant promoter of a durable Scottish and Dutch commercial network from 1673 that was based in Albany, named after his Scottish ducal title (Landsman 1998: 351–74). His opening up of participation from the multiple kingdoms in the Hudson’s Bay Company was reflected in the naming of the Bay’s eastern shore as North and South Wales and its western shore as New Britain (Moreland and Bannister 2000: 158–60).

The duke of York also attempted to moderate the Gothic mercantilism that sought to secure the fishing resources around the British Isles for English benefit. The Company of the Royal Fishery of Great Britain and Ireland established in 1661, which drew upon the expertise of agents involved in the common fishing of Charles I, was a Thames-led initiative regulated by the English common law. Having attracted criticism from the diarist Samuel Pepys that the money realized by lottery as well as public subscription proved more corrupting than remunerative, the company was remodelled in 1664. Its continuing operation was compromised by the existence of a separate Scottish initiative operating through provincial associations from 1661 that were recast in 1670 as the Royal Company for Fishery in Scotland. This venture, which stuttered on until 1690, remained distinct from and detrimental to the viability of the complementary Company of the Royal Fishery of England established under the duke’s leadership in 1677. Regardless of any resolution on respective territorial waters claimed for Scotland and England, neither company could operate independently of Dutch fishing expertise (Scott 1912 II: 361–82).

Whereas fishing was part of the debate on national improvement through commerce in England, it was integral to the debate on national survival in Scotland. As in Ireland, overtures for union with England also featured as issues of political economy. Scotland, however, had no equivalent to Sir William Petty who promoted union with England in order to facilitate social engineering, if not ethnic and cultural assimilation, through the transplantation of peoples (Kelly 1987: 236–63). When James established his court in Edinburgh during his retreat from the Exclusion Crisis in England, he reinvigorated Scottish endeavours for the targeted pursuit of colonies as the commercial alternative to union (Brown 1994: 58–87). In 1681 the Scottish Council of Trade reported that the only effective way for the country to cope with mercantilism and growing dependence on English markets was either to seek closer union or develop overseas colonies. James duly authorized Scottish ventures to South Carolina in 1682 and East New Jersey from 1685. The future James II (like his grandfather, he viewed his nomenclature as King of Great Britain) was the only Stuart monarch not to sponsor political incorporation – an understated issue in assessing subsequent Scottish support for Jacobitism after 1688–91.

VII

The ‘Glorious Revolution’ in England can be viewed as a triumph of Gothic constitutionalism and mercantilism: the Anglican ascendancy was confirmed, limited monarchy was consolidated and the Navigation Laws were reasserted comprehensively and exclusively. In Ireland, the replacement of James II by William and Mary established an Anglican ascendancy for the English interest which rigorously excluded Irish Catholics and Ulster-Scottish Presbyterians from public life. In Scotland, the
parliamentary deposition of James was unequivocally Whiggish. Notwithstanding the re-establishment of Presbyterianism, the Revolution was marked especially by the resurgence of radical constitutional activity as the unicameral Scottish Estates attempted to secure permanent checks on the executive power wielded on behalf of the British court. In turn, politicians favourable to the court used the prospect of union as a diversionary ploy to root and branch constitutional reform (Riley 1979: 27–33, 48–54). Albeit distinctive in each of the multiple kingdoms (Harris 1997: 97–117), the Revolution settlements effectively empowered baronial sectarianism in alliance with military engagements that were predominantly Francophone and with commercial opportunism on a global scale. The proclaimed Gothic achievement of constitutional monarchy in place of Stuart autocracy glossed over the continuation of the fiscal–military state instigated in the Stuarts’ dominions outwith England in the Restoration era. Ostensibly under parliamentary control from the Revolution, imperialism was moderated rather than contained by votes of supply and fructified by the creation of the National Debts in 1693 that was financed through the Bank of England from 1694 (Braddick 1996: 27–45).

The Revolution transformed a British empire based on the Stuarts’ royal prerogative into an English empire subject to constitutional oversight by the English parliament. Notwithstanding their establishment of the Bank of Scotland and their warranting of the Company of Scotland trading to Africa and the Indies in 1695, William and Mary could not endorse the Darien colonial venture as a rival to the English East India Company. William’s need for parliamentary supply, his desire to appease Spain and the expendable nature of Scottish interests as he sought to broker a military alliance against Louis XIV, conspired to reduce Darien from a confederation of Scottish, English, Dutch and Hanseatic commercial interests to a separatist endeavour. Though funded as a national enterprise, as a commercial compact between God and the Scottish people, surveying and provisioning were deficient. While English polemicists declared open season in ridiculing the audacity of Scottish enterprise, Spanish tenacity on the Panama Isthmus was wholly underestimated. Indeed, the Darien fiasco, which came to grief in 1700, was in no small measure due to misplaced British – not just Scottish – disrespect for Spain as ‘the sick man of Europe’ (Storr 1999: 5–38).

The political fall-out from Darien was the mobilization of Scottish public opinion against the court, which imperilled the continuation of regal union following the accession of Anne in 1702. Anglo-Scottish antipathy was compounded by a legislative war instigated by the Act of Settlement, which the English parliament had imposed unilaterally in favour of the house of Hanover in 1701. Scottish retaliation was two-pronged. The Act Anent Peace and War provided for an independent Scottish foreign policy on Anne’s death. The Act of Security threatened to dissolve the regal union unless the sovereignty of Scotland, the power of its parliament and the freedom of its religion and commerce were secured from English interference by Anne’s successor. Scottish retaliation was trumped by the Alien Act of 1705 and by the mobilizing of troops on the Borders and across the North Channel in Ireland. Along with the threat of subjecting the Scots to the same punitive tariffs as foreigners was an invitation to treat for incorporating union (Young 1999: 24–53).

The understated issue during the legislative war was the relative standing of the Irish parliament, which had accepted the Act of Settlement only to have its overture for
parliamentary union rejected by the English in 1703 (Smyth 1993: 785–96). Overt English interference post-Revolution that had damaged the wool trade, asserted the jurisdictional superiority of the Lords at Westminster and threatened the redistribution of forfeited Jacobite estates, had provoked William Molyneux’s *The Case of Ireland* in 1698. His assertion that Ireland was as separate and distinct a kingdom as Scotland from England, instigated a polemical debate which initially differentiated the independence of Scotland from that of Ireland, but then challenged the sovereignty of Scotland in relation to England as an imperial monarchy. Such were Scottish antipathies that the hangman in Edinburgh publicly burned pamphlets advocating English claims of suzerainty. The Scottish Estates remunerated published rebuttals. Alexander Fletcher of Saltoun, as a committed opponent of English influence on Scottish affairs, made much of the constitutional and economic slavery of Ireland (Robertson 1995: 198–227). Notwithstanding such polemical rhetoric, Scottish politicians generally preferred confederation or a federal arrangement. But the English were intent on parliamentary incorporation, which was facilitated by the Scottish sense of defatism occasioned by the Darien fiasco. The failure of the Scots to break out of the mercantilist prism made them more reliant on access to English domestic and colonial markets.

The accomplishment of parliamentary union signposted a collective crisis of political will among Scots to pursue a separate commercial agenda, not an entrepreneurial lack of ambition. The British nature of the empire was reasserted through Scottish networks within an English governmental framework. While the coalescence of political elites lay in the future, and full integration was never achieved with respect to the church, the law and local government (Brown 2001: 363–84), the Gothic realities of British state formation were expressed appositely eight days after the Treaty of 1707 became operative. On 9 May, Governor Thomas Handasyd of Jamaica was notified by the Council of Trade and Plantations ‘that Scotchmen are thereby to be looked upon for the future as Englishmen to all intents and purposes whatsoever’ (Macinnes 2001: 67–94).

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FURTHER READING

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