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Introduction

Substance Dualism and Its Physicalist Rivals

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To say the least, substance dualism has not enjoyed good public relations within academic philosophy, or for that matter, within related disciplines, such as psychology, biology, or neuroscience. So it is natural that some readers will want to know how, and even why, this volume came about. In this introduction – and more fully in the book itself – we hope to show that due to recent developments within the philosophy of mind, a renewed interest in historical and contemporary theories of the soul, and a more careful evaluation of what does and does not follow from neuroscience, substance dualism is back on the table for a serious critical reevaluation.

At the outset, it is important to be clear that, unless otherwise indicated by an individual author, this volume will understand “substance dualism” in a very broad sense that is by no means exhausted by the Cartesian variety. By “substance dualism” we mean the generic view that (1) there is a substantial self, soul, or ego that is immaterial and (2) that self, soul, or ego is not identical to the body and is the bearer of personal identity. Given the variety of theories about what constitutes a substance (or substance-like entity), substance dualism thus defined is compatible not only with Cartesian dualism but also with a number of non-Cartesian alternatives, including several varieties of Thomistic (or neo-Thomistic) dualism, Hasker’s emergent subject dualism, and the holistic anthropology of E. J. Lowe.

We will see that substance dualists and their many critics have been brought together by a shared focus on the nature of mental subjects. And, as much is at stake, including the tenability of the reigning doctrine of naturalism, it is not surprising that the debate is intense. From the beginning, we therefore felt that the only fair way to present this new development – the return of the subject to the center stage of philosophy of mind – is to construct a level playing ground of debate for all of the various positions and their critics, in hopes that readers can decide for themselves where the better arguments lie.
We will begin with a brief explanation of why this book is timely (Section 1.1), then review in more detail recent developments in the philosophy of mind (Section 1.2) and in scholarship on the soul (Section 1.3). We conclude by considering the broad implications of the return of the subject for the larger question of the tenability of naturalism (Section 1.4) and give a brief outline of the structure of the book (Section 1.5), followed by summaries of each chapter (Section 1.6).

1.1 An Inconceivable Book?

1.1.1 The official doctrine

Go back a few decades and the idea of a wide-ranging scholarly examination of the merits of substance dualism would have seemed outlandish. Dennett captured the mood at the time when he wrote, “it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one’s opponents” (Dennett 1978, 252). While in some cases incredulity about substance dualism has resulted from sophisticated but ultimately resolvable difficulties such as those raised by Wittgenstein’s discussion of private language (2009 [1953]), most professional philosophers are simply inoculated against any version of substance dualism by a seemingly unanswerable objection firmly impressed on their minds during their very first class. Descartes argued that the soul and body are substances of fundamentally different kinds, the one an immaterial, indivisible thinking thing with no spatial extension, the other a material, divisible entity that necessarily occupies space. A standard rhetorical question follows: how can substances of such fundamentally different kinds possibly causally interact, as Descartes maintains that they do? It seems inconceivable that items not sharing a common medium (space) could influence one another, and Descartes’s well-known replies to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia’s pointed questions on this issue look like the hand-waving of an ancien régime, about to be swept aside by a scientific outlook that has no room for the soul.

In his day, Gilbert Ryle (1949) complained that an essentially Cartesian view of the mind was still part of the “official doctrine” about the nature of consciousness. But for most twentieth-century philosophers of mind it was the perceived failure of substance dualism in general that deserves that title. It was assumed that Descartes’s version of substance dualism had been fully understood, found irredeemably flawed, and that other versions, if they were considered at all, were subject to the same fatal defect. The Cartesian vignette that has for decades adorned almost every introductory class in philosophy is one of many reasons that twentieth-century philosophy of mind was dominated by research programs that ignored an understanding of the conscious subject (apparently too much like a Cartesian ego), but instead focused on scientifically tractable aspects of cognition, such as the explanation of behavior and the relation between mental and physical states and events. While behaviorism soon fell, philosophy of mind embraced a physicalist research program, according to which mental states either are, or are entirely determined by, physical states of the organism. For many still today, the triumph of physicalism, as the attempt to integrate human beings into a consistent, scientifically grounded picture of the world, is so complete that the soul must be dismissed, along with epicycles, the humors, and phlogiston, as outmoded and redundant.
1.1.2 Fault lines in physicalism

How then, could substance dualism have earned the right to a serious, well-rounded, critical examination? To some, this will still appear as unmotivated as a contemporary reevaluation of alchemy. But the truth is far different from the simplistic narrative of Cartesian failure and physicalist triumph. One problem is that, while physicalism has generated an extraordinary variety of theories of the mind, they generally have serious, if not fatal, problems. Not only that, but there is also a recurring pattern of failure, that suggests there is something wrong, not with the specific details of a given account, but with the whole approach. In one way or another, these theories fail to capture basic aspects of the mind, such as phenomenal consciousness, intentionality, and even rational thought. They do not seem to capture accurately what it is like to feel pain, the fact that my thought can be about something beyond itself (including future, fictional, and even necessarily nonexistent entities that cannot causally explain the thought), or the fact that my thought can access and be governed by noncontingent norms of logic.

As a result, there has been a move toward theories of mind that embrace some version of emergentism, a nonreductive version of physicalism which allows that novel mental qualities and powers may emerge from the right physical base. But now some difficult questions arise. How far can emergence go before it abandons core doctrines of physicalism? At what point does emergence become a form of dualism under a different name, if it effectively concedes most of what dualists have maintained about the distinctive characteristics of the mind? That these are serious questions is shown by the fact that there are emergent subject dualists (Hasker 1999, and this volume), as well as emergent physicalists. We will explore the move from standard physicalism to emergentism in more depth in Section 1.2.

Another problem with our opening narrative is that scientifically minded modern people, including analytic philosophers, have often spent very little time investigating the soul. Perhaps a majority are unaware that there are many, quite different views of the nature and function of the soul. And even in Descartes’s case, reliance on a brief caricature may have obscured a more accurate and fair understanding of his theory of the soul. In recent years there has been an explosion of research on the soul, mining the historical sources, adopting some of their insights, but also proposing constructive modifications to handle well-known problems and objections. We will survey some of this thinking in Section 1.3.

1.1.3 The return of the subject

As it happens, these two threads – the fault lines in physicalism and the reconsideration of the soul – draw together in a fascinating sea change in the philosophy of mind. While standard versions of physicalism were largely atomistic, focusing on particular mental states and events, there is an increasing recognition that philosophy of mind must address the nature of mental subjects. One of the most puzzling things about conscious mental states is that they are intrinsically subjective and, of course, subjectivity requires a subject. For many, it is strongly inconceivable that thoughts and experiences be ownerless: there cannot be an experience of a sunset that is no one’s experience, or a thought that the sunset is beautiful that is no one’s thought. But if that is right, then thoughts and experiences cannot be understood as independent atoms: their nature and existence depends on a unified whole to which they necessarily belong. And, embarrassingly enough, the person who insisted on this point – that thoughts are not detachable from thinkers – was our friend Descartes.
A mental subject, it seems, is a basic precondition of thought, just as Descartes said, so
that Ryle’s behaviorism was guilty (quite literally) of changing the subject, by refusing to
speak of something essential to our mental lives. Attention to this fact has led to a
fascinating development in the philosophy of the mind in recent years, what we have called
the return of the subject. Even those resolutely opposed to the Cartesian paradigm
increasingly feel compelled to offer some account of the origin and nature of mental
subjects. Hard questions again arise. Can the subject be accommodated without allowing
Descartes an unwelcome revenge on his many critics? Jaegwon Kim (1998, 46) had already
noted that the same problem of causal interaction raised for Descartes at the level of mental
and physical substances reappears for non-Cartesian property dualists at the level of
mental and physical properties. But if everyone (beyond those eliminativists who
implausibly deny conscious phenomena altogether) must give an account of mental
subjects, it is not obvious that an appeal to “emergence” will save these accounts from
facing a question uncomfortably like the one posed to Descartes.

This is by no means a counsel of despair, partly because several philosophers have
pointed out that there is something wrong with the question. Hume taught us that there is
no logical connection between causes and effects, that causes do not even have to be like
their effects, and that we often have very good reason to think that two kinds of events are
causally related without knowing how. And Hume’s point seems correct even if one does
not embrace his view of causation.

If this is true in general about causation, then the fact that we lack a fully adequate
account of how mind and body interact does nothing to discredit the overwhelming prima
facie case that they do (Swinburne 2013). And critics of Descartes typically operate from an
event-causal paradigm that fails to take seriously the idea of substance causation anyway. As
Lowe (2008) and Swinburne (2013) have argued, if there are substances with basic causal
powers, it is much less obvious why a mental substance could not have the power to
influence (and be influenced by) the physical world.

In any event, there is no doubt that contemporary philosophy of mind has seen a major
shift toward an attempt to understand the mental subject, with book-length studies of the
unity of consciousness, the self, and the first-person perspective (Searle 2001, 2007; Tye
2003; Bayne 2012; Baker 2013).

Another of the hard questions is whether this return of the subject is really a good fit for
naturalism as the dominant approach to philosophy. One might raise the question of
whether theism is more plausible than naturalism as an explanation of the existence of
mental subjects. We will return to this theme in Section 1.4.

As the subject has moved to center stage, another development has been a broader
understanding of what may qualify as “substance dualism.” In this sense, not all of today’s
substance dualists would accept Descartes’s view that mental and physical substances are in
principle independent of one another. Some take the view that while mental subjects have
powers different from physical brains, the mental subjects are still ontologically dependent
on those brains. Others, though, side with Descartes or Aquinas, and allow that the
existence of disembodied souls is possible.

Whether this possibility is required to make sense of basic Christian doctrines, such as the
resurrection, is a major issue that divides Christian dualists (Loose 2012; Moreland 2014; Van
Horn 2010) and Christian materialists (Corcoran 2006; Murphy 2006; van Inwagen 2007).
More generally, every version of “substance dualism” in the broad sense is also challenged by
other philosophers, some more, some less sympathetic to standard physicalism. So this book
follows a debate-style format allowing a fair comparison of each position and its rivals (for a brief outline, see Section 1.5, and for summaries of the debates, see Section 1.6).

### 1.2 From Standard to Emergent Physicalism

It is not an exaggeration to say that the history of “standard” physicalism, that is, the largely reductive physicalism preceding the contemporary emphasis on emergence, has been one of persistent failure. Early attempts to understand mental attributions without postulating an occult ego suggested that, for example, to say someone was in pain was really to say something about certain characteristic body movements, such as wincing, crying out, withdrawing affected limbs, and so on. While behaviorism had several versions, a common complaint was that no alleged pain behavior was in all cases necessary and sufficient for pain (Putnam 1968). Spartans (or super-Spartans) may so train themselves as to emit no pain behavior despite excruciating agony, and method actors (or Italian soccer players) may be utterly convincing in the expression of pains they do not experience. This is not surprising since the most important part of pain is the quale – what it is like to feel pain – not the behaviors it typically produces. The point was made, in hindsight rather obvious, that mental states are causes, and one cannot adequately define causes exclusively in terms of their effects.

If mental substances are assumed to be out of the question, but mental states are causes, the natural next suggestion is that mental states are in some sense identical with physical states (Smart 1959). For type identity theorists, there is an identity between being in pain (as a type of mental state) with some physical type of state (with the firing of “C-fibers” standing in for whatever scientists tell us is the real physical substrate for pain). This idea did not survive long because it was soon realized that there are marked neurophysiological differences between creatures that experience pain, making it unlikely that the substrate for pain is the same in all cases (Lewis 1980). Token identity theorists thus proposed the more modest thesis that each particular pain state was identical with some physical state of the brain, and the identity might also be species-relative. However, the token view failed to explain what it is in virtue of which instances of mental states qualify as tokens of the same type and thus only avoided the problem of multiple realizability of particular mental states by undermining their identity conditions and thus their very existence.

But even if token identity theory were not flawed, the identity theory faced other large and obvious objections. Physical states can be completely described in an impersonal way and do not seem to be about anything. But mental states are inherently personal, having a subjective, what-it-is-like character (Nagel 1974; Jackson 1982, 1986). And they typically are also about something. For example, we may have a thought about Paris or a pain “in the foot,” indicating that the thought and the pain have intentional content. The Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals implies that mental states are not physical states because mental states have properties that physical states lack.

At about the same time philosophers of mind became dissatisfied with the identity theory, many of them fell in love with a computational model of the mind. In the 1970s and 1980s it came to seem almost self-evident that the human mind was much like a computer and a confluence of ideas from computer science, psychology, linguistics, and philosophy birthed the new paradigm of cognitive science. One of the attractions of the computational model is that computers can be understood at a variety of levels. It was thought that the main error of the identity theory was to view the brain at too low a level of abstraction. If,
instead of focusing on the physical hardware (or “wetware”), we move up to the level of its functional organization, we will get the high-level, abstract view of the brain appropriate for understanding the mind.

At first sight, this proposal, known as functionalism, seemed highly promising. Functionalism offered a simple solution to the main objection to type physicalism because, on the functionalist view, mental states are not identified with specific types of physical states, but with their functional roles. A common analogy was the mousetrap. The functional role of a mousetrap – a device that traps and kills mice – has multiple physical realizers, ranging from the standard 5-part trap to the most convoluted Rube Goldberg machines. In the same way, the functional role of a pain state – a state mediating impending or actual bodily damage and other appropriate states and behavior – may be realized differently in different species or even within the same species, due to developmental differences, brain damage, and so on. And the functional role is abstract, something different from ordinary physical characteristics, so perhaps this might also explain the failure of the token identity theory.

Unfortunately, it did not take long for skeptics to realize that functionalism was, in a way, a sophisticated, internalized version of behaviorism. Among many problems raised, the most decisive is that a functionalist theory of pain can be realized by a robot that does not feel pain and whose states are not about anything. Early on Ned Block (1978) pointed out that if all that matters for the mind is having the right functional roles, then if a crowd of billions of people emulate every functional role of the neurons in their brain, the crowd must have its own consciousness and mental states, over and above those of each member of the crowd. But we judge this to be obviously false.

A variant of the same problem arises in functionalist attempts to explain away qualia in terms of powers to discriminate. For example, perhaps all we mean by our ability to distinguish green qualia and red qualia is that we have the power to discriminate between two stimuli. But this is again obviously false since a robot can be equipped with a device that distinguishes the different wavelengths of light and which is programmed to behave differently in the two cases, but no one thinks the robot has a conscious experience of red or green, or knows what it is like to be appeared-to-redly or appeared-to-greenly. This problem of accounting for the subjectivity and intentionality of mental states continues to afflict the most sophisticated varieties of functionalism. In 1992, John Searle, himself a well-known critic of functionalism as a theory of artificial intelligence (Searle 1980, 1983) looked back at the dismal state of affairs.

The most striking feature is how much of mainstream philosophy of mind of the past fifty years seems obviously false. I believe there is no other area of contemporary analytic philosophy where so much is said that is so implausible . . . In the philosophy of mind, obvious facts about the mental, such as that we all really do have subjective conscious mental states and that they are not eliminable in favor of anything else, are routinely denied by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers in the subject. (Searle 1992, 3)

The take-away message from the decline of standard physicalism is that we cannot substitute physical or functional states for mental states without losing the very characteristics (phenomenal subjectivity and intentionality) that make the states mental. Fifty years is a rather long time to spend exploring alternatives to this (in hindsight) inevitable conclusion.
Given these persistent difficulties, philosophers have looked for weaker relations between the physical and the mental. The core principle of physicalism is the principle of causal closure (PCC).

Pick any physical event . . . and trace its causal ancestry or posterity as far as you would like; the principle of causal closure says that this will never take you outside the physical domain. Thus, no causal chain involving a physical event ever crosses the boundary of the physical into the nonphysical: If \( x \) is a physical event and \( y \) is a cause or effect of \( x \), then \( y \) too must be a physical event. (Kim 2011, 214)

But PCC is at least consistent with denying that mental properties (and states) are identical with physical properties (and states). Initially, the most popular proposal was that the mental depends on the physical by way of supervenience (Davidson 1980; Kim 1982, 1984). According to the basic idea of supervenience (developed further in weak or strong forms), there is no mental difference without a physical difference, and so if we fix the physical facts, we thereby fix the mental facts. Supervenience is not identity, since it is an asymmetric relation. Two molecule-by-molecule physical duplicates could not be in different mental states (at least conceived in terms of so-called “individualistic,” or “narrow content”). But it is possible that the same mental state could supervene on different physical base states in different individuals. Hence, supervenience allows for the idea that supervening states can be “multiply realized” by different subvenient states.

It may seem consistent to claim that mental states characterized by subjectivity and intentionality supervene on physical states of the brain, thereby avoiding the problems besetting standard physicalism. But even if that is true, it looks as if supervenience guarantees that the mental states are epiphenomenal, since, as Kim has argued, granted PCC, the physical base states seem to preempt any distinctive causal contribution from the supervenient mental states – the so-called exclusion problem (Kim 2011, 214–220). Among the many apparent absurdities of epiphenomenalism is that were it true, it seems that no one could come to know it or convince anyone else of its truth, since on the standard causal theories of knowledge accepted by most physicalists, both of these achievements presuppose psychophysical causation, that is, that epiphenomenalism is false. And Swinburne (2013) has pointed out that if epiphenomenalism were true, no scientific test could confirm it, since we can test whether an intentional state has effects only if we can identify when someone is in that state, and we can do this only if a subject’s statement that he is in that state is reliably caused by the state, that is, only if epiphenomenalism is false.

Even if Kim’s exclusion argument can be avoided as some maintain, a more general concern is that supervenience is a highly obscure notion. Supervenience asserts, rather than explains, a systematic correlation between mental and physical phenomena, and this does not come for free out of a metaphysical necessity, because the correlation appears to be contingent. There is no conceptual difficulty in the idea that our physical duplicates in other possible worlds are “zombies” with no conscious states or have inverted qualia (feeling pain when we feel pleasure, etc.). Even if, in our world, psycho-physical laws govern the correlations between physical base states and supervening mental states, those laws themselves are metaphysically contingent, and so we need an explanation of why the correlations obtain.

For these and other reasons, it has become more popular among those sympathetic with physicalism to suggest some version of emergentism. Emergentism typically maintains that there is a causal relation between physical base states and resulting mental states. So the idea
is that, in some sense, brains can generate mental states. However, not much is gained by the mere assertion of emergence. For one thing, if Kim is right, the exclusion problem can be reapplied to emergent physicalism (Kim 2006). This creates the dilemma that if the emergent physicalist maintains PCC, he must embrace epiphenomenalism, but if instead he asserts that the mind has novel and independent causal powers, he is rejecting PCC and can no longer claim to be a physicalist.

But even if this argument can be avoided – and again, the matter is disputed – the mere assertion of emergence does not really account for the subjectivity of mental states, and this for two reasons. First, there is simply nothing about the physical base states that predicts or even suggests the emergence of states characterized by subjectivity, and, in a dialectical context that includes dualist rivals, the physicalist cannot simply assert that this is a brute fact. It is a contingent fact with multiple, competing explanations, and the physicalist must therefore show that his explanation is the best. Second, and more fundamentally, subjectivity cannot arise unless a subject emerges, and so the real problem is not simply accounting for this or that mental state but for the mental subject to which all those states belong.

At this point, it has become clear, at least to those with some dualist sympathies, that standard physicalism does not supply the resources needed to account for the existence of mental subjects. This is because the physical brain is a complex aggregate of parts in external relations. But subjects seem to have a unity (they are what all of a certain set of thoughts have in common) and the relationship between thoughts and their subject seems to be internal, since it apparently makes no sense to speak of ownerless thoughts or of another person thinking the very same thought that I am thinking, even if she agrees with me, and has a qualitatively identical thought with the same intentional content and associated qualia. Similar problems arise when we consider a mental subject’s persistence over time. In a simple action of confirmation, for example, confirming my hypothesis that I left the window open, it seems that the subject that discovers that the window is open at time \( t \) must be the same as (i.e., identical to) the subject that entertained the hypothesis that it was open at time \( t-k \). Otherwise it would be as if I thought the window was open, then ceased to exist, and another person, Jack, discovered that the window was open. I do not survive long enough to confirm the hypothesis, and Jack cannot confirm a hypothesis he never entertained.

If we are to take seriously the idea of a subject that owns thoughts at and over time, we must therefore have an illuminating account of mental subjects. Physicalists who have realized this have therefore put considerable effort into developing more sophisticated accounts of the relationship between the brain and the mind, in the hope that they can make more plausible the emergence of a first-person perspective from impersonal gray matter.

Several theories have emerged in recent years which take psychological subjects seriously but attempt to locate them in a broadly physical context. Animalists like van Inwagen (2007) and Olson (2007) maintain that persons are human animals, and so for them the unity and identity of mental subjects are rooted in the unity and identity of particular biological organisms. Constitutionalists like Baker (2001, 2013) and Corcoran (2006) disagree, arguing that persons and living human bodies have different persistence conditions. Being a person requires having intentional states and a first-person perspective which some living human beings lack, so while persons depend on living human bodies, a human can persist when a person does not. As a statue may be constituted by, yet not identical with, a piece of marble, so a person is constituted by, but not identical with, a living human body. Others, like Nancey Murphy (2006), pursue the basic idea of nonreductive materialism (emergent monism) and try to explain in more detail under what conditions mental subjects
can be expected to emerge. Likewise Tim O’Connor, while a theist, holds out for a view of human persons on which unified mental subjects emerge under the right kind of physical conditions (O’Connor and Jacobs 2003; O’Connor and Wong 2005).

1.3 The Soul Reconsidered

As the self has moved to center stage some have wondered if alternatives to Descartes’s view of the soul might be worth a second look (see Goetz and Taliaferro 2011 for a historical survey, Baker and Goetz 2011 for a wide-ranging discussion of how the soul might be integrated with modern science, and Moreland 2009 and 2014 for a recent defense of the soul). The idea of a soul is often ridiculed on the grounds that the soul is not located in space, and therefore, even if it has causal power, there is no reasonable explanation of why it directly causally interacts with just one body. Why, when I want to raise my arm does my arm go up, and not Jeff’s across the street? Why, when I stub my toe, do I feel pain, but not Jeff? This is one example of the pairing problem frequently posed for substance dualism (Kim 2011, 50–54). But it is unclear that Cartesians have no response: perhaps souls have a primitive particularity or “thisness” that explains their particular causal powers as Swinburne suggests (this volume). And in any case dualists are not limited to the Cartesian option. For one thing, Augustine and Kant both maintained, contra Descartes, that the soul is located in space, but that the mode of presence was different than that of a physical object. While physical objects exclude all others from the same space, and only part of a physical object is located in part of that space, it is argued that all of the soul is present in any part of the living body, so that a pain whose physical source is localized in part of the body—say the toe—is nonetheless experienced by the whole soul. It is not so obvious why such a soul could not causally interact with its body.

But some dualists have followed Aristotle and Aquinas, and asked whether the soul should really be conceived of as a mental substance in the terms of Augustine or Descartes. Perhaps the soul is the “substantial form” of a living human person, that which grounds a person’s existence as a rational animal of a certain kind. Like the animalist view, the unity and persistence of the person is rooted in a fact about the living organism. But unlike animalism, the Thomist view is open to the possibility that the soul, understood as a substantial form, can survive the death of the body by continuing to subsist.

As these historic alternatives to Cartesian dualism are given renewed attention, some scholars have also developed revised versions. Alongside modified Cartesianism (Swinburne 2013), there are neo- or quasi-Thomistic positions (Moreland 2014), and Goetz and Taliaferro (2008, 64–69) also consider the merits of the Augustinian/scholastic/Kantian view of the soul. Doubtless there are other possibilities, but even if the quick dismissal of Descartes were justified, the important point is that just as physicalists are now exploring a wide variety of alternatives to standard physicalism, dualists have an equally rich reservoir of theories of the soul on which to draw.

1.4 The Return of the Subject: Broad Implications for Naturalism

The three developments just described—the decline of standard physicalism, the rise of emergent physicalism, and renewed interest in historic treatments of the soul—can, broadly speaking, be taken to point in the same direction. That is, they all suggest that we cannot
hope to understand our mental life without giving a coherent account of the mental subject. In many ways, this is an exciting and constructive development, because it means that the thinking of dualists and nondualists increasingly overlaps and there should be many opportunities for each perspective to learn from the other.

At the same time, this development also sharpens some of the hard questions mentioned earlier, and leads us to more momentous questions about the status of naturalism in philosophy. On the one hand, it is possible that the less restrictive versions of physicalism now in vogue will begin to solve the problems that beset standard physicalism, and this will strengthen the case for naturalism. But on the other hand, there is a serious risk that these new versions of physicalism, by accepting and accommodating more facts about mental subjects, become indistinguishable from dualism, and also not a good fit for naturalism.

As J. P. Moreland (2008, 2009) has argued, the more that mental characteristics – qualia, the unity of consciousness, intentionality, and rationality – are recognized as sui generis emergents, the less acceptable it becomes for naturalism to pose as the sole plausible explanation. If reductive physicalism had been successful, it would be obvious that our mental lives are an unproblematic part of the natural world. But since reductive physicalism has failed, and, according to nonreductive emergent schemes, there is simply a contingent causal relation between physical states of the brain and mental phenomena, emergent physicalism appears to assert a large number of psychophysical correlations as brute facts. And since they are brute facts, the emergent physicalist cannot claim that our mental lives are such as to be expected, given what we know about the physical states of our brains (viewed both synchronically and diachronically). Thus, if theism, as a major competitor to naturalism, can offer a plausible explanation of these correlations, but emergent physicalism fails to do so, theism is, on this score at least, more plausible than naturalism. It is arguable that if reality has always included a conscious mind with intrinsic subjectivity, intentional states, and goal-directed rationality, namely, God, the existence of finite beings with similar minds is much more to be expected than on the basis of the interactions of unconscious, nonintentional, nonrational matter, governed by purely external impersonal relations and undirected causal processes.

One philosopher who is aware of this dialectical situation is Thomas Nagel (2001, 2012). The situation does not merely concern consciousness, but also arises for objective reason and the nature of moral obligations. To the extent that naturalists concede that consciousness, objective reason, and moral obligations cannot be reduced to the world as described by natural science, and therefore must simply emerge, it seems that naturalists will continue to multiply the number of brute facts and correlations, thus creating an opportunity for theism to demonstrate its superiority over naturalism if it can provide plausible explanations of these facts and relations.

Nagel himself has attempted to avoid this (for him) unwelcome outcome by adopting a dismissive strategy. For example, he points out that we cannot find a higher standard outside of objective reason by which to justify it. For if we attempt to explain why our reason has necessary and universal validity, our explanation will itself assume such reason and so cannot provide independent warrant for accepting our reason as objectively valid. The same strategy could be adapted to dismiss the demand for an explanation of moral obligations: any attempt to justify the moral “point of view” will appeal to moral principles that assume that point of view. And, it might be argued that if human consciousness is mysterious, it does not help to diminish the mystery simply to invoke the existence of another being (God) who is conscious.
However, it is arguable that this dismissive strategy does not accurately reflect the dialectical situation. Certainly one cannot justify logic by logic, moral norms by moral norms, or consciousness by consciousness. But the real issue concerns the contingent exemplification of these characteristics. As a matter of contingent fact, there exist finite creatures that can access universal principles of logic and morality and that are conscious. There are plenty of possible worlds in which no such creatures exist. So now the question looms as to whether naturalism or theism is the better explanation of the existence of a world that does contain such creatures. The existence of a rational, moral, conscious being who wishes to create finite beings in His own image then offers an explanation of the existence of such beings that is arguably more plausible than the naturalist’s assertion that such creatures simply emerged.

It is plausible that as emergent physicalism draws closer to dualism in its concern to account for mental subjects, one can expect a strenuous debate precisely because many realize (or have sensed) that the credentials of naturalism (and theism) are at stake. If more sophisticated versions of physicalism prevail, naturalism can claim another advance. But if physicalism simply absorbs without explaining all of the data that theists have used to advance their cause, then naturalism will increasingly look ad hoc – a degenerating research program – and may begin to recede (Koons and Bealer 2010).

1.5 Structure of the Book

For the reasons given above, we think that a comprehensive study of the varieties of substance dualism (broadly conceived) is an exciting, timely topic. It gives an opportunity to hear out the full range of options open to substance dualists and alternative views, side by side with their best critics. With a few exceptions, this book generally uses a debate-style structure, pitting representatives of a given view against their critics. Thus, we first present the case for and against: emergent dualism, classical Thomistic dualism, neo-Thomistic dualism, and Cartesian dualism, together with debates on the evidential implications of the unity of consciousness and near-death experiences. Then we present the case for and against various alternatives to substance dualism, including: animalism, nonreductive physicalism, constitutionalism, and emergent individualism. Finally, and because many are interested in the related theological questions, we conclude with a section of debates on the best understanding of biblical anthropology in general, and of the Incarnation and Resurrection in particular.

We hope this book will be a valuable resource for scholars in a variety of disciplines (notably, philosophy of mind, psychology, and theological anthropology) and that it will be a useful reference for those interested in doing further work advancing the case for or against substance dualism.

1.6 The Chapters in Brief

Closing out the introductory section (Chapter 2), William Lycan, a committed materialist, helps to motivate the book by holding his own feet to the fire and admitting that standard arguments typically relied on to dismiss (Cartesian) substance dualism (SD) are not convincing enough either to set it apart from other philosophical theories or to put it at a significant disadvantage in comparison to materialism. An initial exploration of materialism finds no good arguments in its favor and discussion of nine standard
arguments against SD finds each wanting. Property dualism (PD) fails to avoid the majority of these arguments and it suffers from two further problems of its own. Thus PD is neither significantly less problematic than SD nor an acceptable and “less crazy” way to be a dualist. Lycan remains a convinced materialist but states that in doing so he does not proportion his belief to the evidence.

1.6.1 Articulating substance dualism

In the lead article for the next section (Chapter 3), Charles Taliaferro provides a general defense of substance dualism, conceived as the thesis that persons consist of at least two kinds of things. He articulates an integrative version of substance dualism that affirms the value of embodiment and argues that, contrary to the assumption of many physicalists, we have a clearer understanding of mental than of purely physical causation. Taliaferro further suggests that physicalist denials of irreducible subjectivity are incoherent as subjectivity is the noneliminable basis of the scientific model of explanation that physicalism privileges, and he develops a modal argument to show that persons are distinct from their bodies.

At the end of the section (Chapter 16), Ian Ravenscroft provides an opposing chapter, describing what he sees as the strongest general case against substance dualism. He begins by setting out some of the commitments of both substance dualism and its physicalist rivals before turning to a range of arguments in favor of substance dualism, all of which are found wanting. The argument from emergentism to dualism is also rejected. Three arguments against substance dualism and for physicalism about the mental are then explored. One argument against substance dualism is found wanting, but two powerful pro-physicalist arguments are explicated and defended. The latter arguments assess the relative explanatory power of substance dualism and physicalism and concludes that physicalism has vastly more explanatory power than substance dualism and is therefore on current evidence by far the preferred option. The design argument for theism forms a useful analogy for the argument from explanatory power against substance dualism, and is briefly explored.

In between these bookends, we hear the case for and against specific versions of substance dualism (in the broad sense).

1.6.1.1 Debating emergent dualism

William Hasker defends emergent dualism (Chapter 4). He makes the case that the major alternatives for understanding the nature and origin of the human mind are reductionism, creationism, and emergentism. Difficulties are pointed out for both reductionism and creationism, and it is argued that emergentism is the best of the three alternatives. It is then argued that emergent dualism is the most viable form of emergentism from both a philosophical and a theological standpoint.

In response (Chapter 5), Brandon Rickabaugh makes the case that Hasker’s emergent version of substance dualism has no advantage over nonemergent versions. After a careful exposition of Hasker’s views, Rickabaugh develops four main objections. Emergent substance dualism (1) lacks explanatory power, (2) predicts multiple conscious subjects, and implausibly suggests both (3) that there is a specific number of atomic simples in the brain requisite for a soul to emerge, and (4) that the combination of separable physical parts of the brain in external relations accounts for the unity of consciousness with mental faculties internally related to that consciousness as inseparable parts.
1.6.1.2 Debating Thomistic dualism

Edward Feser presents the case for Thomistic dualism (Chapter 6). Feser explains Aquinas’s understanding of the human being as a single, true substance of the kind “rational animal.” An explanation of substance precedes discussion of the complex nature of a rational animal. Feser defends Aquinas’s view that human, animal, and vegetative kinds of living thing are irreducibly different and notes that human capacities of intellection and will are immaterial. Given this, human death is “full body amputation,” leaving intact a nonfunctioning intellect and will, thus rendering persistence less than mysterious. Talk of the substantial soul existing by itself is seen to be a loose way of describing the truncated human after death. Aquinas’s view faithfully reflects our “weird” and complex human nature, thus avoiding problematic consequences such as imbalanced attitudes to sex that follow from alternatives.

In Chapter 7, J. P. Moreland presents a modified, Thomistic-like form of dualism, otherwise known as “Organicism,” and argues that it has certain philosophical and scientific advantages over physicalist treatments of the human person, and, to a lesser degree, advantages over alternate versions of substance dualism. Moreland then responds to a set of objections against his position.

William Hasker then offers a critique of both Thomistic and Thomistic-like dualism (Chapter 8). For Hasker, Aquinas’s view is attractive because it takes humans to be deeply integrated with their bodies while being both more than mere animals and capable of postmortem existence. However, he believes the view fails to integrate human beings with nature, to give human souls a sufficient role, to justify their existence adequately within the larger system, and to remain consistent with evolutionary theory. While Moreland’s modified Thomism addresses some of these points it remains inconsistent with evolutionary theory and must turn to vitalism. Hasker’s alternative way forward is to propose that human and nonhuman animals have souls of the same kind, to abandon essentialism about species and to adopt emergentism.

1.6.1.3 Debating Cartesian dualism

Richard Swinburne (Chapter 9) presents a sophisticated case for Cartesian dualism. Swinburne notes that, as he stated it, Descartes’s argument for the possibility of disembodied persons fails because it conflates apparent logical possibility with metaphysical possibility. Although there is no obvious logical contradiction in “I am thinking without a body,” disembodied existence could still be metaphysically impossible because “I” refers to my body. Swinburne sets out to repair Descartes’s argument by appealing to a distinction between informative designators (like “H₂O”) and uninformative designators (like “water”), and argues that provided the former are used, logical possibility does reliably signal metaphysical possibility. He further argues that “I” is an informative designator because no one is as well-placed as I am to know how correctly to apply it. Using this distinction, Swinburne contends that it is metaphysically possible that while I am thinking now, my body is completely destroyed, from which it follows that a soul, but not a body, is essential to a person. Swinburne analyzes the nature of the soul and responds to several important objections to substance dualism. He argues that souls have a basic “thisness” which explains the conceivability of a different person having a life qualitatively identical to my own. He finds the interaction objection to substance dualism weak since we often know that very different kinds of things are causally related without knowing how, argues that experiments designed to refute mental causation actually assume it, and offers an account of why a
particular soul is paired with a particular body. Finally, he offers a thought-experiment to support the plausibility of the claim that humans have thisness: it is conceivable that a person should receive incremental brain transplants and at the end have a completely different brain, yet be the same person.

In his critique of Cartesian dualism (Chapter 10), Kim provides a careful exposition of Cartesian dualism and its main supporting arguments. He then considers Princess Elisabeth’s famous complaint that Descartes’s view makes psychophysical causal interaction unintelligible, and develops a related “pairing problem.” Kim argues that dualists cannot explain why the causal influence of a mind is paired with some bodies (and some other minds) but not others. Unlike the physicalist, Descartes cannot appeal to spatial relations to solve the problem, since he maintains that immaterial minds are not in space. But even if they were, it would not help, because spatial location does not individuate minds.

Then (Chapter 11), the late E. J. Lowe offers the alternative of an interesting non-Cartesian variety of substance dualism. He draws together three insights about persons: they are psychological (Locke), substantial (Descartes), and not necessarily immaterial (Aristotle). He emphasizes the simplicity of persons as psychological substances distinct from their bodies but (pace Descartes) also possessing physical characteristics consistent with simplicity. A particular body is mine because my physical properties supervene on its, it responds to my will, is known by me in a special way, and is located at the point from which I perceive the world. The simplicity of the self explains its unity at a time and justifies the ungroundedness of identity over time. This view of the self entails that neuropsychology has value as a source of facts about what goes on in nervous systems when they think or feel or act, while not providing an account of what constitutes mental states: “Thought can no more be, or be constituted by a brain process than a chair can be, or be constituted by, a set of prime numbers.”

1.6.1.4 Debating the unity of consciousness

Dualists often appeal to the unity of consciousness as an important datum favoring their position. In this vein, J. P. Moreland (Chapter 12) explores several theses about the nature of a unified consciousness developed by Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, and argues that they are best explained by some version of substance dualism. He defends William Hasker’s argument that materialism cannot account for the unity of consciousness and contends that Bayne’s “virtual phenomenalism” is inadequate, since if the “self” is only a stream of consciousness, there is no way to explain the fact that the contents of consciousness are inseparable parts of that consciousness. Moreland concludes by suggesting that resistance to substance dualism is fueled by its apparent theistic implications.

However, Tim Bayne (Chapter 13) is not convinced by the argument for substance dualism from the unity of consciousness. After rejecting as inconclusive the classical versions of the argument due to Descartes and Leibniz, Bayne considers the sophisticated contemporary versions of David Barnett, William Hasker, and Richard Swinburne. He contends that Barnett’s argument rests on a “mereological illusion,” that contra Hasker, a materialist can deny an atomistic view of consciousness, and that contra Swinburne, a materialist should deny that there must be a determinate fact of the matter about which candidate (if any) for a person’s future self is identical with that person.
1.6.1.5 Debating near-death experiences

Could the widely reported cases of near-death and out-of-body experiences (NDE/OBE) support substance dualism by providing scientific evidence of the possibility of disembodied persons? Gary Habermas (Chapter 14) considers whether there is good evidence that NDEs support the claim that an immaterial human mind/personality/“soul” might function for at least minutes beyond near-death states. After critiquing the recent negative position espoused by physician and scholar Michael Marsh, Habermas turns to descriptions of many recent evidentially verified NDE reports as samples of the 300 plus reported accounts. These include cases from inside the NDEr’s room, from outside the vicinity including long distances away, reported corroborated information from deceased individuals, NDEs witnessed by healthy individuals, and reports from blind NDErs. The essay closes with a consideration of potential challenges. Habermas concludes that the available evidence certainly appears to indicate that these experiences occur even after the cessation of measurable heart and brain function.

To the contrary, Mike Marsh (Chapter 15) critically reviews assertions that NDE/OBE offer proof of extra-corporeal existence when the brain is supposedly “dead” or “clinically dead.” Marsh argues that studies have failed to produce corroborative empirical evidence for these assertions and that it is unclear how the memory required for recall could be set down with a properly dead brain at that critical time-point. He suggests that NDE/OBE occur as subjects are regaining full conscious-awareness and are analogous to hypnopompic dream awakenings. He points out that most recollections are intensely geo-physical, anthropomorphic, banal, and illogical: they provide nothing revelatory about life without a brain, or importantly, about other supposed cosmic contexts. There is also a marked chasm, Marsh argues, dividing NDE and the associated conceptualizations of “heaven” from true, classical spiritual encounters with the divine: the former are inconsistent with dogmatic (Christian) understandings of the afterlife and are decidedly not excursions of “souls” to some “heavenly” abode. Since prevalence rates are extremely low (< 1% globally), Marsh suggests that those undergoing NDE/OBE may have predisposed brains, genetically, structurally, or resulting from previous psychological stress.

1.6.2 Alternatives to substance dualism

In the bookend chapters of this section, Kevin Corcoran and Angus Menuge consider whether Christians should embrace some form of materialism about human persons. This view is often called “Christian physicalism,” although Corcoran prefers to use “physicalism” to describe more reductive views, while Menuge allows the term to include nonreductive varieties.

Corcoran (Chapter 17) argues that since Christians should embrace the truth, and materialism about human persons is true, Christians should be materialists. He then offers three main arguments in support of materialism. The aesthetic argument points out that materialism avoids a cleavage in nature that applies only to human beings. The biological argument holds that materialism gives a better account than dualism of the gradual development of consciousness. And the neuropsychological argument points to phenomena such as blindsight and phantom limb syndrome as revelatory of both the fine-grained dependence of conscious experience on the brain and the complex structure of what otherwise seems to be unified conscious experience. He turns to the hard problem of
consciousness, arguing that since phenomenal consciousness is fundamental and irreducible, certain kinds of explanation are unavailable in principle and it is likely that any explanation of how neural functioning gives rise to it may be forever beyond our grasp.

In his critique of Christian physicalism (Chapter 26), Menuge defines “Christian physicalism” very broadly, as the thesis that a human person is either identical to or constituted by a physical object possessing mental features that are either emergent from or reducible to physical properties of the brain. Menuge sees as the primary appeal of Christian physicalism (CP) its promise to reconcile Christian anthropology with a modern scientific worldview. However, Menuge argues that, being unable to account adequately for the first-person perspective or knowledge of the natural world, CP fails to ground human capacities to distinguish the self from the rest of creation, to grasp moral obligations, and to carry out plans to take care of the world; capacities required for stewardship of the natural world and thus presupposed by Scripture. Menuge also argues that these capacities are presupposed by science and that CP may not qualify as a physicalist view. If that is right, then Christian physicalism is insufficiently Christian and insufficiently physicalist and it cannot fail to disappoint those who rely on its promised reconciliation.

In between these bookends, we hear the case for and against specific versions of materialism/physicalism.

1.6.2.1 Debating animalism

Eric Olson defends animalism (Chapter 18), the thesis that human persons are animals of a particular kind. He begins by clarifying to what animalism is and is not committed. He asserts that animalism neither assumes nor entails a particular metaphysical theory about the nature of animals, and does not claim to be the whole truth about human persons. Olson’s central argument for animalism parallels a common argument for substance dualism. Substance dualists often defend their position by pointing out that in introspection, we appear to ourselves to be immaterial simples, and that even the strongest physicalist arguments are not strong enough to unseat this appearance. Similarly, Olson argues that we appear to be animals, that alternative views involve much more surprising claims, and that even the strongest objections to animalism are not strong enough to overcome it. In particular, Olson argues that dualist arguments from introspection only show that we sometimes do not appear to be animals, not that we appear not to be animals. Olson considers several other objections, including life after death, and brain transplants, and argues that none is sufficiently compelling to unseat animalism.

In his critique of animalism (Chapter 19), Stewart Goetz does not claim to provide a knock-down refutation, but argues instead that we have stronger intuitive grounds for thinking that we are souls essentially, and only animals accidentally. Even psychologists who are critics of substance dualism agree that it reflects the normal, default beliefs of human beings. We seem to be aware in introspection that, unlike bodies, we lack separable parts, and while there are well-known objections to Descartes’s version of dualism, they can be mitigated by supposing that souls are located in space where their living bodies are, but that they occupy space in a different way than those bodies (the whole soul is present in every part of the body). Goetz argues that a major problem for animalism is that it grounds the persistence of an animal in its life, defined as a complex event. If the subevents of this life are always changing, how exactly can one claim that it is the same life that persists, and how can one ground personal identity across time?
1.6.2.2 Debating nonreductive physicalism

“Reduction” is a notoriously slippery word, admitting of ontological, epistemic, and linguistic interpretations, and while it may be that all physicalists are “reductionist” in some sense, many would affirm that there are important ways in which a physicalist can be a non- or antireductionist. As a leading exponent of nonreductive physicalism, Nancey Murphy (Chapter 20) sets out to defend the view from common philosophical and theological objections. While physicalism is widely believed to be the only metaphysical account of human nature compatible with developments in neuroscience, it is a matter of serious debate in the philosophy of mind whether physicalism can avoid being reductive. On the other hand, while most lay Christians hold dualist accounts of human nature, Christian scholarship over the past century has increasingly called for the acceptance of physicalism. But if physicalism is to work theologically, then a successful argument against reductionism is required. Murphy first argues that biblical and theological objections to physicalism can be countered. She then illustrates how physicalism converges with cognitive neuroscience, and finally considers in some depth a new scientific paradigm, complex dynamic systems, that undermines the claim that reductionism is synonymous with the “scientific” approach.

In response, Joshua Rasmussen (Chapter 21) provides what he sees as an in-principle refutation of any form of physicalism, including nonreductive forms. While Murphy’s defense of physicalism is largely empirical, Rasmussen’s critique is more conceptual. He develops a counting argument, inspired by Cantor’s diagonalization proofs, to show that there are more mental properties than physical properties, and therefore that some mental properties are not physical properties. On grounds of uniformity, he then argues that there must be a categorical difference between mental and physical properties, and concludes that all mental properties are nonphysical. The argument is extended to show that mental properties cannot even be grounded in physical properties, in which case all standard versions of physicalism (which, at a minimum, assume psychophysical supervenience) are false. In the last part of the chapter, Rasmussen outlines how dualists can give at least as good an explanation of the primary data used to motivate physicalism. Taken together, Rasmussen’s arguments support a “basic mentality thesis,” which asserts that at the foundation of our nature is a mental substance.

1.6.2.3 Debating constitutionalism

Another sophisticated alternative to reductive physicalism is constitutionalism, ably articulated and defended by Lynne Baker (Chapter 22). Baker argues that it is not inconsistent with Christian Scripture or doctrine to hold to person–body constitutionalism: that what is essential to one’s existence as a human person is the possession of a second-order capacity for a robust first-person perspective; a second-order capacity to think of oneself as oneself, “from the inside.” On this view, a human person has different modal properties than a human body and is thus not identical with it, but rather is a distinct material object that is constituted by it. Baker claims that constitutionalism offers an account of resurrection that is consistent with Christian Scripture while avoiding problems associated with Thomistic and mind-body dualist alternatives. She also holds that it offers a better account of the Incarnation than mind-body dualism by maintaining the materiality of Christ’s human nature.

In his response (Chapter 23), Ross Inman develops several challenges for constitutionalism. If persons and bodies are atom-for-atom physical duplicates then four problems
emerge. (1) How are the modal differences of persons and bodies to be grounded to establish that they are distinct objects? An appeal to relational properties will not do. (2) How many thinkers are there? If human organisms cannot think then, implausibly, zombies are real; if they can (as Baker argues) then there are two thinkers for every human person. In arguing that we can nevertheless count them as one, Baker further increases the view’s unacceptable metaphysical price tag. (3) On constitutionalism, it is necessary to reject Andrew Bailey’s independently plausible priority principle – that human persons possess all of their mental properties in the primary and nonderivative sense. (4) Baker cannot maintain the ontological uniqueness of human persons given that both higher nonhuman animals and human infants possess first-person perspectives. Her attempt to do so only serves to undercut her account of personhood.

1.6.2.4 Debating emergent individualism

Yet another view is emergent individualism, which holds that individual subjects are radically emergent phenomena. Timothy O’Connor (Chapter 24) maintains that persons, who have the natural potential for subjective awareness, intrinsic intentionality, and intentional action, are emergent individuals. On this view, people are wholly physically composed and yet they exhibit higher order properties that, though not basic, are fundamental: persons have “new” causal powers, powers not possessed by the physical systems that compose them, including free will in a robust, libertarian sense. To make sense of this, O’Connor develops a particular version of the substratum-attribute theory of objects, defends it against objections, and applies it to human persons. He ends the chapter by recognizing that for persons, the substratum theory seems inadequate, since that theory is designed to attach substrata to universals, not particular objects. And yet, without substrata, O’Connor worries that (emergent) substance dualism may be the only reasonable alternative.

In a friendly critique (Chapter 25), Robert Koons argues for the superiority of Thomistic hylomorphism over emergent individualism. Koons provides a helpful conceptual map to show the main differences between nonreductive accounts of human persons. He then develops three reasons for preferring hylomorphism to emergent individualism. First, he argues that a top-down model of de-escalation (division of substances) is more plausible than the emergentist idea that coherent substances emerge bottom-up from many independent parts, and that de-escalation is a good fit with the hylomorphic view that substantial forms make a difference to what the parts of a composite substance do. Against many critics, Koons contends that hylomorphism gives a superior account of the possibility of disembodied existence between death and resurrection. Finally, he argues that appeal to formal causes operating through bodily instruments provides a better account of mental causation than emergent individualism’s downward causation.

1.6.3 Substance dualism, theology, and the Bible

The editors realize that for readers primarily interested in mainstream philosophy of mind, theological concerns about the compatibility of various theories with Scripture may not be of much interest and in deference to such readers have placed this shorter section at the end of the book. Yet, for very many theologians, Bible scholars, Christian apologists, and philosophers – including many contributors to this volume – these concerns are of the utmost importance. So we round out our Companion with due consideration for biblical issues.
1.6.3.1 Debating biblical anthropology

John Cooper defends a holistic and dualist biblical anthropology (Chapter 27). He challenges the contemporary claim that Plato’s influence caused the Church Fathers mistakenly to adopt body-soul dualism rather than monism. Exploring in detail the influential work of eminent scholars Joel Green and N. T. Wright, Cooper affirms biblical holism with them but challenges their claim that holism is inconsistent with dualism. While Green affirms essential embodiment and thus a view inconsistent with postmortem existence, Wright affirms the two-stage biblical eschatology that grounds dualism but holds to ontological holism instead. However, their key arguments against dualism are “compromised by problematic hermeneutics, conceptual confusions and faulty reasoning.” Furthermore, Scriptural accounts of both humanity’s creation and a relationship with God between death and bodily resurrection are inconsistent with monism and establish a dualism compatible with holism.

In response, Joel Green (Chapter 28) wonders why “soul” is vanishing from English translations of the New Testament (NT). He argues that the term reflects an anthropological dualism influenced by Plato that is mistakenly read into the text. Historical inquiry has uncovered both the important monistic influence of the content and theological trajectories of Israel’s Scriptures on NT authors and the diverse conceptions of “soul” operative in the NT world. Other sociocultural forms of inquiry also suggest holistic anthropology and there are now better ways to understand anthropological terminology that were previously taken as an obvious indicator of a partitive view. The vanishing of soul enables readers of the NT to engage in a richer theological exploration of the nature of embodied, situated human life.

1.6.3.2 Debating the incarnation

Luke van Horn (Chapter 29) contends that, in debating philosophical anthropology and mind, Christian philosophers have not yet paid enough attention to Christ’s Incarnation. Van Horn contends that the Incarnation is inconsistent with materialism about human beings. While several materialist accounts of the Incarnation have been proposed, Van Horn argues that they face serious metaphysical objections and tend to revive ancient heresies like Nestorianism, according to which Christ consists of two distinct persons. He goes on to argue that substance dualism has the resources to avoid these (and other) objections, and hence that Christians should prefer substance dualism to materialism.

To the contrary, Trenton Merricks (Chapter 30) claims that dualism cannot give a credible account of the Second Person of the Trinity being embodied in Jesus of Nazareth. He argues that dualist accounts of what it means for an immaterial being to control a body lead to absurd conclusions: we are disembodied if our soul is not exercising control over the body; all three Persons of the Trinity are embodied in every human being; and becoming human does not imply having a human body. Merricks suggests that a physicalist view of the Incarnation gives a simpler account of embodiment that solves several problems facing dualists. He is aware of critics who argue that it is metaphysically impossible for an immaterial being to become a material being, but counters that this assumes kind essentialism – if something is an object of a particular kind, it is essentially of that kind – and gives reasons to resist this thesis.

1.6.3.3 Debating the general resurrection

At the end of the book, we consider the end times and whether dualism or materialism offers the best account of the general resurrection. Jonathan Loose (Chapter 31) begins by
pointing out the advantages of dualism in accounting for personal identity across the bridge of death to the resurrection. An immaterial soul accounts for the highly intuitive “simple” view of personal identity – there is always a determinate fact of the matter about whether two individuals are the same person – and makes it easy to see how the very same person who died can live again. But materialism typically endorses a complex view of personal identity – which suggests identity can be indeterminate – and seems to entail a gap between death and new life that no person can cross. However, several materialist models of the resurrection have been proposed. Loose critiques Peter van Inwagen’s “simulacrum” model and Dean Zimmerman’s “falling elevator” model, and argues that Lynne Baker’s constitutional theory is also unable to meet the challenge. He therefore concludes that if there are no better materialist proposals, believers in the Resurrection should be dualists.

The last word on the end times goes to Peter van Inwagen (Chapter 32). He begins by noting that our popular culture encourages unbiblical ideas of the afterlife, and questions whether dualism is required to make sense of the Resurrection. Certainly, the biblical perspective is not the Platonic one that the body is a prison-house and that disembodied existence is ideal. On the other hand, van Inwagen concedes that there are serious difficulties in the idea that God can simply reassemble a person who was made of different particles at different times. Van Inwagen does not claim to offer a definitive justification of a materialist resurrection – the equivalent of a theodicy for the problem of evil – but instead offers a defense to show that materialism is consistent with the Resurrection. While admitting that his “simulacrum” model has won few adherents, he defends it against objections as a “just-so-story” that shows that a materialist resurrection is conceivable, and argues that it is less problematic than the alternatives proposed by Baker and Zimmerman.

We hope that you will benefit from the rich interchange that follows!

References