Initially appearing in the early 1940s, Daseinsanalysis was the first systematic approach to existential psychotherapy and arguably remains the most comprehensive, decidedly ontological approach in today’s community of existential thinkers and practitioners. The original architects of Daseinsanalysis were two Swiss psychiatrists, Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966) and Medard Boss (1903–1990), both of whom who were personally acquainted with the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), to whom the approach unquestionably owes its very existence. Binswanger and Boss, each in their own way, fashioned their versions of Daseinsanalysis as an existential-ontological revisioning of Freud’s psychoanalysis, drawing on Heidegger’s phenomenological, hermeneutic analysis of the human being called Daseinsanalytik.

A Preliminary Overview

The term Daseinsanalysis refers to the analysis of human being, of what it is to be human. Heidegger used the term Dasein from the everyday German term meaning presence, existence, or being to designate human being. Heidegger interpreted Da-sein, literally “there-being,” as that distinctive kind of being who is capable of understanding being, including its own being, and who exists as being-in-the-world and inseparable from it. Though an uninviting term for many English speakers, the word Da-sein has the potential advantage of stripping away hidden, sedimented biases and assumptions that might come with the English words “human being.” As for the second part of the compound, “analysis” is not carried out, as is commonly imagined, in the interest of dissecting or reducing things to smaller or separate units as it is in the natural sciences but, rather, for the purpose of loosening up or unraveling (from the Greek, analyein) the original-most meaning of things, emancipating wider, more
authentic possibilities of human existence. As Heidegger (1987/2001, p. 115) pointed out, it was first used to describe Penelope’s unraveling of her weaving and was also used, most aptly for psychotherapy, to describe the untying of the ropes of a prisoner or slave when being freed. Such an understanding of analysis discloses the fundamental nature and purpose of Daseinsanalysis as an essentially emancipatory, hermeneutic process releasing human beings to take up their right to be and to embrace their own possibilities for fuller, freer, more authentic ways of being in the world.

The earliest formulation of Daseinsanalysis belongs to Binswanger, who sought to develop a more adequate scientific foundation for psychiatry and psychopathology. A colleague, friend, and admirer of Sigmund Freud since first meeting him in 1907, Binswanger turned to phenomenology to provide a philosophical foundation for understanding the human being in psychology and psychoanalysis. Initially influenced by Edmund Husserl, Binswanger later turned to Martin Heidegger’s analysis of human being, called Daseinsanalytik, to formulate “a phenomenological hermeneutic exegesis on an ontic-anthropological level” (Binswanger 1958a, pp. 269–270) before returning to Husserl once again late in life.

Unlike Binswanger, whose primary interest was scientific, Medard Boss was concerned with developing a Daseinsanalytic foundation for therapeutic practice. Originally an aspiring but disappointed artist, Boss turned to medicine and became a classically trained psychoanalyst, beginning with some preliminary analytic sessions with Sigmund Freud in Vienna and going on to include supervision with Eugen Bleuler in Zurich, orthodox supervision and study at the psychoanalytic institutes of London and Berlin, and ten years of study with Jung. In the late 1930s, the senior Binswanger introduced Boss to phenomenology and the works of Heidegger, but, after contacting Heidegger in the summer of 1947 and meeting him in person in 1949, Boss adopted the philosopher as his only authoritative teacher, although adding to this the deeply compatible influence of Eastern wise men with whom he apprenticed in the 1950s.

The brief historical accounts given below draw from the experiences, perspectives, and, to use a quintessentially daseinsanalytical term, the “thrownness” of the author who, thereby, assumes full responsibility for its unavoidable biases and omissions.

Ancestry of Existential Psychotherapy

Although the term psychotherapy only appeared in the final decades of the nineteenth century (Shamdasani 2005), its etymology comes from the ancient Greek psyche, meaning soul, and therapeuein, meaning to attend, serve, or wait upon. Ancient precursors of what we today call psychotherapy appeared in the Asclepian temples in Greece in 400–500 BCE where the connections between illness, dream, and cure were firmly established. Over the ensuing centuries, many fields of human endeavor have tried to alleviate human suffering though their respective methods, whether they be religious, superstitious, philosophical, or scientific (Ellenberger 1970).

From the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism steadily progressed from belief and suspicion to science and reason. The end of the Renaissance produced two extraordinary intellects and humanitarians:
William Shakespeare (1564–1616) and Rene Descartes (1596–1650). Whereas Shakespeare exposed the might of our human passions, their triumphs, tragedies, and comedies, moving and inspiring human beings to this day, Descartes clung to a supreme faith in the human intellect, laying a ground for the entire future of Western science and philosophy. As valuable as the latter’s thought was for human progress, the dualism upon which it rested only rent the human being into two incompatible substances, a thinking thing (res cogitans) and a bodily, material thing (res extensa), but also tore human individuals from their fellow humans and their world by separating them into isolated minds, whole emotional worlds of experience entirely split off from one another. Contrary to the more unitive philosophies of the East, Western philosophy and science was plagued with this pernicious dualism.

Following in the footsteps of Descartes, the Enlightenment prioritized objective science, reason, the intellect, and cultural achievement over passion, the appetites, and the individual. It was not until early in the nineteenth century that Romanticism balanced the Enlightenment’s partiality to science, certainty, and the definable, by emphasizing creativity and the arts, passions and the irrational, mystery and the ephemeral. The Romantics embraced a deep feeling for nature and mankind’s relation to it and craved an understanding of the secrets of the human soul, including its most mysterious and enigmatic manifestations such as dreams, paranormal phenomena, madness, creativity, and genius.

Born in the wake of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, the nineteenth century brought the work of such writers and thinkers as Goethe, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Ibsen, Nietzsche, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Brentano, all contributing to the emergence of the three auspicious nineteenth-century intellectual developments, namely, existential thought, hermeneutics, and phenomenology, which are discussed in some detail in the introductory chapter of this volume.

1900: A Milestone Year

The end of the nineteenth century found philosophy and psychiatry in a crisis with respect to the study and understanding of human nature. The above mentioned philosophers, disgruntled with purely material, biological views of human nature, were hungry for a more essential view of the human as human, one that lay closer to the experience of being human, to what it really means to be human. Meanwhile, Sigmund Freud, a psychiatrist still in his mid-forties, was at the same time seeking to overcome the limitations of both neurobiological analysis and technical behavioral analysis with his new “science of the life of the soul” (Wissenschaft vom Seelenleben), called psychoanalysis, which sought the hidden meaningfulness of human suffering and shortcoming.

Then came the year 1900, the year of Nietzsche’s death and a year that was to hold momentous promise for the future development of existential psychology. This one year alone saw the publication of Sigmund Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), Edmund Husserl’s, phenomenological Logical Investigations (1900/2001), and Wilhelm Dilthey’s The Rise of Hermeneutics (1900/1996). With these publications in psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and
Sigmund Freud: Reluctant Doctor, Unhappy Philosopher

In spite of Freud’s indispensable contribution to modern psychotherapy, readers may puzzle over the fact that the phenomenological psychiatrists Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss would feel so indebted to a thinker who held appearances with such suspicion and invented a whole underworld of imagined psychological entities. Yet, in many ways Sigmund Freud was a quintessential existential man: anxious, willful, committed, self-conscious, meaning-driven, despairing and despondent, aware of the impermanence and transience of all living things, yet terrified of death.

As a child of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on science and reason, and Romanticism, with its fascination with mystery and the irrational, even as a youth, Freud was greedy for knowledge of the world, especially of the human world. As deeply as he wanted to be a philosopher, his financial difficulties and political circumstances at the time pressed him to the unhappy choice of medicine. Thus, as the hermeneutic psychoanalyst Paul Ricoeur put it, Freud always found himself torn between “two universes of discourse: the discourse of meaning and the discourse of force” (1970, p. 92).

Freud’s pre-ontological understanding of human being

Although Binswanger and Boss both recognized how hobbled Freud was by his natural scientific training and assumptions, they were steadfastly impressed by the underlying intuitive insights upon which his often absurd theories rested, what we might call Freud’s pre-ontological understanding regarding the meaningfulness, the hiddenness, and the historical and relational situatedness of human existence.

On meaningfulness  In spite of his naturalistic theories about human nature, when Freud declared that all dreams have “a meaning which can be inserted at an assignable point in the mental activities of waking life” (Freud 1953/1900, p. 1) and followed this with equal conviction regarding symptoms, jokes, everyday errors, and more, he was essentially designating his “science of the life of the soul” as a human science (Geisteswissenschaft), a science of meaning. As Boss put it, Sigmund Freud “was the first to have the audacity to claim that … meaningfulness was all-pervasive” (1963, p. 85) and to show “the thorough-going meaningfulness of all mental phenomena” (1963, p. 86). Thus, without once using the word, Freud essentially designated all psychoanalysis as hermeneutic, a quest for meaning.

On hiddenness  In his search for meaning, Freud soon realized that a vast portion of what it is to be human and ourselves remains veiled, hidden, inaccessible to immediate perception and awareness. This led him to postulate the existence of unconscious
processes of which he admitted “we know nothing” but, nevertheless, “are obliged to assume” (1933/1964, p. 70). Thus Boss wrote “in his untiring search for the unconscious, Freud was on his way to the concealed, to concealment as such … but was unable to let concealment be the secret it is” (1963, p. 101). Instead, according to Boss, Freud “found it necessary to make subjectivistic, psychologic objects out of concealment in order to be able to drag it into the light and make it usable” (1963, p. 101). While Binswanger and Boss both acknowledged this flaw in Freud’s thinking, Binswanger accepted the notion of an unconscious, simply understanding it “in a different way,” namely in terms of “the various phenomenologically demonstrable modes and structures of being-in-the-world” (Binswanger 1957, p. 64). Meanwhile, Boss stridently opposed it, considering Freud’s assumption of unconscious mental life, and even the idea of consciousness itself, to be entirely unnecessary (1963, pp. 85–101). In spite of this difference they both recognized that Freud had grasped the essential ontological opacity of human existence.

On situatedness  Freud’s understanding of human development, his theory of drives, his explanations of the aetiology of neurosis, and his concept of transference, all situated the human being in its world and in time. His understanding of the meaning of the drives and of neurotic symptoms emphasized both their whence and their whither, both the significance of being shaped by the past while also striving on their way toward its future. Likewise, although Freud’s understanding of the psyche or soul (Seele) was radically dualistic, he intuitively understood that the individual was inextricably tied to its world as his theory of drives required an “object,” some other being, whether human or otherwise, to achieve its aim. In other words, Freud saw that the human being could not exist without an intimate connection with its world.

Summary

Given these underlying insights of Freud, Boss was convinced of Freud’s “deep understanding of man” (1963, p. 78), his “deep though unarticulated awareness of man’s basic condition” (1963, p. 62). With such comments, Boss was not endorsing his analyst’s speculative, natural scientific explanations of human phenomena but, rather, his tacit, pre-ontological understanding of the kind of being called human.

A Philosophical Revolt: Tilling the Soil for Daseinsanalysis

In the first decades of the new century, a number of European psychiatrists were disenchanted and restless with the positivistic/natural scientific and speculative/theoretical views of the human being predominant at the time. The German psychiatrist Karl Jaspers was among the first to challenge the “precarious foundation” and “reign of imagined insights,” found in both brain and psychoanalytic “mythologies” (Jaspers 1941/1956, p.170). He was soon joined by four other gifted European contemporaries – Ludwig Binswanger, Viktor von Gebsattel, Eugene Minkowski, and Erwin Straus – to form a sophisticated pioneering cadre of phenomenological psychopathologists seeking a more adequate understanding in philosophical anthropology and grounded
in a disciplined investigation of lived experience. These four also found considerable early intellectual and scientific companionship among such early-twentieth-century philosophers as Paul Natorp, Theodore Lipps, Henri Bergson, Max Scheler, and Martin Buber.

Although contemporary existential psychologists and psychotherapists may trace their heritage to one or more of these thinkers and practitioners, the road to Daseinsanalysis unquestionably went through the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud and the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Boss and Binswanger both understood that Freud and Heidegger, though coming from completely separate disciplines and for different reasons, shared a common commitment to uncover and understand the essence of what it is to be human, particularly in the ways those essential truths remain hidden from view. Both Daseinsanalysts also understood that Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology was ideally suited mode of research for “making what was previously concealed, covered up, available as unconcealed, as out in the open” (Heidegger 1988/1999, p. 8). What Freud described, from his speculative, natural-scientific thinking, as “where id was, ego shall be” (Freud 1933/1964, p. 80), Heidegger described hermeneutically as ”the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being... hunting down the alienation from itself with which it is smitten” (Heidegger 1988/1999b, p.11). For Heidegger, the “understanding which arises in interpretation” is nothing less than “the wakefulness of Dasein for itself” (p. 12).

Martin Heidegger: From Consciousness to Existence

Born on September 26, 1889 in the village of Messkirch, Germany, Martin Heidegger’s whole life and thought was imbued with the influence of the pastoral landscapes and mountains of Swabia and the simple fidelity of its people. Included within this world was the ordering presence of rural Catholicism and his Jesuit education where he excelled in Greek, Latin, and German and “acquired everything of lasting value” (Heidegger 1957/2010, p. 21). Even as a teenager, Heidegger was deeply intrigued by the fundamental concerns of theology and philosophy and, in 1907 when he was just 17, reading Franz Brentano’s doctoral dissertation, On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, became “the ceaseless impetus” for Being and Time and his lifelong absorption in the question of the meaning of Being (Heidegger 1957/2010, p. 21). A year later, in 1908, Heidegger had discovered Hölderlin, and, in another year still, he had begun reading Husserl’s Logical Investigations.

Heidegger received his doctorate in philosophy in 1913 and returned in the summer of 1915 as a Privatdozent, lecturing on Parmenides, Aristotle, and Kant. When, in the spring of 1916, Edmund Husserl joined Freiburg’s philosophy faculty, Heidegger became his assistant, an arrangement that led to an intensely collaborative friendship. Within a few years the two had become the most influential voices in phenomenology, a powerful new mode of inquiry based on the elder’s maxim, “To the things themselves” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p.30). Although phenomenology was, for Heidegger, the most appropriate way to approach the question of being, his understanding of phenomenology gradually evolved from Husserl’s transcendental attitude to a
hermeneutic one which Heidegger much later described as letting “that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p. 58).

By the time Heidegger took a position at Marburg in 1923, his conception of the human being and the task of phenomenology was already evolving. Whereas for Husserl the wonder of wonders was embodied in the human being’s transcendental consciousness, for Heidegger, the greatest wonder was Being as such, the wonder that “there are beings at all and... not rather nothing” (Heidegger 1929/1977b, p. 112). Thus, to Heidegger, phenomenology was no longer a study of the contents of consciousness but, rather, a study of Dasein’s whole every day, fundamentally embodied engagement in and with its world. Nevertheless, their differences did not keep Heidegger from acknowledging that his own research “would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p.62) and dedicating Being and Time to Husserl “in friendship and admiration.” Sadly, Heidegger’s behavior and attitude toward his old master in the ensuing years followed the sad and familiar story of an acolyte’s betrayal of a once beloved teacher and dear friend, a betrayal that began long before the former disciple’s affiliation with the National Socialist party but certainly made deeper and more painful because of it. We shall return to this matter briefly again in Chapter 6 of this section.

Already a mature and spellbinding lecturer, with Being and Time, the 38-year old Heidegger had established himself as the pre-eminent philosopher of Being, tracing his most essential lineage back to the Greeks and Aristotle. For Heidegger, the first question of philosophy was the question of being (Seinsfrage), namely what it means to be in the first place. Since such a question could only be considered by the human being, Dasein, that a kind of being capable of understanding being (verb) and beings (noun), his second question became “What is the way of being of human Dasein?” How is it that human beings are such that they are capable of and concerned with understanding being? Although Heidegger began Being and Time by raising the first question, nearly the entire rest of the book was dedicated to answering the second with his fundamental ontology of Dasein.

Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik eventually uncovered and elucidated 20 or so invariant, universal structures or ontological characteristics. These include, among many others 1) the fact that we are at all; 2) that we are thrown a into time and culture not of our own choosing; 3) that, as a result, we of necessity fall in with our culture and time and largely exist as an inauthentic “they-self” or “herd-self;” 4) that we exist from beginning to end as always social, as with-others; 5) that we exist not just as being, but being-in-the-world; 6) that we exist as stretching out in time between the two profoundly personal and inescapable moments of 7) being from our birth and 8) towards our death; 9) that we exist as unavoidably embodied and, therefore, destined to decay and die; 10) that we are born with the capacity to understand being, including our own; 11) that from this very same capacity for understanding we see our human frailty, finitude, and unavoidable death and anxiously flee in the face of these human conditions; and 12) that we cannot help but be concerned with our world, the others with us, and we ourselves.

Taken as a whole, these and the other equiprimordial fundamental, ontological characteristics provide the philosophical, ontological bedrock for Daseinsanalytic
psychology and psychotherapy. Bringing us thus face to face with our own fundamental condition is something “psychology had never before considered in this manner” and, in doing so, Heidegger “ultimately revolutionized psychology and psychiatry” (Spiegelberg 1972, pp. 20–21). Paul Tillich wrote that “only in the light of an ontological understanding of human nature can the body of material provided by psychology... be organized into a consistent and comprehensive theory” (1952, p. 65). Rollo May thought such ontological analysis of the existing human could also “give us a structural base for our psychotherapy” (May 1961, p. 83). Taken as a whole, these and the other equiprimordial fundamental, ontological characteristics provide the philosophical, ontological bedrock for Daseinsanalytic psychology and psychotherapy (Craig 2015).

As English readers often find Heidegger’s obtuse, iconoclastic language forbiddingly rarified, it is easy for them to overlook the circumstance that, in fact, his entire fundamental ontology grows out of a respectful phenomenological analysis of how things present themselves simply and concretely in everyday life. He began from the bottom up, that is, with a careful phenomenological-hermeneutic analysis of our ordinary quotidian (ontical) human existence, just at it is lived by each and every human being.

Although Being and Time is almost universally considered Heidegger’s most prodigious and influential work, he continued to develop his thought on the relationship between Being and Dasein throughout his life. Especially significant were a number of his works between 1930 and 1941, including his second great work, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Heidegger 1989/1999a). These works reveal what is often referred to as “the turn” (Die Kehre) from phenomenology to thought, or from Dasein’s relation to Being to Being’s relation to Dasein, and the event of their mutually inter dependent co-arising known as Ereignis. It was actually this so-called “second Heidegger” with whom Medard Boss studied and collaborated in person from 1949 to 1972.

Daseinsanalysis: The Birth of Existential Psychiatry, Psychology, and Psychotherapy

A major difficulty for English students of Daseinsanalysis is that both Binswanger and Boss referred to their approaches as Daseinsanalysis (Daseinsanalyse). Although this demonstrates their shared, albeit distinctive, allegiance to Heidegger’s ontological understanding of human existence, their respective Daseinsanalytic works represent largely different projects, each with their own separate aims, aspirations, and ways of understanding Daseinsanalysis as such. Whereas Binswanger designed and understood his Daseinsanalysis as a research method aimed at providing a more adequate scientific foundation for psychiatry, Boss fashioned his Daseinsanalysis as a radical, phenomenological revisioning of psychoanalytic psychotherapeutic practice. Finding appropriate, consistent English nomenclature for their two approaches has been a confounding preoccupation for secondary source English authors such as May, Angel, and Ellenberger (1958), who unfortunately translated Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse as “existential analysis” and Spiegelberg (1972, p.333), who, equally
The History of Daseinsanalysis

Unfortunately for English readers, used only Heidegger’s German term Daseinsanalytik to designate Boss’s approach. In this part of the Wiley World Handbook we shall retain the term Daseinsanalysis (Daseinsanalyse) to refer to the work of both Daseinsanalysts, trusting the context to distinguish which approach, Binswanger’s psychiatric or Boss’s psychotherapeutic is being addressed.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of Daseinsanalysis compared to other existential psychotherapies, is its stalwart appreciation for Freud. Although many existential therapists today appear reactive to such Freudian constructs as transference, resistance, and repetition, according to Boss and Binswanger these ideas all refer to actual concrete human phenomena, albeit inadequately explained in crudely reductive bio-mechanistic terms. Today, Daseinsanalysts still claim that it is just as erroneous to dismiss Freud out of hand as it is to embrace his thinking as doctrinal truth. What is needed, rather, is a thoughtful, open-minded phenomenological-hermeneutic reformulation of the psychoanalyst’s remarkable insights, no longer trapped in the language of homo natura but liberated into an understanding of homo existentialis, of the human being as human and as a whole. Boss and Binswanger were not entirely alone among existential therapists in their critical appreciation for Freud. American existential analysts like Rollo May, James Bugental, Henry Elkin, and Paul Stern also embrace essential elements of Freud’s thought and practice, albeit with varying phenomenological criticisms and reappraisals.

Ludwig Binswanger: Daseinsanalytic psychiatry and psychopathology

Ludwig Binswanger was born April 13, 1881 into a family of prominent Swiss psychiatrists. His grandfather, the senior Ludwig Binswanger, founded the famously humanitarian psychiatric center, the Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, and his uncle, Otto Binswanger, treated Friedrich Nietzsche at the Mental Asylum in Jena, Germany. Deciding as a youth to follow in his family’s footsteps, Ludwig Binswanger undertook medical studies in Zurich, Lausanne, and Heidelberg, then returned to Zurich to complete his training and education with Eugen Bleuler and Carl Jung at the Burghölzli Hospital.

When Freud invited Jung and his wife to visit him in Vienna, Jung invited Binswanger to join them, arriving together on the evening March 2, 1907. At 10 am the next morning, Freud and Jung met for the first time, not interrupting their conversation for 13 hours. Both Jung and Binswanger attended their first meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society the following Wednesday evening, March 6. When the Jungs left Vienna for holidays a few days later, the captivated Binswanger remained alone for another week. Thus began a decades-long friendship that continued to the end of Freud’s life. Though their admiration for one another was not always reciprocal, Binswanger always held Freud with unwavering “personal affection and reverence” (Binswanger 1957, p. 99), never failing to acknowledge his “greatness and the indomitable spiritual and moral force of his personality” (Fichtner 2003, p. 219), so much so that, after a visit in 1927, Binswanger wrote in his diary, “with nobody else does one feel so small” (Fichtner 2003, p. 238).

Binswanger’s appreciation for Freud’s friendship and his “monumental” psychoanalytic technique did not deter him from disagreement. Dissatisfied with Freud’s
natural scientific understanding of human nature and hungry for a more adequate philosophic foundation for psychology and psychoanalysis, Binswanger soon took up the project of developing a **phenomenological anthropology**, a view of the human being in its totality with “a psychiatric-phenomenological research method” adequate to its subject. Binswanger was not concerned “primarily with mentally ill man, but with *man as such*” (Binswanger 1956, p.144), not with Freud’s *homo natura* (natural man) but, rather, *homo existentialis* (existential or historical man; Binswanger 1963a, p. 150).

Binswanger’s scientific phenomenology took a radical turn in 1927 with the publication of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Initially coming to Heidegger’s works through Husserl, the psychiatrist finally met Heidegger in person in January 1929. Binswanger first used the term Dasein in his mytho-poetic 1930 study entitled *Dream and Existence* (Binswanger 1930/1963a). In 1936 Binswanger presented his paper for Freud’s eightieth year Festschrift entitled *Freud’s Conception of Man in the Light of Anthropologie* (Binswanger 1947/1963b, pp. 149–181), challenging his friend and mentor’s understanding of human beings as *homo natura* with a human scientific anthropological critique. Binswanger had been particularly impressed by Heidegger’s hermeneutic understanding of Dasein as *being-in-the-world* (*In-der-Welt-sein*) with world being understood not as a physical world but a horizon of meaningful relationships and possibilities. For Binswanger, such an understanding of the human being meant the final destruction of “the cancerous evil of all psychology… namely the dogma of the subject-object-cleavage of the world,” (Binswanger 1946/1958b, p. 193, translation of “das Krebsübel aller Psychologie, nämlich der Lehre von der Subjekt-Objekt spaltung der ‘Welt’” in Binswanger 1946/1947, p. 193).

Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein’s worldedness also meant that one could understand human beings, independent of health or illness, as simply having different ways or modes of being-in-the-world, modes that Binswanger, following Heidegger, called “World Designs” or “World Projects” (*Welt-Entwurf*). Binswanger went on to suggest that Dasein’s world as such was constituted by three different but interrelated everyday worlds. He called these the “around-world” or “one-world” (*Umwelt*), meaning the environment including the body; the “with-world” (*Mitwelt*), referring to the social or human relational world; and the “own-world” or “self-world” (*Eigenwelt*), referring to the “inner,” reflexive, self-relational world without at all implying that this tri-dimensional perspective in any way betrayed the primordial unity of Dasein.

Just as Binswanger did not hesitate to differ from Freud, he also questioned Heidegger’s starkly individualistic characterization of Dasein at the expense of the social existence, especially loving “bi-modal” interpersonal relations, or the we-thood character of human existence. Deeply influenced by the relational existential philosopher Martin Buber, whom he knew personally and with whom he shared a decades long correspondence, Binswanger unfolded a “phenomenology of love,” specifically in reaction to human loving having been “left freezing in the cold outside of Heidegger’s picture of existence” (see Spiegelberg 1972, p. 206). Binswanger’s phenomenology of love was thoroughly in keeping with the affectionate family atmosphere of his Kreuzlingen family sanatorium roots, albeit at odds with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein wherein Care (*Sorge*) was understood to naturally include the ontical possibility of love as a way of carrying out one’s ontological
capacity for being-with-others (Mitsein). Although Heidegger praised Binswanger’s work and encouraged him to continue his understanding of psychopathology through a fundamental ontology of Dasein, he also recognized how the psychiatrist had stepped beyond *Being and Time* and failed to grasp its full ontological import. Binswanger eventually acknowledged his failure and attributed it to what he called a productive misunderstanding. Nevertheless, Binswanger and Heidegger continued to enjoy a thoughtful correspondence well into the 1950s even though Medard Boss had become Heidegger’s so-called authorized spokesman in psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy. Unlike Boss, Binswanger continued to follow his own inclinations as an independent thinker and eventually returned to his previous master, Edmund Husserl, and phenomenological research emphasizing the importance of experience which, at that point, replaced the previous use of the term world (Holzhey-Kunz 2006, p. 286).

Unfortunately, little is known of Binswanger’s actual, everyday practice of psychotherapy. Even his most well-known case studies include no account of his own specific, concrete psychotherapeutic activity, a lacuna perhaps explained by his comment that “with Daseinsanalysis alone, we cannot do psychotherapy. What is needed is the colossal knowledge and craft that has been put at our disposal by psychoanalysis” (Binswanger 1960, p. 254, author’s free translation). Binswanger’s few comments on the actual practice of psychotherapy were primarily attitudinal, emphasizing, for instance, Daseinsanalysis as a loving encounter between existential partners (*Daseinspartner*), who, eschewing abstract, theoretical discourse, meet person to person, Dasein to Dasein, and converse in the language of the individual’s own everyday life (Binswanger 1960, p. 253). Beyond these broad strokes of insight, it was left to Medard Boss to develop and articulate a systematic Daseinsanalytic approach to psychotherapy.

Medard Boss: Daseinsanalytic psychotherapy

Medard Boss was born October 4, 1903 in St. Gallen, Switzerland. When he was two, his parents moved to Zurich, where he remained for the rest of his life. Unlike Binswanger, Boss’s parents were not doctors and his path to medicine was not so straight. Originally aspiring to be an artist, Boss was discouraged by his father, who thought painting a “breadless profession.” Scheming to cure his son of his artist dreams he took him to the Pinakothek Museum in Munich to see the work of European masters. Boss ruefully admitted he had overestimated his own talents, succumbing to his father’s “cure,” though continuing to paint for the rest of his life.

On the way to psychoanalysis Returning to more pragmatic aspirations, Boss enrolled in medical school at the University of Zurich. When he happened across and read Freud’s *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (Freud 1916–1917/1961), he decided to take his 1925 summer semester at the University of Vienna, hoping to meet with Freud in person. Although his father supported medical studies in Vienna he refused

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1 Biographical material drawn from an autobiographical article by Boss (1973) and an interview by Craig (1988).
to pay for such a thing as analytic sessions with Freud. Undeterred, Boss wrote to Freud to request an appointment and the 69-year-old psychoanalyst agreed to meet with him at a reduced fee. To pay these fees, Boss had to forego meals, using his father’s food allowance for his appointments instead. The cost of this strategy was that Boss’s free associations were often accompanied by stomach growls to which Freud sometimes responded by dropping some shillings in Boss’s pocket as he left, saying only that he didn’t want the 22-year-old student to go hungry. Boss was struck by the fact that this was hardly in keeping with Freud’s technical recommendations for the conduct of therapy.

After returning to Zurich to complete medical studies Boss continued his own psychoanalysis with Hans Behn-Eschenburg, affiliated with the Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis, and, likeBinswanger, assisted Eugen Bleuler at the Burghölzli. He then trained at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute where he was supervised by Karen Horney, whom he described as the most human of the faculty, Otto Fenichel, and Harald Schultz-Hencke. Boss also took Institute classes with Wilhelm Reich, Hanns Sachs, and Siegfried Bernfeld and, for a time, worked at the Brain Injury Research Institute as an assistant to Kurt Goldstein. Boss’s education and training at the highly orthodox Berlin Institute indelibly shaped his future opinion of psychoanalysis as hopelessly rigid and unable to escape the assumptions of the nineteenth-century physical sciences. Boss also trained for six months at the London Psychoanalytic Institute and assisted Ernest Jones at the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases. Boss returned to Zurich and the Burghölzli before finally opening his private practice and becoming director of the Schlössli Psychiatric Clinic in 1936.

Two years later, in 1938, Carl Jung invited Boss to join semi-weekly seminars at his lakeside home in Küsnacht. Although impressed by Jung’s more “phenomenological” approach to depth psychotherapy and his criticism of Freud’s causal-genetic thinking, when Jung ended the seminars after ten years, Boss left him behind. Nevertheless, Jung’s influence remained with respect to the interpretation of dreams resulting in some dream scholars continuing to consider Boss a Jungian.

On the way to phenomenology Boss continued to grow more dissatisfied with the speculative, reductionistic theories of psychoanalysis, especially the replacement of the everyday phenomena of dreaming or waking, with representational symbols for Freud’s drives or Jung’s archetypes. Such hypothesized entities were never things one can encounter or experience directly but, for Boss, “merely assumed abstractions” (Boss 1953/1958, p. 58). Boss especially came to resent the labyrinthine symbolic interpretations requiring therapists to perform theoretically “tedious acrobatics” (Boss 1963, p. 234) that, as he admitted, may well cure patients of their initial symptoms but at the cost of developing “a new neurosis best called ‘psychoanalytis’” (Boss 1963, p. 236). Given his discontent with such natural scientific theories, it came as quite a relief, even before meeting Jung, to find the more respectful human approach to psychological science found in the work of Ludwig Binswanger. Binswanger introduced his younger colleague to systematic phenomenology in the late 1930s, and Boss’s earliest publications regularly cited Binswanger and other phenomenological psychologists including Erwin Straus, Victor von Gebsattel, and Hans Kunz. Most significantly, Binswanger introduced Boss to Heidegger’s Being and Time.
On the way to Daseinsanalysis  Boss began his own personal study of Heidegger in earnest while confined to a military bunker in the Alps during the Second World War. His initial experience was both disappointing and unpleasant as he initially found it impossible to understand even a single sentence. Doggedly persisting by reading passages over and over, he gradually began, as his friend Paul Stern later put it, “seizing upon islets of meaning in a vast sea of incomprehension” (Stern 1979, p. xiii.). The most decisive of these islets appeared to Boss in Heidegger’s interpretation of the two different ways human beings care for other humans, namely, intervening care and anticipatory care (Heidegger 1927/1962, pp. 158–159).

There, Boss recognized that what Heidegger called anticipatory care was a consummate philosophical description of Freud’s technical recommendations for a therapist’s relation to patients. Intervening care involves helping others by “leaping in” on their behalf by, for example, giving advice, medication, material assistance, or the like, thus taking over responsibility for others where they are unable to do so for themselves. Such care, however, comes with the danger of making them dependent and possibly even dominated and demoralized. In contrast to this, anticipatory or “leaping ahead” care, involves opening up perception and awareness within which others can see clearly for themselves just how things stand for them and freeing them to be responsible for themselves. With such anticipatory care, the therapist waits, Boss later wrote, “ahead of the patient in his existential unfolding” (Boss 1963, p. 73). For Boss, this distinction was the most incisive description he had ever read for Freud’s recommendations regarding what psychoanalysts should and should not do.

Seeing the possibility for a richer, philosophically grounded understanding of his own psychoanalytic practice, after the war Boss wrote to Heidegger to inquire about the possibility of meeting him in person for help with his own contemplative or “reflective thinking” (Besinnliche Denken). Heidegger wrote back on August 3, 1947 with an invitation to visit him at his mountain hut in Totnauberg and asking for some Swiss “chocolate to support his work and thought.” Although Boss and Heidegger exchanged a handful of letters over the ensuing two years, due to the border situation after the war, Heidegger did not meet Boss in person (or receive his chocolate) until the midsummer of 1949. From that time on, their relationship unfolded with increasing complexity. By the early 1950s Boss had devoted himself almost exclusively to his apprenticeship with the philosopher and the implications of his Daseinsanalytik for psychology, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis, a devotion that Heidegger repaid by authorizing Boss’s and not Binswanger’s version of Daseinsanalysis as most authoritatively faithful to the philosopher’s thought. Over the ensuing years their relationship grew not only through a correspondence of some 256 letters but also from personal visits and family journeys to Italy, Greece, and Turkey. They frequently visited one another in Heidegger’s homes in Freiburg and Totnauberg and Boss’s in Zurich and Lenzerheide. However, the culminating event of their relationship and for psychology and psychotherapy was the establishment of a series of seminars arranged for Boss’s students and colleagues in Zurich, held almost entirely in Boss’s own home in Zollikon and suitably known as the Zollikon Seminars (Heidegger 1987/2001). Auspiciously, Daseinsanalysts now have a detailed, albeit far from complete, record of their friendship and collaboration.
What is most remarkable, however, is that such a friendly, intensely collaborative relationship between an eminent philosopher and a medically trained psychoanalyst could ever occur in the first place. According to Boss, from the beginning Heidegger “saw the possibility that his philosophical insights would not be confined merely to the philosopher’s quarters but might also benefit many more people, especially suffering people” (Boss 1987/2001, p. xvii). Heidegger’s interest in providing a sound philosophical understanding of human beings for the regional sciences of psychology and medicine was matched by Boss’s own professional aspirations, which were to use Heidegger’s fundamental ontology to provide a philosophically “solid theoretical foundation, the genuine foundational science of another, completely new psychology, psychopathology and psychotherapy” (Boss 2002–2003, p. 26).

Prior to meeting Heidegger, Boss had openly acknowledged his indebtedness toBinswanger’s published works and personal guidance in order to bring a phenomenological perspective to the practice of psychotherapy. His first major work emphasizing the perspective was on sexual “deviation” and relied on Binswanger’s understanding of “the dual mode of existential love” and of sexual deviation as “an existential illness,” not a medical disease. However, by the time the book was translated and published in English as meaning and content of sexual perversions in 1949 he had already begun criticizing Binswanger and other phenomenologists based on his new mentor Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik. Boss’s second significant German work, this one on dream interpretation, appeared in 1953, with the English translation following five years later as the analysis of dreams (1958). In it, Boss critiques psychoanalytic, neo-analytic, and non-analytic views of the dream and introduces a phenomenological approach emphasizing a return to the dream itself, the reality of which, Boss declared, is to be considered as valid as that of waking. His case of a fortyish engineer (pp. 113–117) who reported 823 dreams in a three-year analysis became an instant classic in the field of dream interpretation. In 1954 Boss published a still untranslated German introduction to psychosomatic medicine, moving from a strictly biological view to the individual’s own concrete experience of being embodied.

Boss’s first comprehensive, systematic exegesis of his own Daseinsanalytic psychology and psychotherapy, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis (1963), significantly expanded an earlier, much smaller 1957 German book of the same title. In it, the impact of his decade-and-a-half-long study and collaboration with Heidegger were finally systematically exposed. This first major work provided a detailed comparison of the philosophical systems and assumptions underlying psychoanalytic and Daseinsanalytic views of the human being and offered Daseinsanalytic alternatives for understanding such clinical phenomena as “transference,” “resistance,” the “unconscious,” and dreams. Boss followed this two years later with an English translation of his own favorite book, A Psychiatrist Discovers India (1959/1965), which described two lengthy stays in India and Indonesia, where he apprenticed with spiritual masters, and compared their thought with that of Martin Heidegger. Boss returned to the topic of dreams with his especially practical I dreamt last night… (1975/1977) articulating his phenomenological approach to dream analysis, called explication, and sharply distinguishing it from Freud’s association-based symbolic interpretations. In a discerning phenomenologically guided discussion of dreaming
and waking he writes, “Waking and dreaming” are “but two different modes of carrying to fulfillment the one and same historical human existence” (1975/1977, p. 190). In his magnus opus, *Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology* (1971/1979), Boss relentlessly impugned the psychoanalytic and medical worlds’ unexamined tendency to subscribe to an objectifying, natural scientific ideal. The alternative, grounded in Martin Heidegger’s *Daseinsanalytik*, was a rigorous philosophical interrogation of the human being as a new and adequate phenomenological foundation for thinking and practice. Boss was both proud and grateful to have Heidegger’s own “patient and painstaking care” (Boss 1978, p. 12). Perhaps Boss’s most gratifying Daseinsanalytic project, one that he worked on over the last years of his life, was to edit Heidegger’s letters and conversations with him as well as transcripts and notes taken from the *Zollikon Seminars* (Heidegger 1987/2001).

The following three chapters of this section deal more explicitly with the philosophy, theory, practice, and method of Daseinsanalytic psychotherapy. However, before moving on to these more contemporary perspectives in daseinsanalytic theory and therapy, this chapter will close with an overview of critical theoretical considerations with respect to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein, especially as Being and ontology are so essential for understanding Daseinsanalysis in particular and, to some extent, existential psychology and psychotherapy in general. What follows is based on what Boss himself taught the author in person and was then presented in one of Boss’s last articles, entitled *Recent Considerations in Daseinsanalysis* (1988). This view of fundamental ontology is unquestionably molded by the Heidegger after the “turn” who was the only Heidegger Boss knew.

**Fundamental Ontology: The Philosophical Foundation of Daseinsanalysis**

Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutic analysis of Dasein, called Fundamental Ontology (*Daseinsanalytik*), provided a philosophical foundation for psychotherapeutic Daseinsanalysis, challenging both the scientific-biologic and the conjectural-psychoanalytic views of *homo natura* reigning at turn of the century. As noted earlier, such a hermeneutic ontology also provides existential psychology and psychotherapy in general with a radical epistemological alternative to the kinds of calculative (quantitative) and speculative (theoretical) psychologies that have ruled the field for decades (Craig 2015, p. 84).

The term ontology, combining the roots *ontos*-, from the Greek word *on* (*ov*) for being, and *logos*, from the Greek word *logia* (λογία) for discourse, reason, or science, has been commonly understood as the science of being (the verb *is*), a pre-eminent concept of Daseinsanalysis and one vital for many other forms of existential psychotherapy as well. As Rollo May once put it, “the distinctive character of existential analysis is … that it is concerned with ontology, the science of being” (May 1958, p. 37). The term *being* is so prominent in existential counseling and psychotherapy that Deurzen and Kenwood’s (2005) dictionary for the field lists 13 different compounds beginning with the word being, in addition to the word Being itself. As central as being may be to the field, there is no broad consensus as to its meaning and significance, and some approaches to existential psychotherapy, such as that of Irvin Yalom, eschew ontology entirely.
This reluctance to consider ontology is easy to understand in view of Boss’s own admission that it took a full dozen years after first contacting Heidegger to feel like even a genuine beginner in understanding the philosopher’s thought (Boss 1987/2001, p. xviii). Another obstacle is that Heidegger’s primary concern was philosophy, not psychology which primarily deals of our most familiar ways of being, the concrete ontical mode of everyday human existence which brings most people into psychotherapy in the first place. Although Heidegger began his ontological existential (existentielle) analysis from and with this quotidian mode of existence, called ontical or existentiell, his ultimate concern was with the meaning of the very being (verb) of beings (noun), what it means to be, namely, the is-ness of being that allows everything that is to be at all. Nevertheless, as Boss intuited, such an ontico-ontological analysis would prove essential for understanding what it means to be human. Without an understanding of the human as such, how could any therapist ever hope to understand the particular human beings who appear concretely in his or her office.

The Human Being, Dasein

Heidegger considered the human being’s (Dasein’s) capacity to understand being, including its own being (Seinsverstandnis), to be not only the reigning characteristic of human being but “the sole concern of Being and Time” (Heidegger 1987/2001, p.188). Thus he wrote that Dasein is “ontically distinguished by the fact that in it’s very Being, that Being is an issue for itself” and that “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p. 32). In our everyday existence as Dasein we just live our lives completely absorbed in the hustle and bustle of the day without stopping to reflect on its meaning. However, even in this unreflective mode of our quotidian existence, we always maintain an unthought, unspoken pre-ontological awareness of what it means to be, only vaguely, albeit occasionally disturbingly, appre-hending our ontological nature. We all exist, whether we like it or not, with at least a dim appreciation of our more fundamental humanity, a way of being from which there is no escape, a way of being that, as human, we have to be (zu sein haben; Heidegger 1927/1962, pp, 32–33, 173).

A second primary ontological characteristic making Daseinsanalysis even possible is Dasein’s constitution as Da, there, being-in-the-world (In-der-welt-sein). Although this there-ness of Dasein is often the first of its ontological characteristics to be discussed, there is more to the Da than is commonly recognized. As Heidegger put it, “In Being and Time... the ‘Da’ [of Da-sein] is determined... as ‘the open’” (das Offene 1987/2001, p. 225), which, in Being and Time itself, is more often referred to as “the clearing” (Lichtung) or “realm of world openness or world-illumination.” All three interpretations of Da – “there,” “being-in-the-world,” and “the open” or “clearing” – denote, not some location in physical space, but, rather, the whole horizon of meaningful engagements, relationships, and possibilities as which Dasein primordially exists.

These ontological reflections on Dasein, as abstract and daunting as they may seem, are in no way irrelevant to psychotherapy. Having been cast into the world as a human being and no other kind of being, we have to be these ways, and our relation to these fundamental characteristics as which we exist is, for Daseinsanalysts, the ultimate
existential source of our suffering. We are there in the midst of a confusing and unpredictable world, realizing what it is to be and to be fragile, finite, vulnerable, uncertain, transient, and always on our way to death. This is no less true of the therapist’s existence than it is of the those who come for help.

To summarize, Daseinsanalysis rests on three particularly foundational ontological characteristics of Dasein: (1) its understanding of being including its own being, (2) its there-ness, worldedness, or open-ness of being, and (3) its ontico-ontologic essence and, with this, its everyday pre-ontological understanding of what it means to have to be a human being.

Three basic meanings of the word being in Daseinsanalysis

Heidegger used the word being (sein) in so many different ways in his collected works that readers and even serious scholars are often left completely baffled as to what actually is meant. The Heidegger scholar Tom Sheehan (2015) identified over 60 of these different uses, not including the many compound terms using the word to Dasein (pp. 5–8). In the face of such perplexity, Boss wrote to Heidegger to ask how best to translate the most basic of terms for the English edition of Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis. Heidegger replied as follows:

The suggestion to translate (a) das Seiende or Seiendes as “being” or “particular being,” (b) Seiendheit, in the sense of the mode of being of a specific species of things or living beings, as “being-ness, 2 (lower case), and (c) Seyn, as such, as Being-ness (capitalized) seems best. To be sure, in the sufficient distinction between (b) and (c) the whole road of my thinking is concealed. (Boss 1963, 36ftn)

What follows is a discussion of this dense, illuminating, but widely overlooked passage.

Particular being The first and most familiar way as which Dasein finds itself is as a particular (ontic) human being, in its everyday (ontic) particular world. For instance, right now I exist as a particular man, writing a particular sentence, watching a particular cat outside, sitting under a particular tree. This concrete ontical way of being is how we live our concrete lives, how we usually find ourselves living, breathing, and having our being. Ironically, although we may feel “ontically ‘closest’” to ourselves in this everyday world, we are simultaneously “ontologically farthest” (Heidegger 1927/1962, p. 37). In our everyday ontical worlds we are usually only dimly aware of what we are ontologically, namely, that kind of being called human with all its inescapable contingencies, limitations, and possibilities. Our absorption in the everydayness of existence leaves us strangers to our humanity, our distinctively human being-ness. And yet, without this concrete, particular way of being, we would not be at all.

Although psychotherapeutic practice is carried out in this ontical mode of existing, this same everyday practice requires that we understand what it is to be human in the first place, the very human-ness or being-ness that we share with those who come to visit.

Being-ness The ontological concern with being-ness is the central concern of each of the regional sciences. Felinology, for instance, is concerned with the cat-ness of all particular cats and dendrology with the tree-ness of all particular trees. In the regional
science of psychology and psychotherapy we are concerned with the being-ness, the human-ness of all particular humans, with what makes all human beings human in the first place. The quintessential question for Daseinsanalysts and, hopefully, for other existential psychotherapists is: What universal, invariant, ontologically given characteristics constitute us as human and not some other kind of being? To be ontological (note lower-case) a characteristic must obtain in every moment of every single human being’s existing (Craig 2015, p. 84). Such a standard exacts the highest standards of discernment and delimits the number of possibilities for such claims in advance and, according to Churchill (2013, p. 220), Heidegger himself only identified some twenty-plus or so such invariant characteristics, called existentials, in the whole of Being and Time. Taken as a whole these characteristics are determinative of the human as human, the being-ness of Dasein (again, note lower-case being-ness). As noted earlier, Boss was convinced that these phenomenologically derived ontological characteristics could provide a “solid theoretical foundation, the genuine foundational science of another, completely new psychology” (Boss 2002–2003, p. 26). The existentials, taken as a whole, thus constitute the hermeneutic Daseinsanalytic understanding of the human, replacing the calculative, biological, and the speculative, theoretical epistemological grounds that otherwise dominate our field. Concern with these fundamental ontological characteristics of the human being is what defines Daseinsanalytic science.

Many of these two dozen or so characteristics such as facticity, understanding of being, being-in-the-world, being mooded, being social, being thrown, being finite, being free, being-towards-birth, and being-towards-death have been mentioned previously in this chapter as well as the introduction. However it is essential to note that although these characteristic are determinative of the human as human, they are not determinative of the way of being of our individual lives as lived. Rather, while given to us a priori simply by virtue of being human, it is left for each of us to choose (or not) how we shall fulfill (or not) the possibilities of each universal human characteristic, that is, how we shall understand, how we shall be social, how we shall be free, how we shall live knowing we are on our way to death, and so on. In other words, the characteristics are given to us as fallow, open fields of existential potentiality for being that remain our responsibility to fulfill within the context of our everyday ontic existence. Indeed it is the essential task of the Daseinsanalytic psychotherapist to accompany and engage the other in the appropriation of this freedom to be.

Four advantages recommend such a phenomenological-hermeneutic fundamental ontology. First, such findings can be intuitively verified in our own immediate experience. Second, they provide an elegant and at the same time profound structural understanding of the meaning of the human as human and as a whole. Third, this meaningful structural understanding, this ontological scaffolding, is capable of organizing and holding the possibilities and results of our entire body of psychological research. Finally, these ontological characteristics provide the therapist with a vibrant perspective for understanding and engaging the individual, the possibilities of which will be discussed in detail in the following three chapters.

Beingness-as-such Heidegger closed his famous inaugural address at Freiburg with this question: “Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?” (1929/1977b). In raising this question, he was not pointing to some kind of
hopeless nihilism, as many may be tempted to read it, but, rather to that miracle that anything is, that we ourselves are. Heidegger’s original being question (Seinsfrage) is not about particular being or being-ness but, rather, about the being (verb) of these beings (noun). What does it mean to be at all? What is this event we call being, the shared is-ness that allows everything that is to be in the first place? Heidegger designated this particular meaning of the term being as Being-ness (note upper-case) or Beingness-as-Such and called this distinction between beings (noun) and being (verb), the Ontological difference. After the so-called turn, Heidegger puzzled over how to highlight this difference, sometimes spelling the German Sein as Seyn, or Sein with an X through it, designating the fact that Beingness-as-Such was not really any kind of entity or being but rather nothing. Heidegger was clear that the question of Beingness-as-Such lay beyond the province of the regional sciences, including psychology, but rather was entirely the concern of philosophical ontology. Ironically, Heidegger ultimately had to admit that he himself had failed to answer this question for himself.

Nevertheless, it remains the case that as both simple human beings and psychotherapists we go on, usually unwittingly presupposing this wonder of Being-as-such. As Craig (2015) put it, “although the meaning of Being-as-such rests beyond the reach of the regional sciences, including psychology, Being itself lies trembling, undulating beneath them all, like the ocean beneath our mightiest scientific armadas which navigate across its surface entirely at its affordance” (p. 85). While the answer to the question of the meaning of that most simple and mighty of words, is and to be, lies beyond the reach of the practicing psychotherapist, the matter of sheer existence, that we are, what Heidegger called “facticity” (Faktizität), does prove opportunities for valuable therapeutic reflection. How would it be for you not to exist? What might it have been like if your particular mother, father, sister, brother, lover, or teacher had never existed at all? What if such and such a thing had never happened? Such questions of non-being often yield startling, never previously considered meanings of being.

Heidegger’s “Turn” (Kehre): Fundamental Ontology to the Reciprocal Openness (Offenheit) of Being and Dasein

In the 1930s Heidegger shifted his focus from the phenomenology of Dasein to the reciprocal openness of Being and Dasein. According to the later Heidegger, the openness of Being as such afforded the possibility that such a being as the human being, Dasein, could be in the first place, and the perceiving, understanding openness of Dasein, in turn, is what affords Being the possibility to appear and to be understood as well. Boss put this as follows:

A human openness is required for anything to become present, or to be, but also the openness of Dasein itself, in turn requires Being in order for it [Dasein] to be. The “light-of-human-existence” and “everything-else-that-is” require one another and “call on” one another in a unified inseparable “e-vent” [Ereignis]. Ereignis is the indivisible unity of the appeal of Being to Dasein and of Dasein’s response to this appeal. (Boss 1988, p. 61, author’s brackets)
Many psychoanalysts and even some Daseinsanalysts find this turn unfortunate as, with it, Heidegger not only abandoned fundamental ontology but his original, creative understanding of hermeneutic phenomenology as well. Although Heidegger himself denied that, with this turn or reversal, he had abandoned the fundamental question of Being and Time, question of Being and Time” with this turn or “reversal” (Heidegger 1963, p. xviii), the question is widely debated among Daseinsanalysts today.

Nevertheless, having been taught by the later Heidegger, for his own Daseinsanalytic psychotherapy Medard Boss wholeheartedly embraced Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as the being whose ontological calling is to serve as a “Shepherd of Being” (Heidegger (1947/1977a, p. 210), a role which Heidegger describes as follows:

Man is … “thrown” from being itself into the Truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear in the light of their Being as the beings they are. (1947/1977a, p. 210)

Always the therapist and concerned with the philosophical foundation for therapeutic Daseinsanalysis, near the end of his life Boss drew Heidegger’s later thinking into the practice of psychotherapy as follows: “the relationship between Being and Dasein not only makes psychotherapy possible in the first place, but also gives psychotherapy its most fundamental purpose, that is, for the therapist to respond to the appeal of the patient to be” (Boss 1988, p. 61).

References


