Rethinking Care in a Development Context: An Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

The restructuring of production systems on a global scale and the recurrent financial and economic crises to which liberalized economies are prone, have received considerable attention, both scholarly and policy-oriented, in recent decades. While it may not have made it to the front page of The Wall Street Journal, a great deal has also been said about the social disruptions associated with the ascendancy of the neoliberal agenda — reminiscent of Polanyi’s (1957) analysis of the ‘disembedding’ of markets from social priorities in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe (Beneria, 1999; Standing, 1999). One long-standing critique originating in response to the stabilization and adjustment measures of the 1980s came from feminists who pointed to women’s intensifying unpaid work as ‘shock absorbers’ of last resort (Elson, 2002). While bankers and governments have periodically worried about how to respond to the crises of finance, including the most recent episode that erupted in Wall Street, others have voiced concern about the long-term repercussions for social reproduction (Bezanson and Luxton, 2006). It is indeed tempting in this context to think about a generalized crisis of social reproduction, or a ‘crisis of care’, as some have framed it (Beneria, 2008).

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1. Social reproduction has been defined in a variety of ways. We understand the concept to include the social processes and human relations associated with the production and maintenance of people and communities on a daily and generational basis, upon which all production and exchange rest (Bakker, 2003: 67); it involves ‘the provision of food, clothing, shelter, basic safety and health care, along with the development and transmission of knowledge, social values and cultural practices and the construction of individual and collective identities’ (Bezanson and Luxton, 2006: 3; see also Elson, 1998).

2. Care is defined as the activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional needs of dependent adults and children, and the normative, economic and social frameworks within which these are distributed and carried out (Daly and Lewis, 2000). It is thus one important component of social reproduction.

However, as the contributions to this volume show, even if the care crisis is global, it is far from homogeneous. Moreover, care arrangements in developing countries have not received the same level of scrutiny as those in advanced industrialization countries — a lacuna that the present collection of papers seeks to address. Hence, our assessment of care systems and public policy responses is largely focused on these under-studied contexts in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Women’s entry into the paid workforce — a near global trend — may have reduced the time hitherto available for the provision of unpaid care. But this shift has taken place alongside many other changes, some of which may have intensified care burdens, while others may have had a more favourable impact on the capacity of households to meet such needs. A clear illustration of the former is the pressure brought to bear on family care providers by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, especially in Southern Africa where prevalence rates are high and health systems under enormous strain (Budlender and Lund, this volume).

Care systems are also under stress where families are reconstituted, whether through internal or cross-border migration. In China, due to the residential registration system (hukou) and land use rights, migration remains temporary and results in a large ‘left-behind’ population. Cook and Dong (this volume) cite estimates suggesting that close to one-third of rural children are ‘left behind’, either living with only one parent (mostly mothers), or with grandparents or other relatives. This resonates with the growing literature on ‘transnational families’, also covered in the contribution by Yeates (this volume), which draws attention to care deficits experienced by children in migrant-sending peripheral countries like the Philippines while their mothers seek paid work elsewhere in the world (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Parrenas, 2005). There are clearly hidden costs of migration that are not easy to capture, not only those involved with the dislocation of families but also psychological ones (Beneria, 2008). Yet it is also important not to assume that ‘abnormal’ family arrangements necessarily result in a care deficit.4

The rising prevalence of households with young children maintained by women who have to manage both income earning and care giving, whether in Uruguay (Filgueira, Gutiérrez and Papadopulos, this volume) or in South

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3. That is, if developments in the previously planned economies of East and Central Europe, Central Asia and China are excluded.
4. As Parrenas’s (2005) research in the Philippines shows, ideologies of gender and the naturalization of motherhood frame both the practices and the discourses of loss and deprivation in these households: children constantly complain about the deprivation they experience in terms of lack of maternal love, and the inadequacy of the love they receive from fathers and grandmothers — even where fathers are very present in their lives and other kin (grandmothers, aunts) provide support and care. Migrant mothers, likewise, often justify their work overseas as a household strategy to meet family goals (e.g. putting children through school or lifting the family’s circumstances), even though in reality family and personal goals are often interwoven in the migration project (see also Asis et al., 2004).
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Africa (Budlender and Lund, this volume), presents yet another scenario where the demand on women’s time is enormous. It is also among this cluster of largely lower-income households that access to care services, whether public or market-provided, remains limited. It is important again not to assume that children in these households are necessarily more deprived, for example in nutritional terms, than children in families where both parents are present (Moore, 1994). There is nevertheless a tendency over time towards what Chant (2010) has called ‘the feminization of responsibility and/or obligation’, whereby women with young children are having to assume an increasing share of the responsibility for meeting household needs with little or no support from the fathers of their children.

However, the past two decades have also seen rapid fertility decline in many parts of the developing world (which may mean fewer children and less time devoted to childcare), the increasing availability (though at rates that are far from adequate) of amenities such as clean water, electricity and time-saving domestic technology, and increasing rates of enrolment of children in primary and — to a lesser extent — pre-primary education and care services. Taken together, these developments may well have reduced the drudgery of domestic work among some social groups, and shifted at least a small part of care to institutions other than the family. It is not clear therefore that the overall need for the provision of unpaid care has increased over time in all places, although in some contexts and for some groups it clearly has.

While the present moment may not necessarily be marked by a generalized care crisis, as we have suggested so far, there is nevertheless something new about the current juncture. Care has emerged, or is emerging, as a legitimate subject of public debate and policy development on the agendas both of those making claims — be it through social movement activism or NGO advocacy — and of many governments, not only in the advanced industrialized countries, but also in developing countries. The contributions in this volume present a first picture of differences and commonalities in these trends across a series of developing countries, and the ways in which care dynamics across developing and developed countries are interlinked.

How is this change — the eruption of care onto the public/policy agenda — to be explained? Many would argue that the period of state rollback and retrenchment which marked the 1980s was superseded in the late 1990s by a reorientation in mainstream thinking, with the shift to the ‘post-Washington Consensus’. This entailed a tacit recognition, at least by the international financial institutions, that effective governance was not simply

5. Demographic variables alone do not determine care needs and burdens. Rather, they are filtered through social, cultural and economic factors which, in turn, shape what is considered to be ‘sufficient’ or ‘good’ care. For example, time allocated to adult–child interaction tends to increase as ideas of what constitutes ‘good care’ change. Another implication of fewer children may be that they cannot look after each other.

6. Perhaps indicative of ‘the moment’, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women that meets annually in New York, selected as its theme for 2009 the issue of care, with particular reference to HIV and AIDS.
about shrinking the state.\textsuperscript{7} There was also a willingness to recognize the need for social expenditure — now recast as ‘social investment’\textsuperscript{8} (Jenson, 2010; Jenson and Saint Martin, 2006) — if the liberalization agenda was to stay on course. In the context of a more enabling ideational environment, regional and global development agencies called for social policies that could restore the social fabric ‘through activating greater participation, more “community level” networks and ties of social solidarity’ (Molyneux, 2002: 173), and agencies such as ECLAC, OECD, UNICEF and the World Bank advocated in favour of both cash transfer programmes and early childhood education and care services (Bedford, 2007; Mahon, 2010).\textsuperscript{9}

As is evident from the contributions in this volume, these global policy pronouncements have been taken up enthusiastically in several Latin American countries where governments have developed social policies to address the needs of children, women and the family through care-related policy innovations. These have included conditional cash transfer schemes, different modalities for expanding the availability of early education and care services, and the introduction of child-rearing credits in pension schemes. One suspects that beyond the ideational shifts associated with the social investment approach, which have had particular traction in this region (Jenson, 2010), there has also been some contagion or ‘spill-over’ effect across countries (in the form of ‘best practices’ and the like). Emblematic of a new wave of social policy and based on the pioneer schemes in Brazil (\textit{Bolsa Familia}) and Mexico (\textit{Oportunidades}), cash transfer programmes, largely targeted to mothers, have been piloted and/or institutionalized in at least fifteen countries in Latin America. We return to some of the gender implications of these schemes below.

Less remarked on, but no less significant, is the extent of experimentation in childcare policy and programme development — historically a priority area in national women’s movements advocacy. Given the declining efficacy of stratified social security systems in Latin America, there has been little effort to implement or expand the scope of earlier legislation that had made childcare a right for formally employed mothers (Mahon, 2011). Instead, states in the region have taken significant steps to expand both formal and

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  \item The neoliberal reform agenda has been criticized by some of its own architects for its failure to unpack the different dimensions of ‘stateness’ and distinguish between state scope and state strength (e.g. Fukuyama, 2004).
  \item Jenson (2010) suggests that it is the polysemic character of ‘social investment’ that facilitated its diffusion, i.e. that it was open to multiple interpretations. As she argues, ‘the ideas that spread most are ones that can draw together numerous positions and sustain a moderate to high level of ambiguity’ (ibid.: 71).
  \item It is legitimate to ask if the world is not entering a new ‘roll-back’ phase given the austerity measures being taken in many developed countries. The gender implications of the budget cuts in the UK have been amply analysed by the UK Women’s Budget Group (2010). The global repercussions of these measures, both ideological and economic, are yet to become clear.
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non-formal or ‘community-based’ forms of care and pre-school education. This is covered in some detail by several contributions to the present volume, most notably the comparative paper on Chile and Mexico (Staab and Gerhard), and the single country analyses of Argentina (Faur) and Nicaragua (Martinez Franzoni and Voorend).

Social policies responding to care needs have also been at the centre of public debate and policy experimentation in South Korea and South Africa, energized and facilitated by processes of democratization. In South Korea a combination of both ‘progressive and pragmatic’ motivations, namely a stated concern for gender equality and worries about the very low fertility rates coupled with economic slowdown, has catalysed a relatively sizeable state response over a short period of time (Peng, this volume). The extent of state social provisioning in South Africa since the end of apartheid has also been remarkable for a developing country (Budlender and Lund, this volume). State response seems to have been elicited, in part at least, by the tragic scale of the AIDS pandemic, combined with the historical legacy of family disruption and high levels of structural unemployment. Great anticipation that the post-apartheid state would address the injustices of the past, especially in a context where macroeconomic policy has remained fairly orthodox and incapable of tackling unemployment, has been another critical trigger.

Yet care needs have not uniformly ‘broken out of the domestic’ (Fraser, 1987: 116) and onto the public agenda. The meek policy responses in the highly diverse contexts of Nicaragua, China and India are an important reminder of the multiple forces and structural impediments that stand in the way of making care a legitimate public policy concern. China and, to a much lesser extent, Nicaragua share a history (albeit short in the case of Nicaragua) of socializing care needs through their state-socialist projects. The rejection of that model by pro-market forces — whether of the heterodox (in the case of China) or neoliberal kind — has led to the ‘reprivatization’ (Haney, 2003) of care. Indeed, comparative work on the family in post-socialist Eastern Europe shows how ‘the familial’ was deployed to assist states’ reform of, and often retreat from, social life (Haney and Pollard 2003). In India, meanwhile, strong notions of familialism undergirding state discourse and policy have placed serious limits on the state’s willingness to entertain the idea that care giving could be made, even if only partially, a public responsibility (Palriwala and Neetha, this volume).

Most of the contributions to this volume provide country-based analyses of the social economy of care and relevant policy developments. As such,

10. It is important to note that while in Hungary, according to Haney (2003), ‘familialism’ was deployed to rationalize welfare retrenchment, in the Czech Republic ‘familialism’ was appropriated to justify welfare expansion. The argument in the Czech Republic was that precisely because the family served as a site of refuge and social anchor under state socialism, it should be supported with public funds in the post-socialist era.
they are grounded in methodological nationalism — a feature they share with social policy analyses following the welfare regime approach. This is not to suggest that they are necessarily blind to global forces, whether in the form of care personnel (nurses, domestic workers) who migrate in and out of the country, or the role of global ideational factors in framing national policy options, or indeed the far less subtle role of donors in dictating ‘policy conditionalities’ on macroeconomic lending or in shaping social programmes. But their focus is on national-level processes: the institutional dynamics of care provision, its gendered/class/racial character, its intersection with policy processes, and its interactions with broader trends of social differentiation and polarization.

Taking a different methodological approach — one that privileges the ‘border-crossing webs of socio-economic relationships’ — the contribution by Yeates examines the diverse contours of care transnationalization in the contemporary era. By putting care in a global context, she examines the connections between internal policy processes and what happens in other countries, between internal and transnational migration, and the impact of developed country policies (e.g. international recruitment strategies) on developing countries. In doing so she takes the reader beyond the well-trodden theme of care worker migration. What her contribution illustrates is not only a facet of economic and social restructuring that tends to be neglected by mainstream literatures — the ‘invisible’ or ‘other economy’ as Donath (2000) calls it — but also the ways in which social relations and practices of welfare and care are being ‘stretched’ over long distances across national borders. We include this contribution in the hope of furthering the dialogue between these methodologically divergent perspectives.

The rest of this introductory paper is structured as follows. The first section provides a general background to the special issue, explaining its country selection and working hypotheses. It then turns to the family as the institution that stands central in defining and mediating the actual tasks of caring and its gendered character. However, as the subsequent section shows, we need to avoid the ‘ghettoising of care’ (Daly, 2009) in the family. The notion of a ‘care mix’ (Daly and Lewis, 2000) or ‘care diamond’ (Razavi, 2007) has been used to draw attention to the diversity of strategies, institutions and practices for providing care. Moreover, what goes on inside families is not hermetically sealed from developments in the broader context. Processes of economic and social change, as well as policy developments, play a key role in how care needs are defined, who is seen

11. The ‘care diamond’ metaphor, which draws attention to the four ideal-typical institutional sites mediating care — families, markets, states, not-for-profit sector — was used as an organizing device in the UNRISD research project from which this collection originated, since the project included research on unpaid care provided by household and family members, market-based and state-based care provision, as well as the role of the not-for-profit sector in the countries where it was most pertinent. The care diamond was not meant to provide an analytical scaffolding or serve as a conceptual framework.
as needing care, and how their needs are to be met. The concluding section reflects on the politics of care, and what the analysis of care in developing countries can say about care in developed countries.

ABOUT THIS VOLUME

It is often assumed that care policies are a relatively late development in a country’s welfare architecture. Daly and Lewis (2000), for example, argue that care policies provide a fruitful point of entry for analysing welfare state change, and Daly (2011) argues that policy relating to family life is one of the most active domains of social policy reform in Europe. Morel (2007) likewise sees care policies as part and parcel of the current restructuring of the welfare state, a restructuring that involves both a recasting of the overall relationships between family, market and state, and a transformation of gender relations and norms.

Where does this leave developing countries (clearly a heterogeneous group)? Is there an evolutionary pattern in the development of social policies, whereby care policies appear at a relatively advanced stage of welfare state development? If this were the case, then developing countries with nascent social policies would have to wait some time for care to become an active domain of policy experimentation. However, evidence from other policy domains suggests that countries can leap-frog and that there can be institutional learning (Mkandawire, 2001). Looking at the relationship between late industrialization and welfare development, Pierson (1998) for example notes that after 1923 there was a tendency for ‘late starters’ to develop welfare state institutions earlier in their own individual development and under more comprehensive terms of coverage than the pioneer countries. He also notes that in general ‘the larger and more entrenched a welfare state becomes, the more difficult it is to change... The move toward an active social policy is easier where there are fewer with an immediate interest in the maintenance of passivity’ (Pierson, 2004: 15).

Encouraging as this may be, there are a number of factors that are likely to prove important, if not decisive, in shaping a country’s capacity to respond effectively to care needs. Although not a determining factor in itself, the availability of resources at the national level will always affect the state’s provision of services, infrastructure and transfers/subsidies that can facilitate care giving. However, the translation of resources into the pre-conditions for care will be mediated by specific historical and conjunctural factors, including both political and ideational ones. On the political front, while the presence of gender equality lobbies within both the state and society may help turn care issues into a public policy concern, it is not likely to be sufficient for eliciting policy response. Gender-equality issues that include a redistributive dimension, such as the provision of public care services, invoke questions of socio-economic inequality as well as gender inequality,
and may therefore be shaped by patterns of class politics, such as the power of left parties or trade unions (Htun and Weldon, 2010; Huber and Stephens, 2001). However, state response to care needs can also take a more top-down form, driven by political elites and technocrats, and underpinned by more instrumentalist or ‘productivist’ motivations, such as building ‘human capital’, generating service sector employment, and ensuring ‘family cohesion’. It may also be driven by more mundane concerns such as appearing more ‘modern’ or enhancing state legitimacy in the eyes of both domestic and international constituencies. What we see emerging from the contributions to this volume are not linear processes of policy development, but a more messy picture punctuated by both horizontal movements indicative of institutional learning/borrowing as well as policy reversals and institutional disarray.

Apart from the prerequisite of having a time use survey, countries in the UNRISD project were purposefully selected from three different regions to include from each region one country with a relatively more developed system of social welfare (e.g. Korea, Argentina, South Africa), and one that was considered to be a welfare laggard (e.g. India, Nicaragua, Tanzania). The aim was to have maximum variation in terms of social policy development so as to have some policy development in the area of care, and to capture some variation in policy responses to care. While the project intended to include policy developments with respect to different groups of care recipients (young children, those with severe illnesses/disabilities, the frail elderly), at the country level researchers focused on areas of care around which more significant policy developments were taking place. Childcare, as is evident from the contributions to this volume, turned out to be a significant area of policy experimentation across all the countries included in the project, while care for people living with HIV/AIDS became a research focus in the case studies on South Africa (this volume) and Tanzania (see Meena, 2010).

Elderly care is a neglected area in the countries included here (with the exception of South Korea and China). Policy debates on population ageing often focus on financial issues, such as pensions. Meanwhile, the need for practical support in carrying out daily activities and the demand for long-term physical care are often neglected. In many middle-income countries these are now urgent issues requiring policy attention (but perhaps less so in those countries where populations are skewed to young ages). The contribution on Uruguay in particular draws attention to the urgent need to develop a system of elderly care, almost from scratch, in a context where the 75+ age group, which is more prone to disability, is increasing rapidly. China has also seen interesting demographic shifts: while the ratio of the population aged 0–14 to the working population fell sharply from 1990 to 2006 (from 41.5 to 27.4

12. The UNRISD project, ‘The Political and Social Economy of Care’, commissioned original research in seven countries: Argentina, Nicaragua, India, Korea, Japan, Tanzania and South Africa. This was complemented by desk studies on Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Switzerland. Most of the papers included in this volume were part of the UNRISD project, the two exceptions being the contributions on China and on transnationalism.
per cent), the ratio of the 75+ age group to the working age population rose (from 2.5 to 4.7 per cent). The burden of elderly care is particularly acute in this context in the aftermath of the ‘one-child policy’ (though not implemented in rural areas).

Despite the diverse trajectories, periodization and authorship of economic reform packages, all countries in our cluster have seen the promotion and consolidation of a market-led development path, albeit with notable variations in the specific templates followed. These reforms have been marked by rising levels of income inequality almost everywhere, and poverty levels that have remained persistent in some contexts. The contributions to this volume are particularly interested in how social policy provision for care has emerged, evolved and is changing in line with altered political and economic conditions. The tension between patterns of economic development that are largely exclusionary and polarizing, and processes of social and family change that raise new risks and demands forms the backdrop. Many of the tensions are being addressed (though not resolved) in the messy realm of social policy formulation and implementation where policy elites (sometimes in conjunction with external actors) interpret, appease, deflect or subvert the articulated ‘needs’. ‘Needs’ are always interpreted through the existing forms of political power distribution so that those who are the most marginal are the least likely to have their ‘needs’ recognized (Fraser, 1987). Unequal care in turn reinforces inequality (Tronto, 2006). Masquerading under different banners — poverty reduction, social protection or community participation — a broad range of social programmes has been put in place to address the needs of the most disadvantaged, yet without abandoning the neoliberal basics centred on economic liberalization and a nimble state that facilitates the integration of people into the market.

FAMILIES AND THE PROVISION OF UNPAID CARE

Families are clearly central to the welfare regimes of many developing countries, as they are elsewhere. In fact one of the early criticisms directed at Esping-Andersen’s (1990) *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* was his neglect of the family and of women’s unpaid work as important contributors to societal welfare (Lewis, 1992). Nearly a decade after the publication of his classic study, Esping-Andersen (1999: 11) explained this oversight in terms of ‘the blindness of virtually all comparative political economy to the world of families. It is, and always has been, inordinately macro-oriented’ (and gender blind!). In his more recent work he argues emphatically that the revolution in demographic and family behaviour, spearheaded by women’s embrace of personal independence and lifelong careers, has triggered the proliferation of new and less stable household and family arrangements, which in turn demand a new welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 2009). A similar position has been adopted by several other welfare state analysts who distinguish between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social risks and argue for the adaptation
of welfare states to the latter (Bonoli, 2006). This resonates with the approach taken by Filgueira et al. in their analysis of welfare, care and gender in Uruguay in this volume, which underlines that the failure to adapt to the new social conditions is even more devastating in middle-income countries such as Uruguay which are marked by very high levels of inequality.

Household and family arrangements are heterogeneous and unstable in the contexts we are concerned with, as well as being unable to meet welfare needs without support from other sectors of the economy. However, the forces underpinning change have been far more insidious, associated more with persistent economic crises and lop-sided development models, and less with women’s embrace of personal independence and lifelong careers, as Esping-Andersen puts it (for Europe). Work on welfare regimes in Latin America has underlined the point, overlooked in much welfare regime analysis and theorizing by feminists and non-feminists alike, that the heterosexual nuclear family form may not be the norm everywhere, and has attempted to integrate more complex family forms into such analysis (Martinez-Franzoni, 2008). In countries such as Nicaragua, India and South Africa a significant proportion of households are complex and extended, and a substantial number of children continue to grow up with adults other than their parents, who possibly share childcare and other care work among themselves. Even in South Korea, where the economy has undergone massive structural transformation, high levels of co-residency amongst the elderly and their adult children allow multi-generational family members to share housing, pool resources and exchange child and elderly care services. In many of these contexts, families and extended kin networks remain important cultural and survival resources. Feminist social policy analysts by no means argue for a notion of individuals as atomized and autonomous beings. Yet even the limited forms of ‘de-familialization’ that have been proposed (for example, women’s capacity to uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of the family) are difficult to apply in contexts where family and kinship networks remain important to people’s livelihoods and security, and where non-familial provision of social security is weak (Hassim and Razavi, 2006).

This kind of social embeddedness is not only a primary source of identity, but also structures women’s entitlements by offering them some access to resources such as land, housing and childcare even if only as a consequence of their conjugal or maternal status. In the midst of economic crisis, when jobs disappear and the little state provision that there is becomes eroded, these networks take on an even more critical role. In the context of recurring crises in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, the proportion of extended households increased in some countries as a response to the economic

13. The ‘new’ risks invariably include tensions between work and family life (due to women’s entry into the labour market), single parenthood, having a frail relative, possessing low or obsolete skills, and insufficient social security coverage (due to labour market changes away from full-time lifelong employment) (Bonoli, 2006).
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privations that lower-income sectors experienced and as a means of pooling resources and meeting needs such as shelter (Jelin and Diaz-Munoz, 2003). Similarly, household strategies, such as the tendency for women to take on paid work, the out-migration of younger and able-bodied members, or pooling and sharing of resources across extended kin networks can change, sometimes very rapidly, in response to the broader context within which these networks are embedded (Cerrutti, 2000; Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1988). This underlines the critical point that the family is not an isolated institution (Jelin and Diaz-Munoz, 2003). Nor is it autonomous. Domestic units, whatever their composition and form, are rooted in social networks which provide support and solidarity, sometimes across national borders, as well as being connected to the wider political economy through the flow of goods and services (Moore, 1994). However, while households and families play a crucial role in social protection and reproduction, the extended nature of economic crises in many developing countries, as well as structural changes associated with migration and HIV/AIDS, may have exhausted kinship solidarity networks (Therborn, 2004: 180).

Another feature exemplified by several countries in our cluster, most notably South Africa, Uruguay and Nicaragua, is the relatively high incidence of households with children that are maintained primarily by women (mostly mothers and grandmothers) without male support. As the evidence from Uruguay shows, it is among the lower-income strata that the presence of such households is particularly high (around 21 per cent) — more than double the rate found for higher income groups. A similar pattern can be seen in Argentina, and also in South Africa if race is used as a proxy for social class. There may be certain advantages for women of forming such households, in terms of greater decision-making power, freedom from violence, or more control over assets (Chant, 2008). It is nevertheless a constrained choice which leaves mothers in the difficult position of having to both earn a living and care for their dependants, in a context where income-earning opportunities are limited and family networks already strained.

A stark illustration of how broader political and economic processes shape and disrupt families comes from the South African contribution. Here the legacy of colonial domination and apartheid/racial capitalism has left a deep mark on family structures and gender relations, with important implications for the organization of care. The migrant labour system, which was most formalized in the country’s mining industry,14 effectively removed men from their families for most of the year while they worked in mines and lived in single-sex compounds. Women and children were for the most part restricted to an increasingly impoverished hinterland of subsistence agriculture. As is well known, the migration routes from these mines and

14. There is a tradition of both functionalist (anthropologist) and Marxist analytical work on the migrant labour system in Southern Africa; in a review of this work, O’Laughlin (1998) reiterates the importance of seeing the labour migrant system in Southern Africa as a regional labour system.
colonial construction projects also became paths for the spread of venereal disease and more recently AIDS (Caldwell et al., 1992).

These patterns, Budlender and Lund suggest, are still visible fifteen years after the end of apartheid: the majority of children are still living apart from their biological fathers. In 2005, only 35 per cent of children (0–17 years) were resident with both their biological parents while 39 per cent were living with their mother but not their father. South Africans continue to have lower rates of marriage and higher rates of extra-marital childbearing than most other countries. Women in South Africa are likely to end up responsible for providing for their children both financially and in terms of care.

Budlender and Lund are reluctant to claim any causal relations between the patterns of residence and marriage, on the one hand, and the persistently high rates of male unemployment, on the other. For Botswana, however, O’Laughlin (1998: 24) has argued that the reason many women and men do not marry and establish common households ‘is because they cannot and not because they do not wish to do so’. In the context of long-term structural unemployment — which afflicts the southern African region — many poor men do not form households at all and effectively ‘disappear’. Both rural poverty and the high incidence of households maintained by women, O’Laughlin suggests, derive from the dominant model of accumulation in the region that continues to be exclusionary and polarizing.

Beyond the political economy, ‘the family’ also embodies strong ideological and normative dimensions or a social imaginary that defines the rights and responsibilities of its members, and identifies who should provide care, as well as the legitimate recipients, and the best location for such provision. Across the wide range of countries included in this cluster, regardless of cultural and religious traditions, political configurations and socio-economic variations, the actual tasks of caring are defined as family responsibilities, and within families, as quintessentially female/maternal duties. In China, the care of the elderly by the family is even endorsed by several pieces of legislation and the Constitution, and it is a criminal offence for an adult child to refuse to support an aged family member (Cook and Dong, this volume). Women, however, tend to experience stronger pressures to care than men do in most societies, as the experience of caring is very often the medium through which they are ‘accepted into and feel they belong to the social world’ (Graham, 1983 cited in Giullari and Lewis, 2005: 11).

The inequalities in the provision of unpaid care work — unpaid housework, care of persons and ‘volunteer’ work — are captured in the time use survey data referred to in many of the contributions to this volume. It should
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not come as a surprise that, in all countries, women’s hours of paid work are less than men’s, while men contribute less time to unpaid care work. Among six of the countries in our core cluster (India, South Korea, South Africa, Tanzania, Nicaragua and Argentina) the mean time spent by women on unpaid care work was more than twice the mean time spent by men (Budlender, 2008a). When paid and unpaid work were combined, women in all six countries allocated more time to work than men — meaning less time for leisure, education, political participation and self-care. In general, therefore, it is fair to say that ‘time poverty’ is more prevalent among women than men. But this statement relates to averages calculated across the population. In fact, the distribution patterns for men and women are very different, with low variability among men (that is, men seem to do a consistently low amount of unpaid care work) and high variability among women (some women do significantly more unpaid care work than others). As a consequence, there is a notable level of in-group inequality among women. Age, gender, marital status, income/class, race/caste and the presence of young children in the household are some of the factors that influence variation in the time people spend on unpaid care work. Being male tends to result in doing less unpaid care work across all countries. As far as the age of the care giver is concerned, the common pattern is an initial increase, with age, in the amount of unpaid care work done, followed by a decrease. Household income, meanwhile, tends to have an inverse relation with women’s time inputs into unpaid care work. In other words, in low-income households women allocate more time to such tasks than in high-income households, possibly a reflection of the fewer possibilities of purchasing care services, the absence of infrastructure and larger household size. Having a young child in the household has a major impact on the amount of unpaid care work assumed by women and men.16

Yet despite the construction of care work as deeply familial and maternal, care is not and has never been confined to the family and family-mediated relations. Many of the intimate tasks associated with care slip out of the unpaid domain of family and ‘go public’ (Anttonen, 2005). This happens in a variety of ways, for example when households resort to market-mediated relations to access care assistance provided by domestic workers or child minders, or through public sector or not-for-profit sector service provision. In some instances the ‘publicness’ of care is straightforward, for example when families resort to a public old age home or crèche for the care of an elderly parent or a young child; here both the location of care and the technology and basic social infrastructure are not readily available, domestic tasks can absorb a huge amount of time, leaving little time for the more ‘interactive’ part of care. Even in the developed countries, domestic work continues to absorb a significant share of women’s time among low-income households who are not able to hire help or purchase market substitutes. The contributions to this volume have therefore tended to include non-relational aspects in their analysis of care.

16. Detailed analyses of the time use data for the UNRISD project countries can be found in the edited volume by Debbie Budlender (2010), Time Use Studies and Unpaid Care Work.
relations mediating it, as well as the source of funding, partially shift away from the family. In other instances, families can make their own financial arrangement for hiring care that is provided in the home or in another location (for example a private crèche). The relations can become even more complex and fuzzy where states show a propensity to give financial support to families to provide childcare at home, either by the parent or through the employment of a home-based childcare worker. In this case, as in the case of child-oriented cash transfer schemes already referred to, while the state assumes some financial responsibility for childcare, ‘the bottom line is that the family [mother] is still seen as the appropriate provider of care to young children, although not as the sole provider’ (Daly, 2011: 15).\footnote{17}

Notions of familialism\footnote{18} and maternalism\footnote{19} resonate across the countries covered in this issue, regardless of how families arrange their actual tasks of caring. These normative assumptions are often carried over into the policy domain where almost by default it is women/mothers who are seen as the ones who have to bear responsibility for the care of other family members. In periods of rapid change, as in the case of China with the declining influence of socialist ideology that accorded at least formal equality to women and men, traditional patriarchal values can see a revival: the growing references to China’s Confucian cultural heritage in policy circles, Cook and Dong suggest, not only frees the government from assuming fiscal responsibility for welfare provision, but is also likely to reinforce traditional gender norms and/or simply leave care needs unaddressed.

Even when it is not mothers or other family members who provide care — when care is shifted out of the family — the workforce tends to be predominantly female and workers often face significant wage disadvantages \textit{vis-à-vis} workers with comparable skill levels in non-care related occupations (Budig and Misra, 2010; England et al., 2002).\footnote{20} Caring seems to be widely devalued, no matter where it takes place and who performs it, the low pay often justified by constructing such work as ‘low-skilled’ and/or as work which carries its own rewards.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Daly’s paper deals with European policies only; however, the point being made can be extended to the cash transfer schemes in developing countries as well.
\item Familialism can be understood as an ideology that promotes family as a way of life and a force for social integration. A familialist welfare system, more specifically, is one that relies heavily on the family for the provision of welfare and care.
\item Maternalism has been defined by Koven and Michel (1993: 4) as a variety of ideologies that ‘exalted women’s capacities to mother and applied to society as a whole the values they attached to that role: care, nurturance and morality’. Unlike the papers on India and Argentina in this volume that use the term maternalist to describe state policy, Koven and Michel’s analysis was grounded in women’s social movements and their engagement with welfare policies. However, they also drew attention to ‘the protean character of maternalism, the ease with which it could be harnessed to forge improbable coalitions’ and the ‘subtle shift from a vision of motherhood in the service of women to one serving the needs of paternalists’ (ibid.: 5).
\item An analysis of workers in the care economy of UNRISD project countries appears in a Special Issue of \textit{International Labour Review} (Razavi and Staab, 2010).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
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Running counter to predictions that paid domestic service would disappear with economic development, rising income inequality seems to have acted as a major driving force behind its growth. It is therefore not surprising that paid domestic labour remains an important source of employment for poor women in some of the most unequal parts of the world, such as Latin America and South Africa. Similarly, in both India and China, the recent period of economic growth has witnessed an increase in the number of women employed in domestic service, with the rise of an urban ‘servant-employing’ middle class as the pull factor, and shrinking employment opportunities in rural areas as the push factor. In the context of growing inequalities, the movement of domestic labour across borders has also increased, not only from South to North, but also within Southern regions (e.g. from Peru to Argentina, from the Philippines to Singapore). Hovering at the most informal end of the labour market spectrum, most of these workers are excluded from regulations on minimum wage, maximum working hours, or mandatory employer contributions.

CARE AS PUBLIC POLICY

As analysts of care have often remarked, one of the complexities of care is that it cuts across conventional policy boundaries — ‘in fact, there is no policy for care as such in most national policy settings’ (Daly, 2009). Yet this very complexity also points to the marginal status of care in the currently dominant paradigm of growth. ‘Can we imagine another centrally important human activity, e.g., national defence, or transportation infrastructure, that would be spread so thinly and unevenly across the four corners of the care diamond?’ (Tronto, 2009).

Good care requires a variety of resources. Time is a key input into care provision. However, the question of time cannot be considered without the material/income dimension. It is one thing to be time-poor and income-rich (middle-class professionals), another thing to be time-poor and income-poor (women wage labourers in rural India), and yet another to be time-rich and income-poor by being forced into idleness because of very high rates of structural unemployment. Hence the concern about time needs to be much more firmly connected to income and poverty (Elson, 2005). In the welfare regimes literature, care-related interventions have been broadly categorized into three areas, dealing with time (e.g. paid care leaves), financial resources (e.g. cash transfers) and services (e.g. pre-schools, homes for the elderly) (Daly, 2001). While the broad trend across Europe favours multidimensional responses to care, it also reveals that overall spending on family policy varies

21. As Yeates’s paper (this volume) shows, in Britain too, household spending on paid domestic labour quadrupled between 1986 and 1996, and the number of people employed as domestic workers increased by 17 per cent during the late 1990s when average employment growth was 3 per cent.
One of the key policy lessons emerging from this evidence is that time, money and services are complementary policy inputs, rather than being substitutes. This is an important point to bear in mind, especially in view of the enthusiasm with which donors have been advocating for child/family-oriented cash transfer schemes in developing countries — albeit aimed at enhancing children’s capabilities and/or reducing poverty, rather than facilitating care per se or reducing gender inequality — without sufficient reflection on the critical role of care services.

A Decent Income for Care

One way in which care giving can be supported is by providing allowances, financed through public funds, so that the primary care giver can temporarily withdraw from full-time paid work. This is equivalent to what Fraser (1997) has termed the ‘care-giver parity model’. One problem with this scenario, as she points out, is that even if the system of allowances-plus-wages provides the equivalent of a basic minimum breadwinner wage, it is likely to create a ‘mommy track’ in employment — a market in flexible, non-continuous full- and/or part-time jobs (Fraser, 1997: 57). Recent policy discussions in Europe on welfare restructuring have placed the accent on the need for labour market ‘activation’, especially of women with young children, including lone mothers, who have tended to have lower rates of labour force participation and some degree of financial assistance on the basis of their maternal status. It is in this context that Orloff has written about ‘farewell to maternalism’ (2005). Others have looked into what the new ‘adult worker model’ can mean for gender equality, both in the home and in the market (Daly, 2011; Giulari and Lewis, 2005).

Governments do not seem to be bidding ‘farewell to maternalism’ in some of the countries covered in this special issue. In the case of several Latin American countries which have been experimenting with different types of cash transfer schemes aimed at children and the family in recent years, feminist analysis suggests a revival of maternalism (Molyneux, 2006). One issue that is considered problematic is the requirement that mothers contribute a set amount of hours of community work, such as for cleaning schools and health centres, in addition to the commitments they have to make to taking their children for regular health checks and attending workshops on health

22. This is similar to a broader concern which has been raised about conditional cash transfers, namely that while cash stipends may enhance poor people’s access to services (by enabling parents to purchase school uniforms and books, for example), they do little to strengthen the supply and quality of public health and education services, which are often in a dire state after years of neglect and under-funding.

23. Concerns have been raised about the quality of jobs that women are getting, particularly in view of the European policy emphasis on the need for more ‘flexible’ employment regimes that are necessary for global competitiveness (Giullari and Lewis, 2005).
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and hygiene (ibid.), intensifying women’s unpaid workloads. Attention has also been drawn to the ways in which women in such programmes seem to be ‘primarily positioned as a means to secure programme objectives; they are a conduit of policy, in the sense that resources channelled through them are expected to translate into greater improvements in the well-being of children and the family as a whole’ (ibid.: 439). Endorsing these concerns, Faur’s analysis of Argentine social policies (this volume) suggests that the appeal to mothers’ responsibility and commitment to their children and families as a prerequisite for obtaining the minimum resources needed for subsistence from the State, reflects a traditional maternalistic perspective ‘re-packaged into a modern criterion for eligibility to social assistance’.

Such a critical stance is not shared by other contributors. South Africa has been another pioneer in the public provisioning of social assistance grants for children, old people, and a number of other social groups. Indeed the proportion of households that receives at least one of these grants is significant. Similar to other cash transfer programmes, women predominate among the beneficiaries: 98 per cent of those who receive the Child Support Grant (CSG) and 73 per cent of those who receive the pension for elderly people are women. The other important characteristic of the South African grants is that they are unconditional (though means-tested), going against the orthodoxy that insists on behavioural conditionalities.\(^{24}\) Hence, the concern that conditional cash transfers increase women’s unpaid care burdens, as the contributions on Argentina and Nicaragua in this volume suggest, is not pertinent here.\(^{25}\) Budlender and Lund (this volume) argue that these grants ‘crowd-in’ care, especially for children, by substituting for employment-based income in a context where many adults and prime carers are unemployed or discouraged from even looking for work. They also cite evidence that suggests that receipt of an old age pension grant may enable grandmothers to care for their grandchildren while the younger women migrate to seek paid work.

There are, apart from the problematic conditionalities, multiple impediments that stand in the way of making these transfers a rights-based entitlement: their weak legal basis in many countries; the fact that some of these programmes rely on external funding of unknown duration; the means-testing that very often lacks transparency to beneficiaries; abusive behaviour by officials within the system; and the absence of automatic redress

\(^{24}\) However, there have been attempts to introduce conditionalities in South Africa since 2010; see Lund (2011) for clarification and an argument on why linking the CSG to school attendance is ‘a step in the wrong direction’.

\(^{25}\) Although there is evidence to show that conditional cash transfers increase children’s school enrolment and attendance rates and improve their health, there is little if any research that proves that it is the conditionalities that cause this ‘rather than simply the injection of additional cash into the household’ (Budlender, 2008b: 8–9). If the positive impacts are not the result of the conditionalities, there is little reason for the state to face the challenges and administrative costs associated with implementing them and for beneficiaries to face the difficulties that conditions will create for them (ibid.).
mechanisms. Most important perhaps, what needs to be borne in mind is that social assistance payments ideally should be one component of a much more comprehensive system of social security. They can nevertheless be a useful component for many as a reliable (albeit small) source of regular income. In other words, the baby (transfer) should not be thrown out with the bathwater (conditionality).

Being set at a relatively low level, social assistance payments can usually defray only a small percentage of the cost of raising children (or caring for other dependants). Hence, for better or for worse, the income to support care giving will at least have to be partially provisioned through paid work. In developing countries, however, labour markets tend to be extensively informal, with far-reaching implications for people’s lack of access to social and economic security. Countries like India and Nicaragua, whether we label them ‘exclusionary’ (Filgueira, 2007) or ‘informal’ (Martinez Franzoni, 2008) welfare regimes, are characterized by extensively informal labour markets where social protection measures such as pensions and maternity/parental leave are largely directed to the small strata who are in formal (very often public) employment.

Although there is an inverse relationship between the informalization of labour and economic growth (confirming the counter-cyclical nature of informal work), informal employment has been growing not only in contexts of low economic growth but also where rates of growth have been modest or good, suggesting a more complex relationship between the two (Heintz and Pollin, 2003). In China, Cook and Dong suggest that despite high rates of growth, rising levels of unemployment in the late 1990s led to stronger arguments for having less secure ‘flexible’ forms of employment as re-employment measures, especially in sectors where women dominate. In the case of India the entire net employment increase between the high-growth years 1999/2000 and 2004/5 has been that of informal workers (Srivastava, 2008). While Indian women’s economic activity rates are low in comparative terms (the lowest in our cluster of countries), those who enter the workforce often do so as a ‘distress strategy’. Hence, it is very often poverty that pushes women into the paid workforce, and often into marginal forms of employment offering very low levels of income. For vast sections of the workforce earnings are so low that even the existence of multiple earners in the household is not sufficient to pull the household above the poverty line (UNRISD, 2010). This is despite the exceptionally long hours spent on such work. Similarly, the contribution on China documents the ‘harsh

26. These issues have been elaborated at some length in the report of the Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty, Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona (UNGA, 2009).

27. According to the time use survey data, Indian men and women have the longest working hours and the shortest time allocated to ‘non-productive work’ (i.e. sleeping, leisure, studying) compared to other countries in our cluster (Budlender, 2008a).
choices’ that rural women in low-income villages have to make between caring for their young children and earning a livelihood in a context where grandmothers and older children are the only care substitutes available to them. The extensive informality of labour markets in such contexts also makes a mockery of the care-related social protection measures that may be on the statute books, such as entitlements to maternity or parental leave — minimal measures for reconciling paid work and unpaid care responsibilities (historically targeted to women, but now increasingly embracing men too).

While labour markets are more formalized in Argentina, Uruguay, South Africa and South Korea, and the coverage of social protection programmes more extensive, a number of relevant issues nevertheless stand out. In both Argentina and Uruguay, even during the ‘golden age’, women’s primary role in care and reproduction was firmly maintained, and their access to social protection was very often mediated through marriage. Argentina, as the contribution by Faur makes clear, exemplifies significant discontinuity marked by recurrent crises and abrupt changes in its welfare regime. Over a period of important structural reforms (1975–2000), the country has gone from being a regional pioneer in social policy that offered social security coverage, albeit of different quality, to its economically active population and basic education and health services to nearly all citizens, to what may be called a dualist regime. Close to half the workforce is today informally employed and increasingly dependent on the social assistance programmes that have moved to centre stage. This is also the period when falling earnings, especially of male breadwinners due to unemployment or underemployment, have propelled women into the paid workforce.

The fact that today close to half of all economically active women work informally means that they have no entitlement to paid maternity leave or to workplace-based care services, which are differentially available even to those who work formally (depending on the sector, province and the strength of trade unions). In fact the policy direction in Argentina, as in Uruguay and Mexico (Staab and Gerhard, this volume), seems to be moving away from the implementation or expansion of earlier legislation on employment-based rights to childcare for women. Instead, the state has taken significant steps to expand both formal and non-formal pre-school education and care services.

However, there are also elements of continuity and path-dependency. Despite its significantly downsized formal workforce, Argentina stands out regionally for the resurgence of its historically strong labour movement in recent years. This has helped large portions of the formal workforce to recover their wage levels (and some non-wage benefits like family allowances) in the midst of relatively robust growth rates (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). While the reasons for this resurgence are complex, one contributing factor has been the coming to power of a government which has been favourable

28. The origins of maternity leave were not in facilitating care, but rather in protecting the welfare and health of mother and child.
to unions and to union activity. However, in some ways similar to the situation in South Africa, unionism and some form of corporatism in both countries has not been able to overcome the deep segmentation that separates the insiders (mostly formal sector workers) from the outsiders (the informal workforce) amongst whose ranks women predominate. The few social provisions that low-income families and women draw on to reconcile their informal paid work with their care responsibilities are accessed not through employment, but through poorly funded social services and social assistance programmes of diverse kinds.

South Korea stands apart from both Argentina and South Africa given the extent to which employment-related social protection mechanisms are being used by the state to help families (read women) to reconcile their paid work with their family responsibilities, by legislating, regulating and financing maternity and parental leaves (in addition to legislating and financing childcare services and elderly care). However, as the contribution by Peng shows, the ‘caring’ side of the state is taking shape almost in parallel with, and perhaps as a sweetener to, the bitter and more contentious post-1997 labour market reforms that have facilitated the extremely rapid growth of non-standard employment. 29 In 2005, non-standard employment accounted for 24.1 per cent of men’s and 40.3 per cent of women’s employment (Grubb et al., 2007). These labour market trends beg the question as to how effectively the newly mandated maternity and parental leave provisions will be applied across sectors, especially in the smaller enterprises where women tend to be clustered.

Infrastructure and Basic Social Services

Besides income from work (or, in its absence, social transfers), there are at least two other critical pre-conditions for care giving: public provisioning of appropriate infrastructure and technology (water and sanitation, decent housing) to reduce the burden of unpaid domestic work; and enabling social services (health, primary education) to complement unpaid care giving. Both the welfare regime literature and its feminist critiques assume a fairly capable state that will collect taxes and finance basic amenities like electricity, roads and safe water, and at the very least provide basic health and education services. These preconditions cannot be taken for granted in a developing country context.

29. 1997 marked the Asian financial and economic crisis which brought in the IMF with a bailout plan that became an occasion for overhauling the labour market regime in South Korea, to make it more “flexible” (Woo, 2007: 18). Woo argues that the South Korean government in fact used the IMF as a political cover to push through the labour market reforms that the corporate sector had long been demanding but which the government had failed to impose due to trade union militancy.
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The issue of poverty and resource constraints — not only of the majority of the population, but also of the state — is an important theme in Martinez Franzoni and Voorend’s analysis of care in Nicaragua (this volume). Both women and men engage in the labour force at relatively high rates. The problem rather is that the kinds of work people undertake give very low levels of income. This also means that the state’s capacity to generate revenue through personal taxation is constrained. The marginal role of the state becomes clear when the figures for public social expenditure are placed alongside those for cross-border remittances and overseas development assistance.

Public health and education services in many countries have been commoditized over the past decades and their quality eroded because public investment in them, though rising in recent years in some countries, has not kept up with growing needs and expectations. In India and Nicaragua, however, even the reach of basic public health and education services remains inadequate, especially in remote rural areas and among socially disadvantaged groups.

Palriwala and Neetha argue that even the supposedly universal components in the Indian welfare regime — health and education — have always been unevenly and minimally available or not accessed by those who have had the means to resort to private facilities. Matters have been made worse since the 1990s with the substantial increase in private healthcare provision (Baru, 2003), as part of the government strategy to develop medical corporations catering to both wealthy domestic and foreign customers (see Yeates’s discussion of medical tourism in this volume). The lack of affordable medical treatment means that the care of the ill falls on family members, usually women and girls, or the sick are left to recover on their own as best they can. In education, primary school enrolment has expanded significantly, although the quality is very uneven and standards very low, especially in rural areas and among poorer religious and caste groups. High drop-out rates in schools also mean that neither the education nor the care of children (at least during school hours) can be shifted out of the household and made a public responsibility. Much the same could be said about public welfare services in Nicaragua. In both countries regional disparities in the availability of public services have been made worse through policies of decentralization, to the extent that wealthier districts have more easily been able to raise local revenue to supplement national transfers than poorer ones.

Care Services and the Public–Private–‘Community’ Mix

The previous two sections dealt with some of what we called the preconditions for care giving. This section turns to care services for children, which have been a source of expansion in many institutionalized welfare states, and which have also emerged on the policy agenda in some of the countries included in our cluster. This may be in part at least a reflection of
the diffusion of the ‘social investment perspective’ which has a particular interest in children, their ‘human capital’ and capabilities, which are seen as long-term ‘investments’ that will reap rewards in the future. As such the social investment perspective is fully in tune with the notion of ‘equality of opportunity’ that has become part of the common sense in current thinking about equality, displacing the earlier concern with equality of outcome (Phillips, 2006). But care service expansion could also be responding to other pressures and needs, for example facilitating women’s labour market activation or creating employment opportunities for them — other tenets of the social investment approach (Jenson and Saint Martin, 2006).

The feminist social policy literature has tended to rate the provision of publicly financed and/or delivered services for care-related needs rather positively.\(^{30}\) While it acknowledges that this strategy carries heavy financial implications for the public budget, it has several important advantages from a gender perspective (Huber and Stephens, 2000). It tends to legitimize care work, provide relatively well-protected jobs for women (at least compared to the market or charitable sectors), give unpaid carers greater choice in seeking employment, and improve access and quality for recipients of care (especially those on low incomes). However, the direct provision of public care services is not the norm even in Europe (apart from the Nordic countries), where there has been a shift to more hybrid forms of service provision.

In the middle- and upper-middle income countries in our cluster (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, South Africa and South Korea) governments have been actively experimenting with a range of care-related measures, including early childhood education and care (ECEC) services. The challenge faced by most of these countries (perhaps with the exception of South Korea) is not only to expand coverage, but to do so in a way that reduces class and regional inequalities, rather than reproducing and reinforcing them. This becomes a formidable challenge when a mix of public–private–community is used, and where different types of programme are developed for different social groups. This seems to be the model favoured by the World Bank which eschews the kind of universal ECEC services recommended by organizations such as the OECD; inspired by US ‘Head Start’ and related programmes, the World Bank favours ECEC programmes that target the very poor through less formal types of service provision (Mahon, 2011).

In countries where the education system is segmented, there is the risk of reproducing those inequalities in the ECEC services. However, ‘path dependency’ does not mean that there is no room for policy change, as illustrated by the Chilean case analysed by Staab and Gerhard (this volume).

\(^{30}\) The disability movement has tended to lean towards cash benefits (as opposed to service provisioning). Cash benefits, it has been argued, allow care recipients greater choice in accessing the type of services they need and hence more ‘independent living’ (see Williams, 2010 and references cited therein).
The fact that coverage of children under the age of four was extremely low before the reforms arguably increased the government’s room for manoeuvre in shaping the institutional setting in which services would be provided. Their analysis suggests that the government of Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010) may well have used this leeway to strengthen the role of public institutions — in contrast to the larger educational system where powerful private-sector interests have been a major obstacle to equity-oriented reforms.

In all these countries, while higher-income groups usually have a range of options, such as private childcare or hiring domestic/care workers, the ability of lower-income households to purchase care is limited. Pluralism of service provisioning can slip into fragmentation as gaps are filled by providers offering services of varying quality and catering to different segments of the population, as Faur shows for Argentina. In Argentina class and regional differences in access to pre-school education for five-year-olds have been reduced substantially by making enrolment mandatory for this age group and by bolstering public provision. However, for the younger age groups where public provision is limited and the market plays a dominant role, enrolment rates of children from lower-income households remain only a fraction of their higher-income counterparts. Since low-income families cannot access the fee-based private childcare facilities, they face long waiting lists for public crèches, or have to resort to the less professionalized ‘community’ services (Childhood Development Centres) being promoted by the Ministry of Social Development.

A somewhat similar situation prevails in Mexico (Staab and Gerhard, this volume), where from the early 2000s the Ministry of Public Education made public pre-school education mandatory for all three- to five-year-olds, while the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) has, since 2007, put in place a large day-care programme (Federal Day-care Programme for Working Mothers) targeted to a younger cohort of children (one- to four-years) from low-income households. The latter programme, like its Argentine counterpart, also relies on less professionalized staff. Interestingly, and in some contrast to the maternalist thrust of the Mexican cash transfer programme, the Federal Day-care Programme’s main aim has been to expand employment opportunities for women (rather than enhancing child welfare or school-readiness); it aims to do this by giving mothers access to affordable ‘community-based’ childcare options, and by creating employment opportunities for women as ‘self-employed’ carers offering their services under the programme. As Staab and Gerhard rightly argue, while care work is often devalued even when it is institutionalized and professionalized, the ‘community’ strategies being pursued in Mexico and many other countries raise serious questions about both the working conditions and pay of women carers, as well as the quality of care that is being offered to children from low-income households.

South Korea’s overall performance in terms of number of children enrolled in pre-school is comparable to the Latin American countries. Here
The state has sought to partially finance, regulate, but not necessarily deliver care services. Indeed, only around 6 per cent of the childcare centres are truly public; the rest are subsidized, private for-profit and non-profit centres (mimicking the role of the private sector in the delivery of healthcare). Government subsidies on a sliding scale based on parents’ income are paid directly to the institution where the child is enrolled. Hence, the same institution may be frequented by children from low- and high-income groups, as the participation of those with lower incomes is subsidized by the state. An effective and equitable mix of public and private provision thus demands a fairly capable state that can regulate market and not-for-profit providers and subsidize the access of lower-income households. Yet a ‘public–private’ mix is often advocated in contexts where such capacity, both administrative and fiscal, is weak.

In the lower income countries, such as India and Nicaragua, care services tend to be rudimentary and inadequate. However, some of the infrastructure for providing these services may be already in place. Examples include the crêche-nutrition units (anganwadis) in India, or the childcare centres in Nicaragua. Yet public financing of these schemes is extremely low, and their reliance on very low-paid and ‘voluntary’ work is not supported by adequate training and resources.

The temptation by states, especially when fiscally constrained, to rely on ‘voluntarism’ is a theme that reverberates across several contributions to this volume, in particular Martinez Franzoni and Voorend’s analysis of ‘voluntarism’ as an important pillar of Nicaraguan social programmes. As their study amply shows, ‘voluntarism’ is also deeply gendered. Although the costs of social programmes can be reduced, it is highly questionable whether this ‘volunteer’ support is appropriate in a context where families, especially women, already face multiple demands on their time. It is also not clear what ‘voluntarism’ means in a context of extensive poverty or high structural unemployment, where many ‘volunteers’ may have joined the programme in the hope of acquiring skills that will channel them into paid employment. The latter concern has been raised widely in response to the Home Based Care programmes relying on ‘volunteer’ work that have mushroomed across African countries because formal health systems are not able to cope with the burden of HIV/AIDS-related care (Akintola, 2004; Meena, 2010).

THE POLITICS OF CARE

The contributions to this volume challenge the view that only advanced industrialized countries are able to develop care-related policies and programmes, while developing countries are indelibly stuck on a ‘familialist’ track. While severe resource constraints at the national level tend to reinforce reliance on the unpaid work of women, whether as mothers or ‘community’ workers (as we saw in Nicaragua), the relationship between income and policy development is not linear or univocal.
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Classical European-style care policies in the form of employment-related measures such as paid and unpaid leave, severance pay and flexi-time, may be non-existent or rudimentary in many developing countries, but they are also out-of-sync with the ‘real’ labour markets in these countries which leave a large proportion of the workforce outside formal systems of labour regulation. However, other care-related policy areas are receiving attention. Several developing country states have been active around early childhood development programmes, and some have even outpaced developed countries in terms of actual coverage of children. In a developing country context, policies apart from leave and care services — such as infrastructure development, basic social service provisioning and social protection programmes — have particular salience in facilitating care giving. Many developing country governments are experimenting with different ways of responding to care needs in their societies. The variations across countries in how social and care policies are taking shape hold some useful policy lessons. One is the danger of relying on ‘voluntarism’ — a useful message at a time when the role of the ‘community’ is being reified in some developed countries to fill the gap in the context of welfare state retrenchment. The other message is the risk, in particular for women, of labour market ‘flexibility’ and the danger of de-linking social policy from employment issues and macroeconomic policy more broadly. On this last point it is important to underline that social policy more broadly, and care provisioning more specifically, effectively help (re)produce labour and replenish the labour pool; and conversely, to create a welfare system that is more than a thin safety net of last resort requires state revenues that can be generated and sustained by fully employing the human resources of a country in high-productivity activities. As Heintz and Lund (2011) remind us, drawing on Esping-Andersen’s 1990 influential book, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*:

A de-commodifying welfare state must maintain something close to full employment. There is no way of de-linking employment policy from the broader welfare regime. This includes macroeconomic policies which have a direct impact on the level of employment. Given the impact of the recent financial crisis, it also requires policy which disciplines capital in ways that support broader social objectives — in today’s economies, this means regulating financial capital in particular. (Heintz and Lund, 2011: 22)

Another emerging message clearly relates to the intersecting inequalities of gender/class/race/location and the risk of market-driven care arrangements reinforcing those inequalities. A final note of caution underlined by developments in China is the risk of policy reversals and patriarchal resurgence. The latter only goes to underline how tenuous and contested the gains in gender equality often are. In particular historical junctures women’s movements have been able to rally around care issues, build political and institutional alliances, and call on the state to fund good quality services for the care of young children or the elderly. Sweden may be a case in point. It may also be a rather exceptional case. Care concerns have often been thrust upon the state by virtue of
exigency, for example in the context of rapid population ageing and fertility decline (as in South Korea) or in the midst of health epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, both of which have intensified care needs and provided an opening for putting the issue on the policy agenda. In other instances, interest in children’s well-being on the part of both policy elites and children’s rights advocates seems to have driven the policy process, especially at a time when attention to child poverty has been heightened. This seems to have been the case in Chile, Uruguay, South Africa and Argentina, for example. However, as the following contributions make clear, policy responses in all these countries have been facilitated by specific historical and political conjunctures: the coming to power of left-leaning governments, sometimes with feminists in critical positions (as the contributions on Chile and Uruguay show), the momentum created by democratic openings (as in South Africa). Alternatively, it may reflect the search by politicians for a ‘winnable’ strategy, as Peng’s analysis of the Roh Moo-hyun administration suggests for South Korea. Here the government responded positively to the demands of feminists and welfarists for care-related policies, because childcare was an effective reform package with which the Roh government could address several key policy issues simultaneously: high unemployment, low economic growth, low fertility and gender equality.

The key question is how to sustain the pressure and ensure that the measures that are put in place meet the needs of all those who require care, and the rights/needs of all those who provide care. The fact that care giving is so easily naturalized — even by women themselves — as ‘something that women do’, and hence not an issue that could be rendered the subject of public contestation and policy-making, often acts as a barrier to its politicization. A key challenge that confronts countries examined in this volume is the inequalities in the quality of care that different social groups receive — inequalities which closely mirror the configurations of social class and racial/ethnic status. These imbalances fly in the face of all the rhetoric about ‘equality of opportunity’. In a world where elites can satisfy their care needs by hiring others (domestic workers, nannies, and so on) and by accessing fee-paying crèches and homes for the elderly, while others rely on under-funded public services and over-stretched kinship and family networks while they struggle to meet their family’s subsistence needs, it is not easy to construct alliances around common human needs for care. The conundrum has been eloquently captured by Joan Tronto:

as long as care is privatized and individualized it is possible to praise oneself for one’s caring and decry the ways in which others care. Such praise and blame will likely follow lines of race, class . . . [and] will likely make it more difficult to see inequalities as a result of lack of choice and to see them more as the result of deliberate bad actions, decisions, and ways of life of others. (Tronto, 2006: 11)

Providing meagre allowances (for families, children or the elderly) or ‘community services’ to support care, financed through the public budget, then become subject to all kinds of paternalistic conditionalities in order to
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police the behaviour of the welfare recipients or ‘dependants’ (Fraser and Gordon, 1994; Standing, 2011). The inequality in care then creates a vicious circle, and people are unlikely to recognize the structural underpinnings (unequal power, economic and social inequality and patterns of discrimination) of care imbalances. Thus, they are unlikely to see that the care imbalance requires social responsibility and a collective response. Turning the vicious circle into a virtuous one where the costs of care can be socialized and its benefits maximized becomes a formidable challenge, but one that must be faced if we are serious about creating really equal societies.

REFERENCES


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