Part I  Global Multilingualism, World Languages, and Language Systems
1  Globalization, Global English, and World English(es): Myths and Facts

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Introduction

Today’s world is claimed to be economically and culturally more globalized than ever before, thanks to faster and more reliable means of transportation and communication, which have facilitated greater human traffic and the exchange of larger volumes of information and goods. This concurrent evolution has also led to increased mutual cultural influences across national and regional boundaries, which prompted some experts to claim that the world has been homogenizing by convergence, at the expense of cultural diversity. To be sure, the directions and volumes of traffic are not necessarily symmetrical. The players or partners involved in the relevant world-wide networks of interconnectedness and interdependence do not hold equal economic powers; it is the more powerful who control which populations and commodities (including languages) are transported more freely, and in which directions. Thus, to the eyes of many, globalization is no more than McDonaldization and Americanization (largely through the world-wide diffusion of Hollywood movies); and the spread of English is no less than a part of this trend (for such views, propounded in one form or another, see for instance Crystal 2000, 2004; Nettle and Romaine 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Phillipson 2003; Hagège 2006). Some linguists have thus claimed that a ‘global English’ is bound to emerge which should facilitate communication world-wide, alongside – or perhaps superseding – ‘indigenized’ or ‘world Englishes.’ According to the same futurologists, the more widely this ‘global English’ spreads, the more likely it is to drive other languages to extinction, just as has been witnessed in North America and Australia.

However, neither economic globalization nor language spread is new in the history of mankind. What is especially striking today is both the scale and the speed at which these processes are evolving. I submit that examining them comparatively, with more historical depth than is exhibited in the current linguistics
literature, should help us sort out myths and facts about how English is actually spreading and whether it is justified to expect the consequences of the process to be uniform all over the world. I therefore invite the reader to be patient and to review with me a selective, informative history of mankind from the point of view of colonization, which will help us assess more critically the spread of English. This history will explain why we need not fear the emergence of a ‘global English,’ let alone of a time when it might function as the world’s exclusive or dominant vernacular. I will start by articulating from the outset the interpretation of globalization that really bears on language endangerment.

**What Is Globalization and What Is New about It?**

Answers to the above questions vary and depend largely on what particular aspects of the manifold phenomenon called ‘globalization’ a scholar chooses to focus on. If we start with the characterization of globalization both as “the process of becoming global” (Keohane and Nye 2000) and as “the state that results from this process,” then we must also articulate what the word *global* means. Although most dictionaries privilege its meaning as ‘world-wide’ (as in *global warming*), we cannot ignore its other interpretation as ‘all-inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ (as in *global war* – which is different from *world war* – and as in *global problem/solution*).¹ Thus there can be globalization at the local level, consisting of interdependencies which obtain among the different components of the industry or economic structure of a city, or at the regional level, for instance when neighboring countries form economic alliances, such as in the now very successful case of the European Union.²

Globalization need not be thought of exclusively or primarily at the world-wide level. This level differs from the local especially in scale. Although the two may be claimed to differ also in complexity, this is not necessarily the case, unless one conceives of world-wide globalization as an economic system in which all the components of national industries are fully integrated, in complementary ways. The reality is that most of Africa and a great deal of the Pacific Islands remain on the margins of the present world-wide economic system. Moreover, only some industries (such as car and computer manufacture) are distributed complementarily over different parts of the world. However, the relevant trade networks, which should connect the missing links, do not include all parts of the world – especially not those still lagging in transportation infrastructure.

Telecommunications, transportation, shipping, and banking are indeed among the handful of industries that can be claimed to instantiate world-wide globalization *qua* networks of interconnectedness and interdependence. These particular industries also make it obvious that the world is not equally interconnected; countries with the highest globalization index are more centrally connected than others, and the so-called ‘global cities’ are more interconnected than other places. One can likewise argue that world-wide globalization is simply a geographically expanded version of glocalization, although students of multiculturalism discuss the latter as if it were a consequence of world-wide globalization. As cultures, and
therefore languages, travel primarily and the most naturally with people, these
observations prompt us to assess critically claims that English is becoming a global
language (see the sections “The Fallacy of ‘Global English’” and “Will there be an
English-only Europe?” below).

One may also argue that the most primitive forms of globalization in human
economic history can be traced back all the way to the beginnings of agriculture,
when farmers colonized the hunter–gatherers and some complementarity and
interdependence arose in modes and kinds of food production. The evidently
monumental differences between, on the one hand, the forms of cooperation
and trade that emerged then and, on the other, today’s international industrial
conglomerations and networks of trade amount to differences in scale and com-
plexity rather than to differences in kind or spirit. The goal remains for different
partners to specialize in what they produce best, or more extensively, and to
buy the remaining commodities from other parties, thereby improving and maxi-
mizing production through cooperation. That the spirit of this practice has
remained fundamentally the same is evident in the asymmetrical power relations
which obtain between partners – namely in the tendency for the economically
and/or militarily more powerful to dominate the weaker ones. This tendency may
entail the adoption of cultural practices, including the language, of the more
powerful by the weaker party. However, things have not always proceeded this
way in human history (see below). For our purposes, this perspective should
help us not only to determine the places where English has spread, but also to
assess discriminatingly the communicative functions it serves and to establish
whether its impact on the indigenous languages has been uniform around the
world. On the other hand, it is evident that non-local globalization can be related
to colonization, as explained below – except where partnership is negotiated
between equals.

Complexity in local globalization may have started also with the emergence of
towns and cities. Life in such larger agglomerations has required a certain amount
of interdependence through complementary organization – such as with housing,
food and water supplies – and adequate communication and transportation net-
works in order for the residents to function adequately. The cities’ specialization
in industries, as opposed to farming and hunter–gathering, also led to an inter-
dependence between rural and urban environments, although the division of
labor and some amount of cooperation in food production varied from one part
of the world to another, according to particular times in history. All this antici-
pated the emergence of nation–states, in which national economies would be
coordinated (and even planned, to the extent that this was possible) in ways that
can be described as involving globalization. As a matter of fact, we can say that
the more globalized a city’s or nation’s economic system is, the higher its globali-
zer or glocalization index is, and the more centrally or significantly it can
participate in the world-wide global economic network. The so-called ‘global
cities’ (such as New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Los Angeles, Chicago,
and São Paulo) are those with a high glocalization index, and they function not
only as major world financial centers but also as primary ports of entry and as
principal diffusion centers in the spread of world-wide trends. They are also
places that can best highlight differences in the ways English and other major languages have spread around the world, especially through the extent of the contrast between them and the surrounding rural areas. Otherwise the characteristics of interconnectedness and interdependence associated with world-wide globalization are generally extensions of those that apply in glocalization.

‘Global cities’ also remind us that world-wide globalization started with long-distance trading practiced at an early date by, for example, the Babylonians, the Egyptians, the Phoenicians, the Chinese (on the Silk Road), and, later, the Greeks and the Romans (Cowen 2001): essentially they remind us that enterprises started from economically and politically powerful cities. Then as now, the size of the world was largely determined by how far technology enabled the traders to go and their respective languages to travel with them. In the Middle Ages the Arabs and the Chinese definitely expanded the size of that world-trade, as the former sailed across the Mediterranean as well as eastwards and southwards along the Indian Ocean, while the latter sailed southwards in the Pacific and westwards in the Indian Ocean. Further improvements in transportation technology would lead to the European Great Explorations of the fifteenth century and to the consequent colonization of most of the rest of the world by Europeans (see for instance Osterhammel and Peterson 2005). Since then, world-wide globalization has changed in respect of how far away the colonizers and traders traveled from their homelands, how fast they journeyed, how much commodity and human traffic actually took place, how much more complex the exchange system has become, and how asymmetrical the share of profits has been between partners.3

Long-distance trade involved not only exchanges of commodities, but also traffic of people and ideas, and hence of cultures. This produced language spread, which sometimes transformed the vernacular a into lingua franca, as has been the case in history with Akkadian, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Arabic, Malay, Swahili, Nheengatu (Lingua Geral), Quechua, and Mobilian, to name but a few (see Ostler 2005 for many more examples), before the age of modern European languages. Out of the latter, English has emerged as a pre-eminent world language and, being ‘indicted’ by linguists for the loss of several indigenous languages, especially in North America and Australia, it has been mischaracterized as the ‘killer language’ par excellence. I will return to most of the issues related to this topic from the next section onward. I would just like to conclude this section with some comments on the role of urbanization in language coexistence and competition, which will explain why the impact that the usage of English as a vernacular has exerted, in particular on indigenous languages in North America, may not be replicated in former British exploitation colonies, especially those of Africa.

Cities have usually been contact settings, where individuals of different ethno-linguistic backgrounds have migrated either from rural areas or from other cities, typically in search of better economic opportunities. It is probably around them that one can most easily defend the hypothesis that, due to complex webs of interconnectedness and interdependence among residents and among the industries in which they (hope to) function, globalization cum glocalization is homogenizing places culturally, hence linguistically. Cities also happen to be the nodes
that connect different nations in the world-wide network of interconnectedness and interdependence more commonly associated with globalization. If it is true that globalization as a process is homogenizing the world, cities should be the focus of any serious empirical study. I argue below that, despite similarities in the way the (international) airports and highways of cities are structured, in the way night life is experienced, in the names of major hotels (Hilton, Hyatt, Sheraton, Holiday Inn), or in the fact that cities display McDonald’s eateries – a phenomenon which some scholars have characterized as Americanization – there are still many cultural differences between them, which make it inaccurate to claim or predict the end of cultural diversity (see for instance Tomlinson 1999; Marling 2006; Florida 2005). Cities filter cultural influence from outside and adapt it to local traditions. Even if their cultures change significantly under outside influence, they retain a certain amount of substrate or element that keeps them from becoming replicas of each other. In other words, even ‘global cities’ maintain individualities in the peculiar ways they adapt to changes and outside influences, which keeps world-wide globalization from making our planet culturally uniform. Thus although some ‘global cities’ may be claimed to become anglophone or Americanized, they are not undergoing the process in a uniform way, or to the same extent. One cannot rely to the same extent on the usefulness of English as a lingua franca in Tokyo as in Paris or Amsterdam – at least not yet today.4

Colonization and Globalization

As observed by some economic historians (Mignolo 2000; Cowen 2001; Osterhammel and Peterson 2005), modern-day regional and world-wide economic globalization can be associated with, or traced back to, colonization in the sense of political and economic domination of a territory and its population(s) by citizens of another territory. Interestingly, today’s most central players in world-wide globalization include nations that evolved out of settlement colonization – whereby Europeans resettled or founded new homelands in territories outside Europe, eliminated or marginalized indigenous populations, developed highly glocalized economic systems that they intended to be better than in the Europe they emigrated from (Crosby 1986), and imposed socioeconomic world orders that reflect ‘occidentalism’ or westernization. Other players are nations such as the United Kingdom and France, which built powerful economic systems thanks to huge colonial empires, especially through the exploitation of colonies whose production of vital raw materials they controlled exclusively up to the mid-twentieth century. Germany and Japan of course stand out as miraculous developments after World War II.

Discussing world-wide globalization in relation to colonization of any kind (trade, settlement, or exploitation) provides an enlightening historical perspective. It makes obvious various layers of human traffic that account for geographic and demographic patterns of language distribution today. To be sure, higher living standards and regional wars have increasingly contributed to population
movements and contacts, especially through the free relocation of individuals or families, through tourism, deportations, and refugeeism. However, the world is still more heavily marked by the high volumes of human traffic associated with various layers and styles of documented colonization, which may well be claimed to have connected various regions and to have introduced various degrees of interdependence. As I will show below, these migrations have borne on the vitality of languages – both those of the indigenous populations and those the migrants – in various ways, constantly changing the ‘linguascape’ (or the spatial distribution of languages) of the world. Our era cannot be the only time when populations have worried about the impact of the languages of the dominant populations on those of the dominated or marginalized ones.

Among the older cases of population dispersal, the Indo-European and Bantu expansions may be the best known ones to date. Both groups dispersed gradually, over millennia, to resettle in new territories, where their languages eventually prevailed over most of the indigenous ones. In both cases, regardless of whether proto-Indo-European or proto-Bantu consisted each of one single language (a dubious assumption) or of a cluster of related language varieties, the cost of the Pyrrhic victory was further diversification, largely triggered, as it seems, by substrate influence from the indigenous languages. This became evident at a later date, in the spread and diversification of one Indo-European language, Latin.

As indicated above, trade contributed to the spread of many languages as lingua francas. In other cultural respects, it also facilitated the diffusion of the Phoenician alphabet and of the Arabic graphic representation of numbers. In most cases, the languages of trade hardly replaced those they came in contact with, unless there was a concurrent wave of colonization and settlement that spread a given language as a vernacular, as in the case of Arabic in North Africa – but not in south and southeast Asia. Vernacular shifts have typically resulted from settlement colonization, as I intend to show below regarding the geographic expansion of English. For now, suffice it to mention also the successful spread of varieties of Chinese in China, which was a consequence of the Han settlement colonization of East Asia, although several minority languages have survived the invasion. However, note that the Chinese trade-colonial expansion in Southeast Asia during the period between the thirteenth and the fifteenth centuries was not matched by a similar language spread. On the contrary, the Peranakan Chinese – an economically powerful group, comparable to that of Creoles of European descent or of mixed ancestry in Latin America – speak now as their vernaculars some indigenous languages of their trade colonies, and chiefly Malay. (See Ostler 2005 for similar considerations.)

The spread of Latin, which has often been invoked as an earlier example of a ‘global language’ (for example by Crystal 1997), is worth explaining here, as it will help us address the question of whether we can actually speak of a ‘global English.’ While it is true that Latin spread in the world around the Mediterranean and North Sea (including England, Belgium, and Germany) thanks to the Roman Empire (a notorious colonial enterprise), it is also noteworthy that it became a vernacular only in southwestern Europe and in Romania. Actually this vernacular
shift, which, I maintain, is more typical of settlement colonies, appears to have occurred most significantly after the Romans had left the Western Roman Empire (Polomé 1983; Janson 2004) – which obviously had been neither a settlement nor a typical exploitation colony. As explained in Mufwene (2008), this was an interesting colonization, in a style of its own, fitting typologically just between the two.

Unlike settler colonists, the Romans abandoned their western empire when they thought it better to protect Rome against the invading Germanics. However, they had ruled in a manner that rewarded some retired officers by granting them land in the provinces. These former officers continued to speak Latin as an emblem of their status. The Romans had also Romanized the indigenous ruling class, through which they administered their colonies (though they had a few Roman administrators too), and they rewarded quite handsomely some of these natives, who served Rome’s interests, with important offices in the empire – all the way to senatorial and even imperial positions (Garnsey and Saller 1987). It was in fact these indigenous rulers, the emergent Roman-style cities, and to some extent the Christian missions (on which see below) that perpetuated the usage of Latin as a vernacular after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. From the emergent cities, Vulgar Latin gradually spread to the rural areas, along with the Roman-style economy and culture it was associated with (Landa 2000). This process appears to have occurred over several centuries, during which Latin was influenced by the Celtic and other languages it was displacing. Meanwhile, Classical Latin, used by intellectual elites, remained a lingua franca, a status it has maintained to date at the Vatican. Its life was thus not so different from that of Classical Greek in the Byzantine Empire or in modern Greece, where it is no longer used as a lingua franca today (modern dialects evolved from Dimotiki and Katharevousa varieties are now spoken as vernaculars).

The vernacularization of Vulgar Latin in the Romance countries in today’s continental Europe is indeed a geographical and demographic expansion, very similar to that of English, centuries later, in Ireland – where one had to wait until the rule of Oliver Cromwell and the introduction of potato farms in the seventeenth century for English to start spreading as a vernacular. Although it had been introduced to Ireland earlier, in the ninth century, before the change to settlement colonization in the seventeenth, English had remained a lingua franca within a small elite class of traders in and around Dublin and some other towns. (See also Leith 2007 for a discussion of the spread of English in the British Isles from the point of view of colonization.)

In the wake of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, Latin was only the language of former Roman administrators and legionaries (most of whom were indigenous) and, later, of scholarship and of Catholic liturgy. It is also debatable whether, by using Classical Latin, the clergy played a more important role – albeit a negligible one – in the vernacularization of the Romans’ language than scholars did. After all, the missionaries proselytized in some of the indigenous vernaculars spoken by the masses of the population. Until the beginning of the second millennium, the Christian/Catholic schools had succeeded
only in producing an elite class of speakers of Classical Latin (Landa 2000), which makes the history of the vulgarization of Latin, then mostly an urban peculiarity, similar to that of English in Ireland before the seventeenth century. Note also that the school system played a less important role in the spread of English in Ireland as a vernacular than migrant workers on the potato plantations owned by English entrepreneurs did. Although they learned it naturalistically, without the benefit of (much) school education, the migrant workers – and the plantations – gave a lucrative value to English, at least for the common people, just as the Roman-style emergent cities in southwestern Europe did to Latin, the language of their modern economy. I will show below how the spread of English outside Europe is very much correlated to the English colonial expansion, varying in ethnographic functions according to the colonization style applied in different territories.

The European Colonial Expansion since the Fifteenth Century

As explained in Mufwene (2005, 2008), the European colonial expansion since the fifteenth century is, in a number of ways, an extension of the Indo-European dispersal since about 6,000 years ago, at least in the way the latter has been explained by Renfrew (1987). The more recent wave of colonization differs from the older one in the following respects:

1. the role of trade and industrial expansion in triggering massive and often planned population movements;
2. the role played by proprietor companies in the initial peopling of the colonies (including the importation of European indentured servants, of black African slaves, and of Asian and black African contract laborers after the abolition of slavery);
3. the larger size of the colonized territories and the longer distance that separated them from the homelands;
4. the diversity of colonization styles (notably between settlement and exploitation colonies);
5. the speed of the demographic and economic transformation of the colonies; and
6. the complexity and incredible volumes of the new economies.

The linguistic consequences have also been rapid and more extensive, although varying according to colonization styles too (see below).

Although nowadays there is more European traffic in search of warm beaches for relaxation, European explorers (similar to our astronauts), traders, and colonists from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century were seeking socioeconomic solutions to European problems (Crosby 1986; Diamond 1997). Some of these entailed settling new territories such as the Americas, the southern tip of Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, the Falkland Islands, and Algeria, among a host of other, smaller places south of the Mediterranean. Even these solutions had earlier precedents in the colonization, for sugar cane cultivation, of islands closer to continental Europe, such as the Azores, Madeira, and the Canary Islands (Schwartz 1985) – at a time when the only European world powers were the Spaniards and the Portuguese, who competed with the Arabs, the Turks during the early Ottoman Empire, and the Chinese in the Far East. Then Portuguese dominated, as a language of trade and diplomacy, from the western coast of Africa all the way to Japan, and from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century (Ostler 2005). This is a reminder, to those worried about today’s expansion of English as the foremost world-wide language, that we must really figure out what is the same and what is different in this latest wave of demographic expansion of an (Indo-)European language. Even after other European nations, especially England, France, and Holland emerged in the seventeenth century as major maritime powers and engaged themselves in the colonial enterprise, Portuguese remained the primary trade language on the west African coast (Huber 1999); in fact it was replaced (the fastest) only here, where it was not spoken as a vernacular (not counting Cape Verde and the Bight of Biafra Islands, where it would evolve into Creole varieties). Thus Portuguese has been maintained in places such as Diu, Daman, Goa, and Korlai (in India), Batticalhoa (in Sri Lanka), and Macao (in China), where it has served as a vernacular even among the Christianized natives whom the Portuguese lived with, albeit as a ‘creolized variety’ (Clements 1996; Ansaldo 2009).

Note worthy is also the fact that the effects of Portuguese on the vitality of indigenous languages have not been the same from Brazil to Mozambique. The variation is correlated with the fact that Portuguese has functioned as a dominant vernacular only in Brazil, in the Netherlands Antilles, and in the eastern Atlantic islands, as well as in the few settlement concessions on the coast of the Indian Ocean mentioned above and in Macao. Outside Brazil, it evolved into vernaculars identified as Creole varieties, thus displacing the non-European vernaculars among its speakers. In Brazil, its negative impact on the indigenous languages is less extensive than that of English in North America, although it is probably just a matter of time before all native American languages will disappear, as most pre-Indo-European and Celtic languages in Europe have.

This evolution is unlike that observed in Asia and in the black African mainland, including Mozambique, where the indigenous languages have generally survived their contacts with the European colonial languages. European exploitation colonies have generally fostered both individual and societal multilingualism, the colonial languages being typically used as lingua francas, but rarely as vernaculars, by the small minorities of natives who speak them fluently. Colonial languages used as vernacular thus function as emblems of socioeconomic achievement and status – privileges enjoyed only by a small minority in the Third World, where the economy has been on the decline for the past half century. Otherwise multilingualism, in forms that clearly associate different languages with different ethnographic functions, is not only the norm in many parts of the world, but also
a strong protector of the indigenous languages against the spread of colonial languages. (See also Ostler 2005 for a similar observation).⁶

European colonization started everywhere with some coastal trade posts and/or settlement concessions. Gradually, but much faster than with the Indo-European expansion, these initial colonies evolved and expanded into major settlement colonies.⁷ Where European settlers became majority populations, especially in North America and Australia, their cultures prevailed, albeit in new, indigenized forms. Some of their languages also prevailed as the dominant vernacular, since competition among European settlers often worked to the definitive advantage of one colonial group, for instance the Anglos in North America and the Portuguese in Brazil. The indigenous languages were displaced, be it through the extinction of their speakers – through wars and genocides (such as in the Caribbean), and/or through ills (as in North America; see Crosby 1992, Boyle 2007) – through population mixings (as in Brazil and in European settlements in Asia), through further expansions into lands reserved for the natives (Banner 2005, for the United States), or through the assimilation of the natives. The last process occurred much later than in the case of other European immigrants (Mufwene 2008; Mufwene and Vigouroux 2008).

A similar linguistic evolution took place in plantation or slave depot colonies of the Caribbean, to some extent the east Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean, where the European economic system prevailed but the new majority populations were non-European and non-indigenous, and where the new economic regime originally thrived with the help of African slave labor and was sustained later with contract laborers. European languages not only prevailed – at the expense of both indigenous and most other non-indigenous languages – but also evolved into several divergent vernacular varieties, now disfranchised as Creole ones.⁸

On the other hand, Europeans did not develop an interest in full control of the economic resources of Africa and Asia until the nineteenth century. Due to climatic conditions (at least in the case of Africa, see Diamond 1997), the colonization style then changed to an exploitation regime in which only a handful of European colonial administrators and representatives of relevant companies would live in the colonies, for short terms, to exploit raw materials and have them processed in the metropole (see also Leith 2007). These colonial agents communicated with the indigenous populations through other non-European colonial auxiliaries, many of them recruited locally, to whom scholastic varieties of European languages were taught.

The ‘Macaulay doctrine’ (1835) in India, which is fairly representative of European colonial linguistic practices and policies, promoted the education of masses of Indian children in the indigenous languages, reserving education in English only for a privileged few (Brutt-Griffler 2002). We must bear in mind that the spread of a language as a vernacular depends more on its practice in the home and on its genuine ‘transmission’ through interactions with children and immigrants than on teaching a scholastic or standard variety of it as a lingua franca in schools. As explained in Mufwene (2005, 2008), this difference between exploitation and settlement colonies in the ‘transmission’ of European colonial languages
is correlated with a significant difference between the linguistic consequences of European geographical expansion. In settlement colonies, where some colonial languages have prevailed as vernaculars, these have also driven to extinction not only most of their European competitors, but also the languages brought over by slaves and contract laborers.⁹

In exploitation colonies, where European languages function as official languages and as lingua francas commanded only by minority socioeconomic elites, most of the indigenous languages continue to be spoken. Unlike in settlement colonies, the norm has been societal and individual multilingualism, with relatively clear geographical and ethnographic divisions of labor in the usage of indigenous vernaculars, indigenous varieties of lingua franca, and European languages. I focus below on the differential evolution of English and on its varying impact on indigenous language outside the British Isles.

**The British Empire, the British Commonwealth, and the Emergence of English as a Pre-Eminent ‘World Language’**

The colonization of the world entailed fierce competition among Europeans, often engaging them in wars with each other, such as the one between France and England in the Caribbean and in Canada and between both these nations and Spain in the Caribbean. Eventually the Spaniards maintained most of Latin America and the Portuguese settled in Brazil and in their African colonies, aside from minor settlements in Asia. Apart from Lebanon, Cambodia, and the exploitation colonies of Africa, the French kept some of their Caribbean and Indian Ocean Islands, having lost for instance Mauritius, Trinidad, St Kitts, and Grenada to England in the eighteenth century, and Haiti to its Independence in 1804. They fared no better in North America, where they also lost Nova Scotia to the English, and Louisiana to the United States (at that date Louisiana included the whole area bounded by the Rocky Mountains to the west, the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers to the east, the Gulf of Mexico to the south, and Quebec to the north), managing to keep just a little more than Quebec from today’s Canada. The Dutch traded New Netherland (mostly today’s State of New York) for Surinam in the seventeenth century, and they settled in the Netherlands Antilles and Indonesia, losing today’s South Africa and Sri Lanka to the United Kingdom in the eighteenth century. Having lost the United States in the late eighteenth century, the United Kingdom capitalized on building the British Empire (with the colonization of Australia and New Zealand and the confiscation of territories seized from France at the outcome of the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth century). The empire was replaced by the British Commonwealth soon after World War II and the subsequent independence of many former colonies.

In the colonies, the change of colonial rule generally entailed a shift of official languages. In settlement colonies, this change also corresponded to a vernacular
shift up to the Creole varieties, for instance in Trinidad, where the English Creole has driven the French one out. An important exception is Mauritius, where both French and Mauritian Creole have acquired the status of ‘national languages’ and English functions as a statutory official language. Many educated Mauritians are often more fluent in French than they are in English and enjoy socializing in it – which should remind us that language spread and evolution hardly proceed uniformly everywhere, as the ecologies of appropriation and practice vary from one territory to another. Nonetheless, the status of English as the main vernacular and business language in the United States, which emerged as a dominant military and economic power with World War I, just consecrated the hegemony of English as the world-wide language of trade, business, and eventually scholarship and diplomacy (see below). Meanwhile Russian was spreading in eastern Europe and in Siberia as the official language of the emergent Soviet Union.

By the middle of the twentieth century, a few European colonial languages had emerged as ‘world languages,’ in the sense of languages spoken as vernaculars or as lingua francas outside their homelands and by populations other than those ethnically or nationally associated with them. These included English, French, Russian, and Spanish. When the demographics include non-native speakers, the majority of whom inhabit former exploitation colonies and who use these languages only as official language or lingua franca, the total number of English speakers, estimated by some to around 1 billion, dwarfs the number of speakers of other European languages. It is noteworthy that French, which had emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an elite language of ‘high culture’ spoken at royal and imperial courts, even as far as Russia, and as the diplomatic language of Europe in particular, has been losing ground to English since the United States became the dominant economic and military power of the twentieth century – an evolution which has increased its momentum with the new wave of world-wide globalized economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union (in the late 1980s).

I submit that, as in the case of that earlier ‘world language,’ Latin, it was the association with trade and (more) lucrative business that favored English over its competitors, both in the United States and around the world. French had the misfortune of being associated with the elite class and with a metropolis that had lost to its anglophone rivals, Britain and the United States, on the colonial scene. Recall that, centuries earlier, Classical Latin, which was used by the European intelligentsia all the way up to the eighteenth century, also lost to its competitor, Vulgar Latin, which was associated with urbanity, trade, and the then ‘modern’ working class. Eventually the indigenized varieties that evolved from this ‘Latin of the people’ were not only hailed as national languages, but also promoted as languages of scholarship. France and Spain in particular went as far as to set up academies that dictated (not always successfully) the best ways in which educated people should express themselves in their respective languages.

It is important to emphasize that the status of a language as a ‘world language’ is not determined by demographics alone. Mandarin Chinese, which is the world’s foremost ‘major language’ because it has more native speakers than English or
Spanish, does not necessarily count as a ‘world language.’ It is just a major language, and maybe the foremost major language. This largely has to do with the fact that its function as a lingua franca is limited to China and the Chinese Diaspora. Similar considerations apply to Hindi, whose total number of native speakers is close to 200 million and which functions as lingua franca in parts of India and, to some extent, in parts of the Indian Diaspora – but not outside the Indian population.

On the other hand, overlooking variation across nations, Arabic counts as a ‘world language’ to the extent that it is used as a religious/ritual language wherever Islam is practiced; but it does not have that status of lingua franca associated with English and French as languages of business/trade and scholarship which are also used by non-native speakers. Arabic is thus reduced to the same status as Spanish, which outside Spain is spoken mostly in Latin America, as the dominant vernacular. Arabic has prevailed primarily as a vernacular language in parts of the Middle East and in North Africa, since the settlement colonization of the region by the Arabs from the seventh century onwards.

It thus appears that what has made English the foremost ‘world language’ is its function as lingua franca, a status which La Francophonie, as the Organization of Francophone States, wishes French had reached to the same extent, against the odds articulated above (Mufwene 2008). It is this evolution that has led some scholars (see below) to characterize English as a ‘global language,’ that is, as a pre-eminent ‘world language.’ However, it will still be informative to learn more about its expansion as a post-colonial language and about the emergence of the varieties disfranchised as ‘indigenized Englishes.’

**World Englishes**

The heading of this section has to do with (an advocacy for) the recognition of diverse modern English varieties as legitimate, wherever they are spoken, as long as their speakers abide by some local communal norms. The spread of English has proceeded generally at the cost of its structural integrity. English has become assimilated or indigenous – it has ‘indigenized’ – everywhere (Mufwene 2009), changing its features in response to the previous communicative habits of its new speakers, and meeting new communicative needs. The relevant literature has generally made a three-way distinction among the outcomes of the evolution of English since the seventeenth century:

1. ‘native Englishes,’ spoken in the United Kingdom, North America, Australia, and New Zealand (that is, in its original homeland and in the settlement colonies where populations of European descent have become demographic majorities);
2. ‘Creole/pidgin Englishes,’ which developed especially in the Caribbean and on the islands of the Pacific; and
3 ‘indigenized/nativized Englishes,’ which evolved in India and in other former exploitation colonies. \[10\]

The structural differences between various ‘world Englishes’ are due not to the nature of the restructuring processes that led to their emergence but to a number of ecological factors, including:

1 the kinds of input varieties that the new speakers were exposed to: in the case of the varieties disfranchised as ‘indigenized/nativized Englishes,’ scholastic varieties as opposed to vernacular ones;
2 the modes of language ‘transmission’ involved: through teaching in school in the case of indigenized Englishes, through intuitive learning in the other cases; and
3 patterns of interaction with native speakers of the metropolitan kind (of which there was very little in the case of Creole varieties) versus interaction mostly among non-native speakers (as in the incipient stages of Creole varieties and in the post-colonial autonomization of ‘indigenized Englishes’).

In sum, the differences are due to the way in which variation in the contact ecologies influenced the appropriation of English by its new speakers. In the case of ‘native Englishes,’ English mostly became a kind of koine – or koine-ized – among its traditional speakers, who found themselves interacting regularly with speakers of other dialects (Mufwene 2001; Schneider 2007). The new, colonial variety was appropriated by other speakers after the critical period in the speciation process, changing little afterwards (Mufwene 2008; Trudgill 2008).

Whatever the most accurate account of the speciation process is, the end result is that there are several English varieties spoken around the world today, although some are treated as less legitimate than others. Several varieties are not mutually intelligible, owing to differences both in the particular earlier colonial forms of the koines they have evolved from and to the varying extents to which they have diverged from the relevant initial koines. For instance, as noted above, ‘indigenized Englishes’ generally started from artificial scholastic varieties and diverged under the influence of the indigenous languages spoken by the elite populations who used them (primarily as lingua francas). Creole varieties started from non-standard forms of koine spoken by the indentured servants and early Creole slaves with whom the Bozal slaves – who appropriated colonial vernacular languages as their own – interacted.

An important difference between ‘Creole’ and ‘native’ Englishes lies in the fact that the latter evolved in settings where populations of European descent became demographic majorities, whereas the Creole varieties evolved in ecologies where African slaves or non-European contract laborers became overwhelming majorities quite early in the evolution of the colonies and influenced the new vernacular languages by giving them features of the ones they had previously spoken. \[11\]

To be sure, even where ‘native Englishes’ evolved, populations of English descent have become minorities, being overwhelmed demographically by populations
from continental Europe. However, the latter did not shift to English as early as the African slaves on the plantations. By the ‘founder principle’ (Mufwene 1996, 2001), those who shifted later, after the critical period during the divergence process, exerted less influence on the emergent colonial varieties than those who had done it earlier.

Since the end of World War II, and even more so after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, English has spread all over the world, so to speak, having become a convenient lingua franca of trade and scholarship in continental Europe and in many places elsewhere that have not been colonized by England or the United Kingdom. Kachru (1983) refers to these new territories as the “Expanding Circle,” where English, identified among teachers as a ‘foreign language,’ is used strictly as lingua franca for communication with outsiders, but is not an official language (see also Swaan 2007). This is set in contrast both with what Kachru calls the “Inner Circle” – a territory corresponding to the United Kingdom and its former settlement colonies, where English is spoken as the (dominant) vernacular – and with what he calls the “Outer Circle” – a territory corresponding to the former exploitation colonies, where English, identified among teachers as ‘second language,’ functions as an official language and serves as lingua franca for communication both among members of the elite class and with the outside world.

This world-wide geographical expansion beyond the United States and the British Commonwealth has led some scholars (for instance Crystal 1997; McArthur 1998; McCrum et al. 2002; Pennycook 2007) to characterize English as a ‘global language,’ comparable to Latin after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. As noted above, colonial varieties of the Romans’ language continued to be used as the vernacular of the emergent Roman-style towns and as the lingua franca of international trade (for instance in the Hanseatic League), whereas the standard variety – Classical Latin – functioned as the language of scholarship, but had a less successful ‘story’ from the point of view of language evolution. In any case, an important question is whether it is justified to speak of a ‘global English’ any more than of a ‘global Latin.’

The Fallacy of ‘Global English’

As global as English has been claimed to be, it is not evenly distributed around the world. The average population speaking it fluently in the ‘Outer Circle’ countries hardly exceeds 20 percent. India, the most populous country of the lot, stands out with only 30 percent of English speakers, and the Philippines is rather exceptional with its proportion of 46 percent speakers (Kingsley 2008). The number of those who speak English as a foreign language is even smaller in countries of the ‘Expanding Circle.’ As travelers to places such as Japan and Taiwan must have noticed, one cannot visit just any country around the world and hope to get by with English only, especially in rural areas. Even more striking is the fact that the proportion of confident speakers is way below the expected yield, considering all the energy, time, and money invested in teaching and learning English as a foreign
language in countries such as Japan and South Korea. Overall, the extent of the spread of English in the ‘Expanding Circle’ correlates more or less with the extent to which particular countries participate in the world-wide globalized economy, which is in turn correlated with each country’s globalization index. In places that are still on the margins of economic globalization, the presence of English remains scant, especially where the rural population still exceeds the urban one. Although one will always come across peddlers who manage to speak some English at craft markets and in other touristic areas, for commercial purposes, the proportion of educated people who still do not speak English (confidently) is too high to be overlooked.

On the other hand, as is well explained by McArthur (1998), the expression ‘English as a global language’ has misled some into speaking of ‘global English,’ analogously to speaking of ‘world English’ (translated from the French *anglais mondial*). The suggested reference is to what the proponents expect to be a universal standard, used as lingua franca by all speakers of various English varieties (‘native’ and ‘non-native’), some of which are not mutually intelligible. Crystal (1997), who appears to have started the trend, also identifies this variety as “world standard spoken English” (WSSE). He expects it to arise from the will to overcome the diversity that has ensued from the world-wide spread of English, as described above.

If WSSE were to arise spontaneously, or could do so at all, it would be the first such evolution toward linguistic uniformity in the history of language spread and contact. The universal trend has been for the prevailing language to diversify, especially in the spoken form, as is made evident by the history of English itself and, before it, by that of Latin. Worse for the wishful thinking, even Standard English itself, which is controlled by several institutions, has diversified. It seems utopian to me to conjecture that speakers of ‘native Englishes’ will be accommodating, midway, all those other populations speaking their language with a foreign element, and will thus contribute to the development of some WSSE, in order to guarantee mutual intelligibility.

The conjecture is disconnected from the way English has been spoken (and written/read) in international interactions. Typically, speakers of ‘native Englishes’ have spoken their varieties with some arrogance; the burden has been on speakers of ‘non-native Englishes,’ which are generally treated as ‘deviations’ from the metropolitan norms (see Swaan 2007, citing Quirk 1990), to ‘improve’ their intelligibility – not the other way around. The only time when the accommodation has proceeded in the other direction has been when people from the ‘Inner Circle’ have found themselves residing in the ‘Outer Circle’: especially their children have made most of the adjustments, the way children of (im)migrants normally adjust, in any host setting, even to a stigmatized variety.

Crystal completely overlooks the fact that the vast majority of speakers of English world-wide do not speak a standard variety (local or regional). Therefore they have no motivation for, nor would they be particularly invested in, speaking some sort of Standard English in cross-cultural interactions that are normally
informal. However ‘global’ the English language has become – in the sense of being a language that is spoken almost anywhere on our planet and permeates so many diverse domains of modern life (McArthur 1998) – it will continue to ‘indigenize’ everywhere, acquiring local characteristics in the same way it has done to date.

To be sure, it is legitimate to speak of ‘English as a global language,’ as this phrase underscores the fact that English has spread geographically so as to serve especially as an international lingua franca in various domains, in a way in which no other world language ever has. On the other hand, the notion of a global English with uniform structural features all over the world is a utopia we may as soon forget about. It is not even consistent with the process of world-wide economic globalization itself, which has speeded the spread of English on a planetary scale. Note that English is not even the only language of the global economy, since manufacturers trade in different languages, making sure that they secure profitable markets everywhere they can. Thus American companies use German to trade with the Germans in Germany and Japanese to trade with the Japanese in Japan. The others do just the opposite in trading with anglophone countries. It just so happens that, thanks to colonial history, there are so many such countries. In a way, one can argue that English has spread as a business language not only because of American military and economic hegemony, but also because almost any country in the world would like to trade with the United States, the United Kingdom, and many other important members of the former British Commonwealth. As much as the British Council has been accused of spreading English, it is responding to demands for the language. The need for this asset is created elsewhere, especially in the way world-wide global economy has evolved.

On the other hand, economic globalization has not produced, nor is it producing, socioeconomic uniformity. On the contrary, it has replaced old forms of diversity with new ones, producing several local adaptations in modes of production and consumption (Tomlinson 1999, 2007), along with various forms of economic inequity (Stiglitz 2002; Blommaert 2003; Florida 2005, 2007). The so-called ‘McDonaldization’ of the world has proceeded with adaptations to local tastes and customs, using local major languages rather than English everywhere. (Don’t count on English to order your meal at a McDonald’s in France or Brazil!) The world-wide distribution of Hollywood movies has been more in the interest of profits than in the service of American English and culture. Movies have generally been translated into several major languages, and the plots have often been modified to the tastes of local markets (Marling 2006). The evidence suggests that the practice of English in all the ‘circles’ – ‘inner,’ ‘outer,’ and ‘expanding’ – is always embedded in local cultures and is always influenced by the previous linguistic habits of the new speakers. We may as well brace ourselves for more diversity. Crystal (1997) and McArthur (1998) are not at all mistaken in comparing the spread of this imperial language to that of Latin, which has speciated into the Romance languages – and, I may add (along with Posner 1996 and Trask 1996), further into the Romance Creoles.
Will there Be an English-Only Europe?

A concomitant of the myth of the emergence of a ‘global English’ has been the growing fear that, because it is increasingly being used as the lingua franca of western Europe and of the European Union, English is endangering the vitality of other continental European languages and driving western Europe toward monolingualism (Phillipson 2003, Hagège 2006). Noteworthy is also the literature on language endangerment that has painted English as the ‘killer language’ par excellence, likely to displace indigenous languages everywhere. On the example of North America and in Australia, the geographical expansion of English has been feared to eliminate linguistic diversity and to push in the direction of world-wide monolingualism (see for instance Crystal 2000, 2004; Nettle and Romaine 2000; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000).

What has been totally ignored in this respect is the political and apparently also ethnographic distinction, which Kachru (1983) so aptly captures, between the ‘Inner Circle,’ the ‘Outer Circle,’ and the ‘Expanding Circle.’ From the point of view of language vitality, the usage of English as a vernacular in the ‘Inner Circle’ must be distinguished from usage as an official language and as an important lingua franca of the intra-national elite in the ‘Outer Circle,’ as well as from its status as a foreign lingua franca, used for communication with outsiders by nationals of the ‘Expanding Circle.’ It is the vernacular function of English in places where it has also prevailed as the dominant or only language of the economy that has fostered nation-wide monolingualism. Both in the ‘Outer Circle’ and in the ‘Expanding Circle’ multilingualism has been the norm; English is still far from evolving into a lingua franca of the majority; and the fear that it will drive indigenous languages to extinction remains an unsubstantiated myth.

Members of the ‘Expanding Circle’ such as Japan and Taiwan, whose highly glocalized economies function in the local vernaculars, appear to have realized that they need English only at the interface with the world-wide globalized economy, in which it is wise to trade in the buyer’s language (as was also observed by Ostler 2005). This also explains why only those who are likely to interact with the outside world are seriously interested in speaking English (fluently). From an ethnographic perspective, the goal for learners/speakers seems to be the acquisition/command of the foreign language for communication with the foreign market or places one visits as a tourist, rather than the acquisition of a new vernacular in lieu of the current one. Those who emigrate to Anglophone territories make the necessary adjustments after resettling. Depending on whether or not they settle in host communities where they can continue to speak their heritage languages, they may maintain them or they may gradually become less competent in them. Even if the immigrants shift to English as their (dominant) vernacular, they constitute, typically, (small) minorities compared to the populations left behind in their homelands. Thus they, collectively, constitute no threat to the vitality of their heritage languages – and certainly not more so than the massive migrations, free and forced alike, which were associated with the
European colonization and settlement of parts of the world between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries and with the large ethnic Diasporas that this process has created.

It is also noteworthy that the gap between countries of the economic North (including Australia) and countries of the economic South keeps increasing, although polities such as Singapore, Brazil, and China are crossing the divide. Many parts of the world, including large pockets of China, still remain on the margins of world-wide economic and cultural globalization. Even after such countries participate in this complex network, local aspects of their economies will continue to function in their national languages, as is obvious from places such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries. More significant is actually the fact that most of the populations in countries that are on the margins of world-wide globalization are still rural, generally outside of tourist traffic routes, and not directly involved in international trade. Even if school children learn a little bit of English, for them the language is just a subject similar to geography and history; it is not necessarily associated with potential personal benefits of with travel abroad and jobs that require competence in this ‘second’ or ‘foreign’ language. The little knowledge acquired is lost as quickly as that of various other subjects learned in school, which lack practical applications to the subjects’ lives. It is ludicrous to suggest that teaching English as a foreign language in Third World schools is endangering the relevant indigenous languages.

Even in places such as Japan, which have a high glocalization index, the people who take advantage of English classes are mostly those who wish to visit anglophone countries or to get senior white-collar jobs for which competence in the foreign language is an asset. Because English is not needed as an alternative vernacular or as lingua franca for communication among Japanese in Japan, just as it is not in many other countries of the ‘Expanding Circle,’ the majority of learners are not particularly invested in the language, especially since they can earn a decent living in their heritage language.

In countries of the ‘Outer Circle,’ the fact that English is needed only in the small white-collar sector of the industry and the rest of the economy functions in the indigenous languages, compounded by the fact that lucrative white-collar jobs are not likely to increase, has kept in check the spread of English within the overall population. Every person who has gone to high school has undoubtedly learned the (ex-)colonial language, but not everybody feels invested in practicing it, which spells atrophy on the (little) competence acquired in school. Not even call centers in India and the Philippines have contributed to spreading English any further. As large as the number of jobs they provide may sound, one must remember that India and the Philippines are densely populated nations. The market is still very limited, already saturated, and accessible to people who have already invested in English anyway and are apt to learn a stage variety, used only at work but not for socialization with one’s fellow countrymen.

As a matter of fact, the call centers of India and of the Philippines are showing that people do not just decide to stop speaking their heritage language, especially while they continue to live with relatives who still function in them (Mufwene
Practical multilingualism for professional purposes does not of necessity spell the death of one’s heritage language(s). Such death occurs insidiously, when the socioeconomic structure of the relevant populations forces them to communicate more often in a dominant language other than their ancestral one, without them realizing what the long-term effect of their communicative practices is, namely loss of the capacity to use their respective heritage languages. In many parts of the Anglophone world, English is no more dangerous to the indigenous languages than McDonald’s eateries are to their traditional cuisines. There are certainly endangered languages in the ‘Outer’ and ‘Expanding Circles’, but (the spread of) English has nothing to do with their condition.

Conclusions

The claim that economic globalization has helped spread English as a lingua franca around the world is certainly not groundless. However, it makes more sense when the process is related to colonization, to which globalization is originally connected. Much of the impetus that today’s globalization has given to the spread of English is also largely attributable to the earlier role that colonization played in expanding the language geographically and demographically.

It is true that English has become the kind of global language that Latin came to be after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. Equally true is the fact that English has evolved in a way similar to Latin, indigenizing into new vernaculars in the settlement colonies (both as ‘Creole’ and as ‘native Englishes’) and speciating into national and international varieties of lingua franca in the ‘Outer’ and ‘Expanding Circles’ (both as ‘pidgin’ and as ‘indigenized Englishes’). However, just like with Latin, its evolution is not in the direction of a uniform ‘global English’. This is significantly due to variation in the ecologies of its appropriation, which include:

1. the extent of the interactions the new speakers have had with speakers from the ‘Inner Circle’;
2. the specific languages English has come in contact with; and
3. the particular uses to which it has been put.

Rather than driving the world toward monolingualism, the differential evolution of English appears to be substituting a new form of diversity for an older one.

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Globalization, Global English, World English(es)

NOTES

1 As aptly pointed out by Chaudenson (2008), this evolution of the meaning of ‘global’ as ‘world-wide’ or ‘universal’ is related to that of the word globe in its etymological meaning of ‘round body, ball, sphere,’ is used also to represent ‘planet Earth.’ The persistence of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘globular’ among the meanings of ‘global’ should remind us that economists may have been mistaken in equating ‘globalization’ almost exclusively with what French linguists call mondialisation (Mufwene 2005) and with what Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) explains as ‘universalization.’ I argue below that what today is more specifically designated, especially by multiculturalists, as ‘glocalization’ – ‘local globalization’ – is perhaps where we all should start in order to make sense of how globalization as a world-wide phenomenon works, albeit in a patchy way. I even go so far as to propose a glocalization index: a measure (however inexplicit at this stage) of the degree of integration and strength of the domestic economic system of a territory. The index largely determines whether or not the territory functions as one of the centers, is on the margins, or is somewhere else on the continuum of interconnectedness and interdependences that characterize the world-wide networks of economic globalization.

2 Other examples include ASEAN (Association of SouthEast Asian Nations, involving Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement, involving the United States, Canada, and Mexico), and MERCOSUR/MERCOSUL (Mercado Commun/Commun del Sur/do Sul ‘Southern Common Market’ involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay).

3 In a yet unpublished paper, Chaudenson (n.d.) highlights the role that rivers played as the earliest highways of long-distance trade, with canoes serving as the earliest, primitive vehicles for long-distance transportation. As a matter of fact, a closer examination of trade networks in the Hellenistic Empire created by Alexander the Great and in the Roman Empire shows how roads connected with rivers and rivers with seas, to ensure the smooth transportation of humans and commodities between on the one hand Athens and Rome and, on the other, the colonies. Then the saying “all roads lead to Rome” acquires fuller historical meaning.

4 Florida (2007) observes that, even within themselves, cities do not evolve uniformly either, displaying disparities between neighborhoods in their responses to pressures or demands of globalization.

5 This is somewhat reminiscent of the invasions of England by the Scandinavians during the ninth to the thirteenth century – which did not lead to the replacement of English by either Norse or Danish.

6 As explained in Mufwene (2005, 2008) and in Mufwene and Vigouroux (2008), this does not mean that indigenous languages, especially minority ones, are not endangered at all. They are typically threatened by other, major indigenous languages, notably by urban vernaculars and/or by regional lingua francas, which are associated with cash economy and modernity.

7 To be sure, the colonization associated with archaic Greece and then with the Roman Empire was already faster than in the earlier phases of the Indo-European dispersal, a few millennia earlier. As noted in the section on “Colonization and Globalization,” changes in speed are correlated with improvements in technology, especially in modes
of transportation, and with military differences between the colonists/colonizers and the natives (Cowen 2001; Osterhammel and Peterson 2005). In the case of the Americas, the Europeans were also assisted by the deadly germs they brought with them, to which the natives were not (sufficiently) immune (Crosby 1992).

8 As explained in Mufwene (2001), this disfranchising has had more to do with colonial political ideologies, in which linguists have been trapped, than with any peculiar ways in which language restructuring proceeded in the case of Creole vernaculars, which are clearly new, non-standard varieties of Indo-European languages spoken by non-European majorities who in general have also been marginalized socio-economically.

9 Hawaii is exceptional because of the particular time when and way in which it was colonized, although the new English varieties now spoken by descendants of the contract laborers are also disenfranchised as Creole or pidgin. Unlike the slaves in the Caribbean and in the Indian Ocean, the Hawaiian contract laborers were not ethnically mixed and their descendants are still identified by their traditional ethnicities, namely as Chinese, Japanese, Korean, or Filipino. They have also maintained cultural ties with their ‘nations’ of origin.

10 The same literature is also ambivalent about the acrolectal English varieties of the Caribbean, which are the vernaculars adopted by non-negligible proportions of the populations, although these populations constitute minorities. In any case, overlooking them in the present discussion bears little on the accuracy of the position I defend below against the notion of a global English. After all, the typology is essentially sociological, if not political. It contributes little to understanding why and how English has evolved differentially during its spread around the world (Mufwene 2001).

11 Linguists have generally been ill at ease with this explanation, as they had rather not address this racial bias in accounts of the emergence of Creoles. The very fact of arbitrarily isolating ‘Creoles’ or ‘basilectal varieties’ from their ‘acrolects’ in a universe where most of the populations are to be situated somewhere on a continuum between these extreme analytical constructs confirms the bias that these linguists deny. Speakers of ‘native Englishes’ too can be plotted on continua between the ‘standard’ and ‘non-standard’ varieties. Assuming that colonial ‘native Englishes’ are also contact-based English, ‘Creoles’ are really the counterparts of non-standard ‘Englishes’ in North America, Australia, and the like, except that they are spoken predominantly by populations of non-European descent (Mufwene 2008).

12 This is a phenomenon particularly well grasped by House (2003). Many speakers of English, especially from the ‘Expanding Circle,’ do not see the language as a marker of cultural or social identity, although it is evidently an asset. The reality is that, although speakers normally make adjustments to each other, usage of English as an international lingua franca is not associated with a particular community of practice, which would foster the emergence of a common norm. Television and the radio are not interactive enough to produce it; communication on the Internet is not of the kind that can go beyond simply familiarizing its users with diversity; and professional conferences are not regular enough to fulfill Crystal’s dream. As well pointed out by Florida (2007), world-wide globalization is not eradicating locality. This is precisely where the action of evolution lies.

13 The heading of this section was obviously borrowed from the title of Phillipson’s book, which expresses a fear that I believe to be exaggerated. However, my discussion covers many other parts of the world, to which the same considerations apply.

14 See Mufwene (2005, 2008), and a good deal of the literature on ‘world Englishes’ – particularly Kachru, Kachru, and Neslon (2006), and Schneider (2007).
REFERENCES


