# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>xix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part One  What’s in Our Interests?</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  Pleasure</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Questions about Pleasure</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What Is Pleasure?</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The sensation view</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The attitude view</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desire view</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physiology of pleasure</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of Pleasure</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument in favor of hedonism 1: Discernible differences</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument in favor of hedonism 2: Motivation</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher pleasures</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism about prudential value</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nozick’s experience machine argument</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two responses to Nozick</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pessimism about the value of pleasure*</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Questions</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated Bibliography</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Online Resources</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

2 Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life 25
   Hedonism, Again 27
      Objection 1: Trivial pleasures 28
      Objection 2: The role of happiness in deliberation 28
   Satisfaction Theories 29
      Desire satisfaction theories of well-being 29
      Objections to desire satisfaction theories 30
         Objection 1: Which desires count? 30
         Objection 2: Expensive tastes 31
      Life satisfaction theories of happiness 32
      An objection to life satisfaction theories 33
   Objective List Theories 34
      Objections to the objective list theories 35
   The Capability Approach* 37
   Happiness and the Meaning of Life 39
      Emotional state theory of happiness* 40
      The question of the meaning of life 41
      Susan Wolf’s fitting fulfillment theory 42
   Summary and Questions 43
   Annotated Bibliography 44
   Online Resources 47

Part Two Normative Ethics 51

3 Egoism and Altruism 53
   Different Forms of Egoism and Altruism 55
      Feldman’s objection to ethical egoism 56
   Two Arguments for Ethical Egoism 57
      The “ought implies can” argument 58
      The practical reasons argument 58
   Two Objections to Psychological Egoism 59
      The everyday objection 59
      The evolutionary objection 60
   Moore’s Argument against Ethical Egoism* 62
      Problems of Moore’s argument* 63
   Gauthier’s Contractarianism 64
      The paradox of social cooperation 65
      Contractarianism as a solution 67
      The compliance problem 68
5  Intuitionism, Particularism, and Virtue Ethics  113
   Ross's Objection to Consequentialism and Kantian Ethics  113
   Intuitionism in Normative Ethics  115
      Prima facie duties  115
      How do you know?  117
      Prima facie duties and actual duties  118
   Particularism  120
      Prima facie duties and holism  120
      Holism and particularism*  121
      Knowing what is right*  123
   Virtue Ethics  124
      Flourishing  125
      Virtue acquisition  127
      Acting virtuously  128
      Right and wrong acts  129
   Two Objections to Virtue Ethics  130
      Circularity  130
      Improving yourself  131
      Virtue ethics and moral sensibility  131
   Summary and Questions  133
Annotated Bibliography  134
Online Resources  136

Part Three  Metaethics  139

6  Subjectivism, Relativism, and Divine Commands  141
   Subjectivism  143
      Advantages of subjectivism  144
      Objections to subjectivism  144
         Objection 1: Experience  145
         Objection 2: Infallibility  145
         Objection 3: Disagreement  145
   Relativism  146
      Advantages of relativism  148
      Problems of relativism  149
         Problem 1: Disagreement  149
         Problem 2: Moral fallibility  150
         Problem 3: Tolerance  150
         Problem 4: Multiculturalism  151
Contents

Divine Command Theory 151
  Divine command theory and moral words 151
  Divine command theory and moral properties 153
  Advantages of divine command theory 154
The Euthyphro Dilemma* 155
  What is right explains what God commands* 156
  God’s commands explain what is right* 156
    Problem 1: God’s goodness 157
    Problem 2: Anything could be wrong 157
    Problem 3: The reasons for God’s commands 158
Summary and Questions 158
Annotated Bibliography 159
Online Resources 163

7 Naturalism and the Open Question Argument 167
  Moral Realism 167
    Naturalism vs. non-naturalism 168
    Pros and cons of non-naturalism 169
  The Open Question Argument 171
    Stage 1: Words and properties 172
    Stage 2: Moral words and moral properties 173
    Stage 3: The open question test 173
    Stage 4: Moral words and open questions 174
    Stage 5: Putting the argument together 175
  Responses to the Open Question Argument 176
    Response 1: Begging the question 176
    Response 2: Making know-how explicit 177
    Response 3: The sense/reference distinction 179
  Intuitionism in Metaethics* 181
    The problem of knowledge* 181
    Foundationalism to the rescue* 183
    Misconceptions and objections* 184
      Misconception 1: The role of experience and emotions 184
      Misconception 2: What seems self-evident to you 184
      Objection 1: People who understand but don’t agree 185
      Objection 2: Dogmatism 186
  Summary and Questions 186
  Annotated Bibliography 187
  Online Resources 190
8 Moral Motivation and Expressivism 195
   The Argument from Motivation 196
   The Humean Theory of Motivation 197
      Directions of fit 197
      The role of beliefs and desires 198
   Moral Judgment Internalism 199
      Very Strong Internalism 200
      Weakness of will 201
   Strong Internalism 201
   Counterexamples to Strong Internalism 202
      Amoralists 202
      Bad people 203
      A case of depression 204
   Expressivism 205
      The core claims of expressivism 206
      Claim 1: Moral judgments 207
      Claim 2: Moral language 208
      Claim 3: Moral properties 210
      Responses to two common objections 211
      Objection 1: Truths and facts 211
      Objection 2: Mere attitudes 211
   The Frege–Geach Problem 212
      Embedded claims 212
      Valid inferences* 213
      The negation problem* 214
   Summary and Questions 215
   Annotated Bibliography 217
   Online Resources 220

Part Four Ethical Questions 223

9 Moral Responsibility 225
   What Is Moral Responsibility? 225
      Causal responsibility and attributability 227
      The agency condition 227
      Freedom and real selves 229
      The consequence argument 230
      The problem of luck 231
   Galen Strawson's argument against moral responsibility 232
The Frankfurt Cases 234
  Objections and responses* 235
    Objection 1: Flicker of freedom 235
    Objection 2: A dilemma 235
    Response 1: Mele and Robb 236
    Response 2: Dennett 236
The Deep Attributability Principle 237
  Frankfurt's higher-order desire theory 238
The Real Self 239
  Watson's theory of the real self 240
  The time-slice problem 241
  Responsiveness to reasons 242
Summary and Questions 243
Annotated Bibliography 244
Online Resources 247

10 Population Growth and Climate Change 249
The Non-Identity Effect 251
The Repugnant Conclusion 253
  The average utility principle 256
  Critical-level utilitarianism* 257
  Variable value view and intuitions* 259
Climate Change and Personal Obligations 260
  Carbon offsetting 261
Climate Change and Governments 262
  The discount rate* 264
  The social action problem 266
Climate Change and Uncertainty 267
  Maximizing expected value* 268
Summary and Questions 269
Annotated Bibliography 271
Online Resources 272

Glossary of Terms 275
Index 293