INDEX

abortion, 53, 141, 149, 212
achievement, 34
Adams, Robert Merrihew, 83, 152–154
adaptation, 33
addict
   unwilling, 238, 241
   wanton, 238–239, 241
   willing, 238–241
addiction, 96, 131, 229–230, 237
adultery, 201, 241
affect, positive and negative, 7
affiliation, 38
agency, 227–229
agriculture, 249
alcoholism, 131
Alston, William, 157
alternative possibilities, 229–231, 234–235
altruism
   ethical, 55
   and Kantian ethics, 93–94
   psychological, 55
ambiguity
   in inferences, 214
   of the word “happy,” 26–27
ambition, 31
amoralists, 202
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 15–16
anemia, 202
animals, 70, 145, 200–201, 238
Anscombe, Elizabeth
   on directions of fit, 197
   on moral philosophy and virtues, 124
Aristotle
   and the capability approach, 37
   on acting virtuously, 128
   on aims of moral philosophy, 4
   on explanations, 4
   on flourishing, 39, 125
   on happiness, 26
   on human activities, 37, 125
   on virtue acquisition, 127
   on virtues and vices, 126
art, 38, 65, 88, 114, 127
Athanassoulis, Nafsika, 127
atheism, 152
attributability, 228
   deep, 229, 237, 239
autonomy, 34–35
   sexual, 38, 114
average height, 256
average utility principle, 256
  objections to, 257
Ayer, A.J., 209

bad see value
Baldwin, Thomas, 179
Bales, Eugene, 83
begging the question, 176, 235
belieber, 208
beliefs, 197–198, 228
  motivationally inert, 199
  network of, 182
Benedict, Ruth, 148
Bentham, Jeremy, 7, 13, 79
bias, 16–17, 119, 183, 185, 260
Bieber, Justin, 207–208
Big Bang, 169
Björnsson, Gunnar, 203
Blackburn, Simon, 207–208, 210–211
blackmailing, 227, 229
blame, 54, 91, 153–154, 196, 208, 216,
  226–230, 232, 235, 237, 239,
  242–243
Blofeld, 209
Boghossian, Paul, 147
Bond, James, 209
Bonjour, Laurence, 182
boredom, 18, 119
Boyd, Richard, 180
brain, 11
Brentano, Franz, 7
Brink, David, 199
Broad, C.D., 63–64
Broome, John, 259–264
capabilities
  list of, 38
capability approach, 36–39
carbon atoms, 167–168
carbon dioxide, 249–251, 261–267
  average personal emissions of, 261
carbon offsetting, 261–262
cares and concerns, 127, 132
Categorical Imperative, 79, 92, 96–97,
  102
  contradiction in conception and,
  92–93
  contradiction in will and, 92–93
  counterexamples to, 99–100
  responses to objections to,
  102–104
catholic mistake, 41
Catholic Church, 236–237
causal
  relations, 209
  responsibility, 228
causation, 5, 170, 209
  and natural properties, 168
charity, 31
Ceylon tea, 198
champagne, 31
character, 128, 196, 232–233, 237
character traits, 16, 124–126, 128, 130,
  132
charity, 98–103, 114, 150
Charity example, 99, 103
Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor,
  237
children, 42, 60–61, 70, 251–253, 255,
  263
Christman, John, 241
Christmas cards, 120
circle, vicious, 155, 182
circular thinking, 130
climatic change
  consequences of, 261
  governmental obligations, 262–264
  personal obligations, 260–261
  predictions, 267, 269
  skeptics, 267
climate sensitivity, 251
cognitive states, 197
common cold, 5
compatibilism, 235

Index
compliance problem, 68–69
compulsions, 237–238
Connery, Sean, 209
consequence argument, 230–231
consequences, 81
consequentialism, 79–86, 101
act-, 83
direct and indirect, 83–84
maximizing and satisficing, 86
rule-, 83–84
structure of, 81–82
constant valence, 120
contractarianism, 56, 64–70
objections to, 70–71
contradictions, 92–94, 147, 151
control, 228, 232, 243
counting blades of grass, 31, 42, 88
courage, 126, 129
Crisp, Roger, 6, 10, 14
Cudworth, Ralph, 155
curiosity, 129

Dancy, Jonathan, 120–122
De Brigard, Felipe, 10
deception, 70, 209
decision table, 66
decision theory, 29
definitions, 172–174
deflationism, 211
deliberation
and addictions, 241
and expressivism, 195
and happiness, 28–29
and virtue ethics, 129
moral, 260
procedures, 83
Dennett, Daniel, 236–237
deontic qualities, 80–82
depression, 59–60, 204–205
Descartes, René, 5
desirable, 87–88
desire, 8–9, 29–31, 87–88, 91, 228, 241
bizarre, 30–31
higher-order, 239–240
impersonal, 30–31
as non-cognitive states, 197
second-order, 238
to take care of children, 60–61
uninformed, 30–31
desire satisfaction theories of well-being, 29–30, 84
objections to, 30–32
desserts, 174
determinism, 230–233, 235
Diet of Worms, 237
differences
morally relevant, 89
Dinner example, 99, 102–103
direction of fit, 197–198
mind-to-world, 197–198
world-to-mind, 197–198
disabled individuals, 70, 252–253, 256
disabling conditions, 122
disagreement
and divine command theory, 152–153
and expressivism, 208
as an objection to relativism, 148–149
as an objection to subjectivism, 145–146
in planning, 210
discount rate, 264–266
disgust, 210
divine command theory, 151–154
advantages of, 154–155
objections to, 155–158
dogmatism, 186
do no harm principle, 252, 260–261, 263–264
Double, Richard, 239
Dreier, Jamie, 143
Dworkin, Ronald, 31
duties
  actual, 118–120
  to future generations, 251, 253
  prima facie, 115–121
  weights of, 118–119

eating meat, 144, 148, 195, 200–202,
  205, 261, 263
economics, 29, 266
education, 38, 132, 184
egoism
  arguments for ethical, 57–59
  ethical, 55
  objections to ethical, 56, 62–64
  objections to psychological, 59–61
  psychological, 55, 57
Eiffel Tower, 171–172
ejaculation Tower, 209
elm trees, 125
emotions, 34, 119
  and expressivism, 197
  and happiness, 40–41
  and intuitionism, 184–185
  and virtue, 126–129
  moral, 55
empirical investigation, 5–6, 10–11, 33,
  148
endorphins and enkephalins, 10
epistemology, 181
equality, 90, 95–96, 105
equivocation, 214
ethical theories, 53
  convergence of, 104–105
eudaimonia, 39, 125–126
euphoria, 26
*Euthyphro*, 155
Euthyphro dilemma, 155–158
evaluative qualities, 5, 80
  see also good; value
Evening Star, 179
evidence, 60, 86, 89, 150, 159, 177,
  181–182, 198, 216

Index

evil, 56, 70, 143, 200
  evolution, 60–61, 144
  exceptions, 95–96
  expensive tastes, 30–32
  experience machine, 15, 30
  explanation
    and divine command theory, 156
    and reasons, 122
    and virtue ethics, 124, 130–131
    evolutionary, 60–61
    moral properties and causal, 170
    of right and wrong, 104, 113–114
  expression, 208–210
  expressivism, 205–212
  core claims of, 206–207
  mere attitudes objection, 211–212
  on moral judgments, 206–208
  on moral language, 208–210
  on moral properties, 210–211
  on moral truth, 211
  see also Frege–Geach problem

Feldman, Fred, 9, 17
  objection to ethical egoism, 56
  objection to life satisfaction theory
    of happiness, 33
female genital mutilation, 149
fidelity, 115
Finland, 99–103, 151
Fischer, John Martin, 227, 235
flourishing see eudaimonia
  animals and plants, 125
foundationalism, 183–184
Fourier, Joseph, 250
Frankena, William, 176–177
Frankfurt cases, 234–235
Frankfurt, Harry, 230
  higher-order desire theory of
    responsibility, 238–241
  objection to the freedom principle,
    234–236
fraud, 56, 114
freedom, 96–97  
  flickers of, 235–236  
  principle, 229  
freeloder, 68, 70  
Frege–Geach problem, 212  
  embedded claims, 212–213  
  the negation problem, 214–215  
  valid inferences, 213–214  
friends, 4–10, 12, 15, 19, 25, 29, 31, 34, 39, 54, 71, 125, 127, 211, 226  
Fukushima, 264  
functionings, 37  
Gauthier, David, 65, 67–69  
Geach, Peter, 213  
  generalism, 121–123  
  generalization, 57  
Gibbard, Allan, 54, 206–207  
global warming, 249  
God  
  and begging the question, 176  
  and the divine command theory, 151–159  
  and the idea of non-natural properties, 169  
  and meaning of life, 43  
  and true responsibility, 232  
  goodness of, 157  
  rationality of, 158  
Godwin, William  
  surgeon and mother example, 82  
good see value  
  for, 62  
  will, 90–91  
gratitude, 115, 120, 226  
gravitational constant, 35  
Great Leap Forward, 56  
greenhouse gas, 250, 266  
Guernica, 88  
guilt, 54, 126, 204, 208  
Hampton, Jean, 59  
happiness, 4, 25–27  
  connection to well-being, 26–27  
  emotional state theory of, 40–41  
  general, 82, 87  
  hedonism about, 27–28  
  life satisfaction theories of, 29, 32–33  
  measurement of, 33  
  objective list theory of, 39  
  the role of, 28–29  
  three senses of, 26–27  
  utilitarianism and, 79, 82, 87–88  
Hare, R.M., 201–203  
Harman, Gilbert, 146, 169–170  
Haybron, Daniel  
  against hedonism about happiness, 28  
  and emotional state theory of happiness, 40–41  
Haydn, Joseph, 14  
health, 12, 34, 38, 261, 264  
  mental, 237  
Heaven and Hell, 155, 232–234  
hedonism  
  about happiness, 27–28, 84  
  about prudential value and well-being, 12–15, 27–28  
  and utilitarianism, 84–85  
  arguments for, 13  
  objections to, 14, 28–29  
“Here I stand, I can do no other,” 237  
Hobbes, Thomas  
  and the sovereign, 68  
  and subjectivism, 143  
hockey stick graphs, 249  
holding responsible, 226  
holism, practical reasons, 121–122  
honesty, 126, 129–130, 132  
Hooker, Brad, 30, 70, 83
Hume, David
and the Argument from Motivation, 196, 199
on pleasure
Humean Theory of Motivation, 197–199
Hurka, Thomas, 34
and perfectionism, 84
and variable value view, 259
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 125, 129
hypnosis, 241
hypocrisy, 200–201
impairing conditions, 205
impartiality, 55, 67, 90, 101, 260
incentives, 91–92
incomplete expressions, 147
indeterminism, 231–232, 235
inferential justification, 182
intention, 56, 103, 197–198, 209, 228, 232, 241
interests, 11, 25, 31, 57–59, 64–69
intergenerational justice, 265
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 251, 267
internal rewards, 127
intuitionism
in metaethics, 181–186
in normative ethics, 115–117
intuitions, 28, 104, 170, 229, 236, 252, 259–260
about experience machine, 16–17
about large numbers, 260
about Moral Judgment Internalism, 200
Johnson, Robert, 131
Judge example, 99, 103–104
justice, 115, 129, 203
Kagan, Shelly, 9–10
Kane, Robert, 229
Kant, Immanuel, 79, 90
on acting rightly, 94–96
and the categorical imperative, 92
on freedom, 96–97
on maxims, 91
on moral worth, 91
on perfect and imperfect duties, 94
and the universalization test, 92–93
Kantian ethics, 80, 90–97
arguments for, 95–97
perfect and imperfect duties, 94–95
Kennedy, John F., 178
killing, 56, 64, 67–68, 71, 84, 95, 98–102, 146, 158, 183, 227–228, 242, 261
kindness, 129, 233
knowledge
by acquaintance, 183
of actual duties, 119
infallibility, 145, 150
know-how, 177–179
moral principles and, 123
non-naturalism and, 171
of prima facie duties, 117–118
problem of, 181–183
relativism and, 148
traditional tripartite theory of, 181–182
value of, 34
virtue ethics and, 131–133
Korsgaard, Christine, 90, 96, 102
Kripke, Saul, 179
language, 171
and meaning, 171–172, 177–181
and reference, 171–172, 179–181
law, 92–104, 142, 263
lawn-mower racing, 42
laws of nature, 231
Leibniz, Gottfried, 155
Lewis, David, 168–169
life plans, 29, 32
life-saving, 82, 91, 98, 116–119
Locke, John, 172
loudness, 9–10
love, 38, 91
and divine command theory, 155
and meaning of life, 42
and personal preferences, 207
as a reactive attitude, 226
and real self, 240
loyalty, 129
luck, 231–232
moral, 127
Luther, Martin, 238
Mackie, J.L., 154
magic button, 204
Mao Zedong, 56
Matrix, The, 16
matter of opinion, 143–144
maxim, 91, 103
maximizing, 66, 82, 84, 86, 169,
McDowell, John, 123–124
meaning of life, 4, 41–42
fitting fulfillment theory of, 42–43
Mele, Al
on Frankfurt cases, 236
on Moral Judgment Internalism,
204
on responsibility and luck, 232
metaethics, 141–142
metaphysics, 153
Mill, John Stuart
argument for utilitarianism, 86–88
on happiness and pleasure, 27–28
on higher and lower pleasures,
14–15
naturalist accounts of rightness and,
169
and utilitarianism, 79, 84
Miller, Alex, 207
minks, 145
money, 12, 33, 56, 64, 93, 98–103, 115,
127, 150, 262
monism, 113–114
monotheism, 151
moods, 40–41
Moore, G.E.
argument against ethical egoism,
62–64
and natural properties, 168
and non-naturalism, 170
and the Open Question Argument,
171–180, 207
objections to Mill’s argument for
utilitarianism, 88–89
objection to subjectivism, 145
moral attitude problem, 207–208
moral code, 146
moral experience, 145
moral judgment, 195
expressivist view of, 206–208
inverted commas, 203
Moral Judgment Externalism, 199–200
Moral Judgment Internalism, 199–200
counterexamples to strong, 202–205
strong, 201–202
very strong, 200–201
weak, 205
moral principles, 115–116, 122–123
contractarianism and, 67–68
person-affecting, 251–252, 263
simplicity of, 122
and virtue ethics, 129–130
moral properties see properties
moral realism, 167–168
moral relativism see relativism
moral responsibility see relativism
as appropriateness of reactive
attitudes, 226
judgments of, 226
true, 232–234
moral sensibility, 119, 123–124
virtue ethics and, 132
moral words
  definitions of, 173
  open questions and, 174–175
moral worth, 91, 94
Morals by Agreement, 65
Morning Star, 179
motivation
  argument from, 196–197, 205–206
desire satisfaction theories and, 30
desires and, 199
egoism and, 57, 60–61
hedonism and, 13
Humean theory of, 197–199
Kantian ethics and, 91
moral judgments and, 195
subjectivism and, 144
virtues and, 126
multiculturalism, 151
Murderer example, 99, 102

naturalism, 168–169
  analytic and synthetic, 180
Nicomachean Ethics, 4
non-cognitive states, 197, 206, 286
non-identity effect, 251–253, 263
non-maleficence, 116
  see also do no harm principle
non-naturalism, 169
advantages of and objections to, 169–171
  see also Open Question Argument
normative competence, 242–243
normative ethics, 53
normativity, 154, 170
  as practical relevance, 170–171
Nowell-Smith, P.H., 185
Nozick, Robert, 15–17
Nussbaum, Martha, 37–39

Obama, Barack, 171
obligations
  climate change and, 260–264
  as a deontic notion, 80

future generations and, 251–253
Hume and the motivating power of, 196
motivation and, 202–203
objective
  goods, 34
  list theories of well-being, 34–39
  moral truths, 142, 168, 211
  views of about meaning of life, 42–43
Open Question Argument, 171–175
  expressivist understanding of, 207
  responses to, 176–181
open question test, 173–174
opera, 31
options, 81, 230, 237, 257, 268–269
orbitofrontal cortex, 11
Oshana, Marina, 226
ought, 13, 62, 80, 118–119, 132
ought implies can principle, 58
oyster, 14

pain and suffering, 7, 12, 18, 60–61,
  84, 242, 257
parallel process, 236
Parfit, Derek
  counterexamples to the Categorical Imperative, 99
  ethical theories and convergence, 80
  on critical level utilitarianism, 259
  on discernible differences and happiness, 13
  on the non-identity effect, 252–253
  on the repugnant conclusion, 253–255
Paris, 181
particle accelerators, 170
particularism, 120–124, 131–133
passions, 4, 42–43, 96, 196, 199
paternalism, 35
perfectionism, 84
personal identity, 252
pessimism, 17–19
Index

Picasso, Pablo, 88

practice, 127

plans, 29

expressivism and, 195–197, 206–215

life, 32–34

network of, 208

practical reason and, 34, 38

Principia Ethica, 62, 172

principle of beneficence

climate change and, 263–264

holism and, 121

as a non-person-affecting principle, 253

and repugnant conclusion, 255–259

as a Rossian prima facie duty, 116

principle of transitivity, 255

prisoner’s dilemma, 66–67, 266

projectivism, 210–211

promise, 54, 58–59, 68, 71, 80, 84, 101, 114–122, 128, 132, 141, 183

lying, 93–94

Promise example, 98, 101

properties

divine command theory and moral, 153–154

identity of, 172

natural, 168–169

non-natural, 169

projected moral, 207, 210–211

pro tanto, 116

psychiatry, 60

psychopaths, 70, 242

public hangings, 121

public policy, 29, 168

public transport, 67

quality of life, 25, 251, 253–254, 257, 263

quantum mechanics, 231

Quinn, Warren, 157

Rachels, James, 57, 145

rape, 38, 54, 82, 114

prick, 88

Picasso, Pablo, 88
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rationality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beliefs and, 198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>egoism, social cooperation and, 65–69, 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God and, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantian ethics and, 93, 96, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moral judgments and, 205–207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and self-evaluation, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uncertainty and, 269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawls, John, 31, 35, 81–82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reactive attitudes, 54, 91, 146, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>real self, 229–230, 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt's higher-order desire theory of, 238–239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objections to Frankfurt's view of, 239–240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objection to time-slice views of, 241–242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watson's evaluative judgment view of, 240–241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reality, 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acting for the right, 71, 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>an argument for ethical egoism based on, 58–59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compliance problem and, 68–69 default, 122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as a deontic notion, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for the wrongness of actions, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God's commands and, 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>holism and, 120–122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore's argument against ethical egoism and, 62–64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prima facie duties understood as, 116–117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reacting to, 132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsiveness to, 242–243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rightness of actions and, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to do the right thing, 95–96, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>virtue ethics and, 127–128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>recklessness, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reflective self-evaluation, 240–241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reformation, 236–237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infinite, 233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vicious, 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rehab, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relativism, 146–147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advantages of, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent, 147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>appraisal, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>descriptive cultural, 148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objections to, 149–151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reparation, 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reporting attitudes, 143–144, 146, 148, 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic, The, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repugnant conclusion, 253–255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responses to, 256–260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resentment, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>respect, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revelation, 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhubarb, 143–144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ridge, Michael and McKeever, Sean, 122–123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right and the Good, The, 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right-making features, 104, 113–114, 116–117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>righteousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreement about, 104–105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consequentialism and, 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criterion of, 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>degrees of, 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>divine command theory and, 153, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantian ethics and, 91–92, 94–95, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>law and, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalism about, 168–169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>property of, 53–54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relativism and, 146–147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjectivism and, 143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utilitarianism and, 82, 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>virtue ethics and, 129–130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Riots example, 98, 100
risks, 126, 132, 264
Robb, David, 236
Ross, W.D.
on actual duties, 118–120
on consequentialism and Kantian
ethics, 113–115
on prima facie duties, 115–118
on self-evident truths, 183
see also duties; intuitionism
rubber ducks, 81
Russell, Bertrand, 183
sauna, 151
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey
on contractarianism, 89
on Mill’s argument for
utilitarianism, 197
Scanlon, T.M., 54
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 17–19, 31–32
Schroeder, Mark, 206, 212
on expressivism and expression,
208–210
on the negation problem, 214–215
science, 6, 42, 65, 127, 144, 170, 182,
207, 210
scientology, 182
self-evident truths, 89, 117–119,
183–186
self-forming acts, 233
self-improvement, 116, 131, 232–234
selfishness, 56–59, 65–71, 93–94, 127,
185
Sen, Amartya, 37
sense/reference distinction, 179–181
sensitivity, 119–120
Shafer-Landau, Russ
on advantages of hedonism, 12
on egoism, 57–58
on objections to subjectivism, 145
on problems of relativism, 149–151
on self-evident propositions, 183
shoplifting, 119, 128
shyness, 126
Sidgwick, Henry
on consequences of utilitarianism,
253
on dualism of practical reason, 56
on pleasure, 8–9
on problems of Mill’s arguments for
utilitarianism, 88
Silver, Nate, 251, 267, 269
Simpson, Homer, 203
sincerity, 56, 195, 201, 205, 209–210,
213–214
Singer, Peter, 42
Sistine Chapel, 120
skepticism, metaethical, 142
skills, 39, 178, 242
slavery, 168
Slote, Michael, 86, 125, 177
Smith, Holly, 65
Smith, Michael
on agency, 228
on direction of fit, 198
on the Humean Theory of
Motivation, 197–199
on knowing the meaning of words,
177
on weak internalism, 205
on wrongness and reasons, 54
snow, 172
Soames, Scott, 177
Sober, Elliot, 60–61
social contract, 70
social cooperation
distribution of the benefits in, 68
exclusion from, 69
expressivism and, 212
paradox of, 65–67, 266–267
social interaction, 125
Spanish Civil War, 88
spontaneous people, 33–34, 238–239
Sri Lanka, 198
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Augustine, 157, 203–204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status quo bias, 16–17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson, Charles, 200, 210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stir-fry, 199, 228</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stolen book, 121, 128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stranger on the train, 13, 30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stratton-Lake, Philip, 116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strawson, Galen, 232–234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strawson, Peter, 226</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sturgeon, Nicholas, 168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subject–predicate sentence, 212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjective, 42–43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjectivism, 143–144, 208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>advantages of, 144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objections to, 144–145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumner, Wayne, 9, 32, 34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superman, 58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supernatural, 151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>super-tasters, 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svanvarsdóttir, Sigrún, 202–203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swinburne, Richard, 154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>synonymy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore’s test for, 174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tännäsjö, Torbjörn, 260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarkiewicz, Władysław, 26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor, Richard, 42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temperature, average, 250–251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>temptation, 201–202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft example, 99, 103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theoretical reason, 126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time-slice theory, 241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tips, 57, 148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to-be-doneness, 154</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tolerance, 148–150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transplant example, 98, 101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Treatise of Human Nature, 196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trust, 69, 84, 127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truth, 126, 198–199, 211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>truth-conditions, 144, 148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyndall, John, 250</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulterior motives, 57, 127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uncertainty, 267–269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universal law, 92–97, 99–100, 102–104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>universalization test, 90, 92, 102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Birmingham, 100, 102–103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwin, Nicholas, 214–215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>use/mention distinction, 171–172</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>utilitarianism, 79, 82, 84, 97, 169, 174–175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>argument for, 86–90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>critical-level, 257–259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterexamples to, 98–99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objection to critical-level, 259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responses to objections, 100–102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>see also average utility principle;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>repugnant conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>actual and expected, 85–86, 268–269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agent-relative, 64, 101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consequentialism and, 80, 100–101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>good and bad, 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instrumental, 11–12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intrinsic, 11–12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prudential, 11, 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theory of, 81, 101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van Inwagen, Peter, 231</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>variable value view, 259</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ventral pallidum, 11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venus, 179–181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>virtue ethics, 124–130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>circularity objection to, 130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on moral knowledge, 132–133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on moral sensibility, 132–133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and the order of explanation, 124–125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and principles, 129–130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and rightness, 129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-improvement objection to, 131</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
virtues and vices, 126, 129–130
  acquisition of, 127
virtuous actions, 128–129
visible objects, 86, 88
volcanoes, 228
voluntarism, 142

Wallace, Jay, 226
Wallenberg, Raoul, 57
water, 180
  lack of, 251, 261, 264
  poisoned, 85
  vapor, 250
waterboarding, 144, 146–148
Watson, Gary, 240–241
weakness of will, 201
wealth, 33, 90, 99, 101, 261

well-being, 4, 25–27
  and capability, 37–39
  and desire satisfaction, 29–30
  hedonism about, 27
  objective list theories of, 34–35
  in population ethics, 253–260,
  264
  psychological, 41
Widerker, David, 235–236
Wolf, Susan
  on the meaning of life, 42–43
  on moral responsibility, 242–243
wolves, 125
World War II, 57
wrong see right

yucky and yummy, 143–144