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Introduction

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The Question

Is there something new, something different, about the spatial patterns of the cities of today and tomorrow which differentiates them from the cities of yesterday? That is the question to which this book is addressed. It asks it of cities around the world. New types of cities, called global cities by some, world cities or megacities by others, are described both in the scholarly and in the popular press. Indeed, internal spatial patterns seem to play a different role in cities today, and a very variable one: service-adapted patterns are different from manufacturing-based patterns, central cities have different patterns from those on the periphery, “edge cities” are different from traditional cities. Within cities, the ghettos are increasingly separated from the rest of the city, while the same holds true, though in a different way, for the exclusionary enclaves of the rich. Areas that are socially and spatially between these two extremes also separate themselves out from the rest of the city more and more. These are the evolving patterns we wish to examine in this book.

Of course cities are in a constant process of internal change. The center of cities decline or change form and functions, and new business districts spring up; immigrants cluster together and mix with others; ethnic and racial groups are segregated in ghettos and slums, or they escape to more livable neighborhoods; new cultural enclaves are formed, while old ones disappear; new forms of cities are created at the edges of metropolitan areas;
suburbanization never seems to end. Spatial divisions of themselves are nothing new, but they are not stable in their causes, in their appearance, in their scale, or in their effects.

There is today a growing consensus in the literature that significant changes in spatial divisions within cities have occurred very visibly since the early 1970s. Descriptive accounts of these changes have multiplied. So have accounts of changes in the national and international context that parallel and perhaps cause them: a process of globalization, changing forms of production, a declining state provision of welfare, differences in power relationships, developing technologies, all have their influence on urban patterns, within cities as well as among them (see, e.g., Fainstein et al., 1992; O’Loughlin and Friedrichs, 1996; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Madanipour et al., 1998). But exactly how do these changes affect the spatial form of individual cities? Are the patterns of all cities convergent? On what do changes depend? Can (should) public policy influence them?

In this book, our focus is thus on one deceptively simple question: what is “new” about these cities of today, and in particular, what is new about the spatial arrangements within them? In brief, we ask the question:

Is there a new spatial order within cities?

We have tried to make this central question more concrete by formulating a set of subsidiary questions:

- Is there a clearly visible direct impact of globalization on the internal spatial pattern of cities? How (if at all) can the impact of globalization be separated from other macro-societal changes that are linked to globalization and/or parallel it?
- Is there indeed any generalizable city form that is characteristic of globalizing cities, be it radial, gentrified, edge city, or other? Or is it precisely that absence of conventional form that characterizes today’s cities, as post-modern discussions of the Los Angeles model suggest?
- Do spatial cleavages that are indeed found in cities today reflect a dual city, a quartered city, a plural city? Are the separate residential parts further apart economically, socially, culturally, than in previous eras? The move of manufacturing to the suburbs and services to the central city goes back many decades: how can the effects of these developments be described?
- Is the old doughnut pattern, with the middle class in the white suburbs surrounding a lower class black inner city, obsolete in countries such as the United States? Is the reverse pattern, with an upper class inner city and working class suburbs, that has characterized many European cities, likewise obsolete? Or are today’s patterns simply a continuation of older
and well-known market-driven mechanisms, with variations only in magnitude?

- Is “race” a critical factor in the definition of the spatial pattern of globalizing cities? If so, how and why? In all countries? Are patterns of immigrant location and separation/integration in the United States a forerunner of developments elsewhere?
- To what extent does, or can, public policy, at the local or national level, influence the internal spatial structure of cities?

We have raised these questions with each of the contributors to this book. They have each provided valuable material towards some general answers; we have summarized our own understanding of what has been learned, and what remains unclear, in our Conclusion.

The volume begins with a general statement of our opening hypothesis in the next section of this Introduction. The following part of the Introduction is devoted to the factors that might be expected to produce a new spatial order within cities. This is followed by a general description of the different spatial forms we expected to find within cities. The core of the book is then devoted to case studies of diverse cities around the world. The cases provide evidence relevant to the validity of the hypothesis with which we began, although there is no pretense that they are representative enough or conclusive enough to validate or disprove it. They do clearly show the need at least for modifications, and we present a revised formulation of our hypothesis in our Conclusion, which presents our own summary and synthesis.

**The Hypothesis**

The hypothesis with which we begin can be formulated as follows.

There is a new spatial order of cities, commencing somewhere in the 1970s, in a period often described as one of a globalizing economy. While cities have always been divided along lines of culture, function, and status, the pattern today is a new, and in many ways deeper-going, combination of these divisions. Although it varies substantially from city to city by historical development of the built form, by national political and economic structures, by the relative weight of the contending forces involved in development, by the role of “race” and ethnicity, and by the place in the international economy, nevertheless there are basic features in common. They include a spatial concentration within cities of a new urban poverty on the one hand, and of specialized “high-level” internationally connected business activities on the other, with increasing spatial divisions not only between each of them but also among segments of the “middle class” in between.

Boundaries between divisions, reflected in social or physical walls among them, are increasing. The result is a pattern of separate clusters of residential space, creating protective citadels and enclaves on the one side and constraining ghettos on the other, in a hierarchical
relationship to each other. The market produces and reproduces these divisions, but the state is deeply involved in their creation and perpetuation. The state can also ameliorate them, and will tend to do so under specific conditions. Present trends do not suggest it will do so in most places. The result is a converging pattern within cities radically different enough from earlier patterns to justify being called “a new spatial order.”

Within this general hypothesis, there are the contours of specific, arguably new, socio-spatial formations (see also Marcuse, 1989; Van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997). They are mentioned briefly below and will be further elaborated later in this Introduction. Those formations include the following:

- Areas that can be considered as protected enclaves of the rich, the representatives of an extremely mobile top, operating at a more global level than ever before. These areas can be labeled as “citadels” or as “exclusionary enclaves” and generally consist of expensive apartments in favorable locations.
- Gentrified areas occupied by the yuppies, the professionals, the managers. They are surrounded by the older, often poorer, population. These areas are located in the inner parts of the older cities.
- Suburbs generally inhabited by the middle class, by households with children and substantial incomes.
- Tenement areas – with less expensive, often (but not always) rented dwellings – inhabited by the working class, the employed, unemployed and temporarily employed. The tenement city is not a homogeneous whole but is increasingly divided in itself. Neighborhoods are differentiated among each other by income, occupation, and ethnicity. In some cases the divisions are represented spatially by the hardening of the boundaries between them.
- Ethnic enclaves, often seen as a specific form of the tenement city. Here, ethnic minorities congregate for various reasons.
- A new type of ghetto, the so-called excluded ghetto, inhabited by the new urban poor, a fully and long-term excluded group at the bottom (Marcuse, 1998).

These ideas were formulated before we knew what the contributions to this volume would be. Since we know now, as this is going into print, what our conclusions are, a very brief summary here is appropriate:

The hypothesis accurately states certain common tendencies, but their manifestation in cities is the result of changes that are of longer historical origin, and dependent on multiple contingencies. In any given case, the variations may overwhelm the general, and the results are much subject to political control. While the general tendencies produce predictable socio-spatial patterns, very visibly affect some locations, and are increasing in importance, they are not so consistent or so different from prior patterns as to deserve being called “a new spatial order.”
Each of these points is developed in our Conclusion.

Influences on the Spatial Order of Cities

It is not a very new idea that cities are part of a larger society, that their spatial form is inter-related with the economic, social, cultural, and political structures of the society within which they exist. Areas within the city are further influenced by developments and decisions on higher spatial levels. Sociologists and geographers now agree that patterns of segregation and concentration change as a consequence of the interaction of individual household decisions with a variety of structures and developments on different spatial levels. Societal processes – like economic restructuring on a global level – have their impact on local situations and developments (Sassen, 1990; Burgers and Engbersen, 1996, Van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997, Van Kempen and Özüekren, 1998) and on choice patterns of households (Clark and Dieleman, 1996).

We begin with a consideration of macro-social forces (see also Van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997).

The unclear impact of globalization

The causes of changes within cities can to a large extent be traced back to developments that take place on higher spatial levels, regionally and even more critically nationally and globally. The latter, with its concomitant national and regional implications, is today generally subsumed under the concept of globalization, a term that is often used, but not always well defined. Globalization can comprise many processes, such as the spatial integration of economic activities, movement of capital, migration of people, development of advanced technologies, and changing values and norms that spread among various parts of the world. We take it here to mean globalization in its present configuration, that is, a combination of new technology, increased trade and mobility, increased concentration of economic control, and reduced welfare-oriented regulatory action of nation states. Other forms of globalization have existed in the past, and today alternative forms of globalization could easily be envisaged, but we focus here on really existing globalization, globalization as it exists today (see also Marcuse, 1997a).³

Globalization clearly has much to do with mobility of goods, of capital, of persons. An important reason to expect spatial changes within cities is the changing nature of economic activities and the concomitant shift in location of components of the production process. One of the main changes in Western societies – but also in many Asian countries – has been, and still is, the declining importance of manufacturing, and the increasing significance of services. Many traditional production tasks in manufacturing have been
mechanized, automated and computerized, making production more capital-intensive and less dependent on manual labor. Other tasks have been shifted to other parts of the world, where labor is less expensive. The increasing ability to separate manual and non-manual components of the labor process has increased the division of labor in the production process, making on the one hand many lower – or unskilled people redundant, and on the other hand demanding more skills from others. The increase in the numbers of so-called flexible jobs gives an increasing number of people the opportunity to find work, but these people are not necessarily the same as those who were made redundant (see also Harvey, 1989; Badcock, this volume).

The power of capital is clear here. Capital’s ability to bargain with labor is tremendously enhanced by its ability to seek out lower wage labor at all kinds of locations, sometimes very remote. Foreign capital may increasingly influence the spatial layout and physical appearance of areas within cities (Beauregard and Haila, this volume). Investors might seek to invest their capital not at home, but at places all over the world where profit is expected to be highest. Some areas profit, some others don’t: uneven development is characteristic of capitalism.

The possible spatial implications of these changes are manifold. We can distinguish between spatial shifts in the production process itself and other spatial changes, e.g. in residential patterns that result from these shifts. For the shift in the production process itself, it is clear that some regions just lose employment, especially manufacturing jobs. At the same time, employment in the service sector increases in some, but not all, cities. It is important here to distinguish between higher-order and lower-order services. At the top of the service sector we find functions of control, in the field of management, finance, law, and politics. Spatial centralization of these kinds of job is increasingly important, despite new communication techniques and fast modes of transport. Centers of some cities keep, or even increase, their importance for these purposes. At the lower end we find unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in sectors like catering (salad bars and snack bars), surveillance, and cleaning. Although unskilled jobs are partly dependent on the existence of jobs in the higher echelons, they can also be found in many places, not only in central cities, but in every place where people concentrate (Sassen, 1988; 1991).

With respect to the effects of these shifts, two lines of reasoning can be discerned (see Bolt et al., 1998). The first follows Robert Reich’s The Work of Nations (1991). He argues that local forms of social solidarity become less important because elites show an increasing international orientation and become less dependent on the services of lower status groups in neighborhoods. There is no need for the rich to live in close proximity to those of lesser wealth. If they even live in the same neighborhoods, the life world of the wealthy is clearly larger than their living neighborhood. Melvin Webber’s (1964) old idea of “communities without propinquity” is important for those
at the upper end of the economic spectrum today; the “urban realm” becomes “non-spatial.” For the very poor, by the same token, their spatially defined neighborhoods, while in ways growing even more important for their residents, become more and more irrelevant to the functioning of the mainstream economy. The location of either with relation to the other recedes dramatically in importance. A logical result is an urban society that is increasingly socially and spatially disconnected, fragmented and polarized.4

The second line of reasoning focuses on globalization as leading to a kind of socio-economic symbiosis within an increasingly polarized society, which can be seen in a growing number of highly-educated, wealthy persons and households, but also in an increasing number of people in the lower segments of the economy (in dead-end jobs and chronically unemployed). Saskia Sassen (1984, 1986, 1988, 1991) can be seen as the main proponent of this argument. The crux in this line of reasoning is that rich and poor, those included in and those excluded from the (formal) economy are dependent on each other. One group has the money for products and services that the other group can provide. The emphasis on symbiotic relationships might end up with a society that is both more polarized and more interdependent and with spatial patterns characterized by a spatial mix of different groups.

Although globalization is a process that obviously has broad impact, there are important questions concerning the specifically intra-city spatial effects of this process. Globalization is not automatically translated into spatial patterns, even in the case of a growing social polarization. Symbiosis between groups might or might not lead to urban areas that include neighborhoods where people with different incomes, ethnicities, skills and education live together. It might also very well lead to different consequences for different groups, leading some to form enclaves, others to be confined to ghettos. Reasoning from megatrends through social interdependence to spatial patterns should be done with great care.

Patterns of migration and other demographic developments

Working people often seek to improve their position by moving. Emigration to areas where a better life can be expected is a process as old as the world. In more recent times, the migration to Western Europe from Southern Europe and other countries around the Mediterranean and the migration within the United States from South to North are examples of large migration flows that are principally motivated by perceptions of work opportunity (see, e.g., Öziükren and Van Kempen, 1997). Also, on a smaller spatial scale, migration for reasons of job-seeking are frequent. Processes of urbanization, suburbanization, desuburbanization and re-urbanization are sometimes motivated by the creation of attractive residential areas, but often have to do with economic opportunities, including the relocation of work.
Not all migration flows are labor motivated. Internationally, political oppression and wars in many countries have pressed people to emigrate, often, where colonies have become independent, to the land of the colonizer, both before and after independence. Illegal migration flows add to the number of “official” immigrants in many countries, often having a disproportionate effect in specific cities and neighborhoods because of chain migration (Burgers, 1998). Not all these migration flows are urban oriented, but many of them were and still are. Migrants increased the demand for housing, often resulting in fiercer competition between households, especially lower-income households, leading not only to overcrowding in receiving neighborhoods but also to price changes and inflationary pressures throughout the housing market. Consequently, conflicts among groups, between those who had already lived in the neighborhood for decades or even generations and newcomers from other countries, are still manifold in all kinds of urban areas.

Population movement from central cities to suburbs is a common phenomenon in most developed countries. The movement is not class-neutral: it is higher income households that move out, largely in search for better or more cost-efficient housing opportunities and for jobs likewise moving out of central cities. In developing countries the same pattern may be observed; the continuing growth of cities in developing countries, which seems to contrast to the pattern in the more developed world, in fact reveals the same class-specific mobility patterns, but coupled with a rural-to-urban movement that swells the concentration of poorer people in the central cities in quantitatively much greater proportions than in more developed countries. Differences between cities do however exist: not all cities can be characterized by a growing number of poor and a declining number of higher-income households, and both rural-to-urban migration and displacement can lead to residential locations for poor people far from the center of cities.

Demographic developments within cities can have enormous influences on local housing demand and therefore on the spatial patterns of households. A sharp rise, for example, in the number of large families may boost the demand for large dwellings. If they are only available in some parts of the city, a concentration of large families may result there. If these large families are mainly immigrant families, we may end up with a spatial concentration of ethnic families. Rates of divorce, increasing numbers of single parent households, the tendency for young people to stay at home longer, the process of people living longer, are other demographic and socio-cultural processes that affect the housing market opportunities of households.

“Race” and racism

The importance of “race” and racism for the development of the spatial structure of cities is not always clear. Their importance in the US experience,
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however, cannot be exaggerated. A number of recent works make this point eloquently (see Massey and Denton, 1993; Goldsmith and Blakely, 1992). Central city “decline”, suburban and edge city growth, the changing nature of the ghetto, and the increase in fortified enclaves in US cities are inextricably linked to patterns of racial relations (Marcuse, 1997a). The fact that most African Americans in the United States live in neighborhoods that are racially stamped illustrates this point, especially when we realize that many of them do not live there as a matter of choice. Where the black ghetto was still seen before World War II as analogous to an ethnic enclave, as a place of cultural and economic and social solidarity, today it is more often seen as a place of social disorganization, restricting opportunity by its very spatial limitations (Wilson, 1987; Marcuse, 1998).

Indications of similar racist tendencies exist in many other countries, where opposition to immigration and immigrants has led to xenophobic political policies and even more visible direct hostilities, including physical attacks on immigrants. Turkish residents in Western Europe, for instance, have often met hostility based variously on immigrant status, culture, religion, and language (see Van Kempen and Bolt, 1997; Özüekren and Van Kempen, 1997). Until now, however, this has generally not led to the relegation of those who are not accepted in European urban societies to only a very small number of neighborhoods that can be considered as the worst places in town where nobody else lives (Peach, 1981).  

The changing role of the public sector

In some countries the welfare role of the state has always been very small: its support for the poor and provision of subsidies for the needy has always been narrowly limited. In other countries there has been an elaborate welfare state, especially since World War II. The main principles of the welfare state have always been twofold: an elaborate system to support those who are in a weak position on the labor market, which for instance meant (more or less structural) financial support in situations of unemployment and illness, and support for the elderly. The second principle is the existence of a system of subsidies in all kinds of fields, like housing, recreation, and social work. Especially since the middle of the 1980s, the welfare activities of states have been declining or retreating. Declining incomes, especially of those who are dependent on some form of state allowance, have been the direct effects of cut-backs in government expenditure. Declining subsidies further diminished the opportunities of all kinds of households on different markets, among them the housing market.

To elaborate on these briefly:

Government cut-backs directly affect the incomes of those who are dependent on the state, such as the unemployed, the elderly, and the handicapped.
Declining incomes directly influence the housing market opportunities of households because they are relegated to those dwellings they can afford to pay. When these dwellings are spatially concentrated in certain areas of the cities, increased spatial divisions may result, characterized by an increasing concentration of relatively poor households in areas with low-rent (and often low-quality) dwellings and a growing segregation of different income groups. Spatial divisions thus become sharper as public sector policies lead to an increasing polarization of incomes.

Processes of concentration and segregation may be further exacerbated by the declining welfare-oriented role of the state in housing. Traditionally, especially in Western European welfare states, social housing has been a very important factor in the housing market (see, e.g., Dieleman, 1994; Van Kempen and Priemus, 1999). Sometimes the social rented sector was designed to be available even to middle- and higher-income households, who entered it either because they liked it (social housing was often good quality), or because they had difficulties finding a place in the owner-occupied sector. Anyway, in countries like the Netherlands and Sweden, at least until the beginning of the 1990s, social housing could not be characterized as marginalized or residualized (see Meusen and Van Kempen, 1995; Özüekren and Magnusson, 1997; Van Kempen, 1997). This is an important difference with social housing in Britain, where the effects of the “Right to Buy” have been described as causing a residualization of the social rented sector (e.g., Robinson and O'Sullivan, 1983; Hamnett, 1984; Bentham, 1986; Forrest and Murie, 1990). In the United States, the construction of public housing has often led to increased segregation (e.g., Bauman 1998).

In a declining welfare state, declining subsidies for social housing and greater reliance on market forces lead to higher prices for new dwellings. Lower-income households then have reduced access to new dwellings. When individual housing allowances also decline, the choice of possibilities for low-income households diminish even further, relegating them to an ever shrinking number of neighborhoods where they still can afford to pay for their housing. Meanwhile, earlier low-income neighborhoods may be invaded by higher-income households, because they are the ones that can afford to pay for dwellings in those areas, in the processes known as gentrification.

The decline of the welfare state does not automatically lead to increasing concentration and segregation. Plans of local government to diversify the housing stock in poor neighborhoods with more market-oriented housing may reduce possibilities for relatively poor households, but at the same time decrease segregation (Van Kempen and Priemus, 1997). And where social housing has been a factor in increasing segregation, a greater reliance on market forces may very well lead to increasing diversification of the population of neighborhoods, temporarily or more structural, even though it leads to a net worsening of the housing situation of the poor, as may be the result
of current policies of privatization in public housing in the United States.

The decline of the welfare state does not mean that all policies with regard to the city have disappeared. Although less government money is usually available than in the previous decade, numerous plans are being developed and carried out to improve parts of the cities. In the Netherlands, for example, the government has recently introduced a policy of urban restructuring. One of the main aims of this policy is to restructure neighborhoods with a concentration of low-rent dwellings: in these areas a large number of these low-rent dwellings will be demolished (and replaced by more expensive rented dwellings or owner-occupied ones), upgraded or sold, in order to reduce the spatial concentration of low-income households and to increase the attractiveness of the area for higher-income households (see Van Kempen and Priemus, 1997). Another example is Australia, where state-managed revitalization of the inner cities has, in combination with gentrification, resulted in the reclaiming of these areas by middle-income households (see Badcock, this volume).

Changing patterns of choice

Especially in many western societies, the standard life course of people and households has changed in the last two or three decades. Claire Stapleton already indicated in 1980 that the standard course from birth–adolescent–couple–family with children–old couple–widow/er is no longer dominant, certainly in Western societies. Part of the declining importance of this standard life-course has to do with the declining importance of traditional values and norms, obedience, and docility and dependence on the church, parents, and husbands, and on the economic end with the increasing participation of women in the paid labor force. Emancipation, individualism can be seen as the driving forces behind an increasing importance of individual choice in all aspects of life, including the life course, the house, and the area in which to live.

One of the main changes in this respect is the postponement of family formation. The longer phase preceding child-bearing can be characterized by an enormous flexibility: people change jobs, partners and dwelling places. Especially in an economy where flexible jobs are on the increase, individuals are more or less forced to be flexible with regard to work places and living arrangements. When this flexibility is translated to the neighborhood level, it is easy to conclude that there must be areas that show a high turnover of (especially young) people. These areas have a specific function for starters in the housing market. Generally they are not the best areas in town, but they are important for many in this phase of flexibility, who do not object to living temporarily in a neighborhood with significant perceived environmental or social drawbacks.
Flexibility may even be a central concept in the period after family formation. The idea that families settled down in a certain area, with aiming to stay there for the rest of their lives will not hold for everyone in the present period. Again, labor market opportunities may cause a family to move, but also the wish to live in larger houses or a better neighborhood be at the root of the move to another place. Even the usually relatively immobile owner-occupiers are expected to become more mobile.

Old people, finally, also have more choice now than ever before. After the children have left home, the empty-nesters may start a completely new life. The American snowbirds are a case in point; in Europe, similarly, some Western European elderly move to the Mediterranean, at least for a part of the year. Others move from their single-family, owner-occupied house to expensive apartments or condominiums, made possible by complex financial arrangements with banks or life insurance companies. For the elderly, some neighborhoods become more, others less, attractive.

But changing patterns made possible by such increases in choice are not available to everyone, nor in all places, nor is the range of opened choices uniform. In Western societies expanded choice has mainly to do with a growing economy; in Eastern Europe growing opportunities have to do with political changes, and in both cases they are very unevenly distributed. Those with low and very low incomes and low education may face declining opportunities, because of fewer labor-market opportunities (as a consequence of the changing economic structure), and because of the declining welfare states (which specifically results in the declining supply of affordable housing), and because of the differential impact of new political structures.

**Spatial Divisions in the New Spatial Order**

The discussion here builds on the earlier conceptualization of a quartered city comprising a luxury city, a city of the gentry, a suburban city, a tenement city, and an abandoned city, but it seeks to pinpoint within those general “quarters” specific types of neighborhoods that may be expected to be found in specific locations as the types of neighborhoods most likely to be produced, expanded, or contracted by the new societal forces described above.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to give an overview of all the changes in all cities all over the world, and we do not make that attempt here; in our conclusion we expand on what is said here, taking into account the lessons taught by the other contributions to this volume. What is presented here is a set of ideal types. Their relevance to particular cities is of course one of the main themes of this book.
The locations of the elite

Thirty years ago, and earlier, the residences of the rich and powerful, if they were in the city, were separate buildings: mansions or high-rises with penthouses and luxury services. They might cluster in neighborhoods, but their neighborhoods were not defined and isolated for protection as such. That pattern continues, but in addition a newer pattern seems to be developing, one for which John Friedmann selected the appropriate name of “citadel” (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982). Citadels are enclosed, protected, insulated areas of upper-income residence, often, particularly if located downtown, combined with office and commercial uses. Battery Park City in New York City, Pudong in Shanghai, La Défense in France, Renaissance Center in Detroit, are classic examples; the latter virtually has a moat around it, a high wall on one side, a river on the other, with entrances that can be controlled and a castle-on-a-hill relationship to the surrounding blighted and abandoned central city. Sigurd Grava (1991, p. 11) describes Battery Park City in understated terms:

“The major issue, in the opinion of most urban analysts, is the current exclusivity or isolation of the development. This is the case in a physical as well as social sense. Battery Park City today is an enclave [sic], a refined space that is not easily accessible nor particularly inviting to outsiders. The West Street chasm [its only land border] is enough to deter all but the most purposeful passers by . . . For those who do make it across, there are only a few attractions . . . The outsiders can sit in the Winter Garden for a while or stare at the incredibly luxurious yachts, but the recreational possibilities are soon exhausted. . . . The restaurants and bars tend to be at the plush end of the scale. The residential areas are perceived as expensive dormitories or fancy shelters for downtown bankers . . . . . This is not necessarily a problem for those who wish to work and live in an exclusive, isolated, and protected environment . . . ”

Citadel formation is in some ways an extension of prior (and continuing) gentrification (see below), but goes well beyond it. Gentrification by and large took place at the borders of the old downtowns, and was of the hard-working professionals, managers, technical people associated with the growing upper-income service sector. The citadels offer some housing for them also, but they include as well the top: board members and inheritors of wealth, ultimately belonging to a different class than those who work for them. They do not need to make the effort of gentrification, and edge cities (below) are not for them either.

The locations of the new gentry

Gentrified neighborhoods and areas of potential gentrification near downtowns are particularly affected by the changing productive structure of the economy.
More high-level jobs in the service sector imply more households with high incomes, much of which may go to housing. The gentrified city is the part occupied by the professionals, the managers, the higher technicians. They are the yuppies, the cosmopolitans (Merton, 1968), the careerists (Bell, 1968). They live alone, or in two-person households, at least for a part of their lives. Gentrification is by the same token likely to increase displacement of the poor from gentrified areas, for the areas of gentrification generally consist of older buildings, left vacant by poorer households after a process of displacement and rising prices.

Gentrified neighborhoods are not necessarily located in older cities; their essential characteristics are to be found in some suburbs, and their social characteristics in some exclusionary enclaves. But the difference is that, in the case of gentrification, the new population is in most cases surrounded by and mixed with the older population. Of course this can be a temporary phenomenon: poor households may be just there, “waiting” to be blown out by those who have more financial possibilities. It is an interesting question when the following stage would then be an enclave, surrounded by a wall, erected as a consequence of neighborhood action, or when the social mix may show a longer endurance. It is in these areas that Sassen’s theoretical notions about the interdependence of groups at opposite ends of the economic spectrum can be seen in practice (Sassen, 1991 and 1994).

Sometimes gentrification is a result of local policy when local government decides to support housing expansion for the well-to-do. It may be preceded by improvement strategies with the aim of increasing the appeal of inner-city living for the new middle class. This could be in the form of attractive housing, but also by way of offering new places of entertainment (a concert hall, a theater) or a shopping mall in places in or adjacent to parts of the central business district, for example on disused tracts of land in harbor areas or former industrial sites.

**Suburbs**

The typical picture of a suburb includes owner-occupied single-family houses with “decent home-owning people” (Greer, 1962), gardens, green environments, nice places for children to play, quiet, and safety. The residential function is far more important than anything else. The suburban environments are usually inhabited by the middle class, family households with incomes sufficient to pay market prices for their dwellings. Most who live there do so by choice. Because they consider their present situation as the top of their housing career, they do not contemplate further moves, or at most horizontal ones if job location changes.

For some, a suburban location may be a place to live only as long as the children are in the house. They may consider moving (back) to the city
Introduction

thereafter; they are potential gentrifiers. And still some others may be attracted to more distant suburbs – ex-urbs –, or in some countries to the countryside. In general, however, suburbs do not show many changes in their population structure, both because mobility rates are relatively low and because vacancies in the housing stock are generally filled by people of the same lifestyle and income. Only the age structure then changes. But the balance between stability and change may be changing. In prosperous economies, households may indeed increasingly choose to move on, to find an even better place, bigger, more expensive, located in even quieter environments, away from the city. Whether for better or not, more families (at least in the United States) move every year, not to get more desirable housing, but because of job changes. There is now a clear tendency in some countries to look at suburbs as just another area to live for only a relatively small number of years. Expanding opportunities have their influence here.

Another major change with respect to suburban environments is the development of, what Marcuse (1997b) called the “totalizing suburb.” Joel Garreau (1991) coined the term “edge city” for the formation, and the word has come into common usage and is used here, although in a broader and more analytically-defined sense than in Garreau (see Beauregard, 1997). This is a suburb in which business activities, employment centers, commercial and cultural facilities are brought together with the residential function. These suburbs are not primarily residential any more: more jobs than bedrooms (Garreau). Although ultimate economic dependence on the central city may still exist, in terms of daily life and daily activities people do not have to leave their suburban environment. The phenomenon is certainly to some extent a consequence of the increasing polarization of central cities, with a parallel increase in the distaste of some of higher income to continue to live near those increasingly excluded from economic growth; to what extent is not clear yet.

Suburbs do not include those with controlling positions in trade, industry, or finance. Their centers remain in or close to the central business districts. Neither do the new cities include the very poor. Their residents are in almost all respects indistinguishable from those of the typical suburb. Racially, edge cities are predominantly white (Marcuse, 1997) and therefore reinforce the class and racial partitioning of the metropolitan area. It is clear that edge cities compete with the existing (large) cities: the central city no longer is the dominant site in the metropolis for jobs, offices, restaurants, shops and cinemas. Literature on the development of edge cities in Europe is scarce, if existing at all, although developments on the outskirts of Frankfurt, for instance, might well qualify (see Keil and Ronneberger, this volume).

Suburban environments are found not only outside cities, but also within them. Almost every city has neighborhoods in which middle class families with children live, with all the social and cultural characteristics of suburbs,
differing from the traditional suburb only in the built form (denser or multi-story housing instead of free-standing single-family houses) and tenure. And tenure differences are not that great: condominium and cooperative forms provide the equivalent of ownership, as may long-term leases. The changing spatial consequence here may be more in the form of social and cultural institutions than residential: the Disneyfication of Times Square can be viewed as the progressive suburbanization of a downtown.

**Traditional working class areas**

Traditional working class areas (the tenement city) are occupied by the blue- and white-collar working class, the (temporarily) unemployed, and those on benefits. The tenement city is the part of the city with less expensive private dwellings and social housing. In some cases, tenement areas are simply a transitional residence on the way up, particularly for the young; in others, people will be relegated to live there for the rest of their lives. In most cases these areas have mixed occupancy, with those whose employment is increasingly unstable (including many in the informal labor market and some at its criminal end) next to the stably employed, the secure elderly, and the hopefully upwardly-mobile. Tensions and hostilities between different categories of inhabitants can thus be part of every-day life. Social and economic change is likely to be the most enduring characteristic of these areas, moving from an autochthonous homogenous character to either ethnic mixture or ethnic concentration. Characteristic of the current period, such areas are not only threatened with instability but also shrinking in absolute extent under the pressure of abandonment on the one side (see below) and gentrification on the other.

Physical characteristics play a major role here. Three different types of areas can be discerned in most western European cities:

- The areas built before World War II, usually located in a belt of more or less deteriorated older, relatively inexpensive housing near the center of the city. We call them the old restructuring areas, because they are generally subject to all kinds of renovation activities.
- The early post-World War II social housing areas, typically located in a ring just outside the old restructuring areas.
- The high-rise areas of post-war construction, sometimes — but not always — spatially detached from the city.

**Pre-war tenement areas** — Dwellings dating from the second half of the 19th century and the first three decades of the 20th century can often be regarded as the worst part of the urban housing stock. They are often small, lacking basic facilities, like a bathroom; rents are generally relatively low. They are
characterized by a mixture of housing types, and their occupants are people
with low incomes: the unemployed, the starters on the housing market, stu-
dents, immigrants, elderly, single-parent families. The enormous differentia-
tion in lifestyles between these categories now and then causes tension, racial
problems, social isolation, and fear to go outside at night (see, e.g., Van
Kempen, 1997).

Partial or complete gentrification is an increasing phenomenon in such
areas. Higher-income households may be attracted by the lively atmosphere
of these areas, or by restructuring processes that lead to a more differentia-
ted housing stock, either because of the implementation of local government
plans or because of gentrification and spontaneous renovation by the inhab-
itants themselves. This might result in new elite enclaves in redeveloped
parts inside or next to deteriorating neighborhoods and housing inhabited by
the poor and elderly. Contrasts in social status and wealth in spatial proxim-
ity create a special kind of dual city where the poor and rich live together in
the same areas, but use very different spaces: the rich go to the streets with
the luxury shops, the poor visit the street bazaars; the rich use private cars,
the poor public transport; and they have different places of work.

Early post-war tenement areas – In some countries the areas built just after
World War II contain a large number of affordable social rented housing,
built to cope with the enormous housing shortages resulting from the War.
At the time they were aimed at housing middle class families of moderate
income. Since they were built some developments have changed the areas
from attractive family neighborhoods to areas in which many people do not
want to live. New housing areas with more attractive housing have pulled
households who could afford to move and to pay higher prices for their
dwellings out of these areas. Because of the initial low quality of the struc-
tures, they are often deteriorating today. New households (young people,
immigrants, perhaps former guest workers), usually with lower income, move
in (Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1997), making those areas less attractive
for older residents and for other new housing applicants.

The future of these areas, directly affected by changing demographics and
the ebb and flow of immigration, is largely dependent on government action.
Without any intervention they will end up as the neighborhoods where only
those without any other choice will end. On the other hand, intervention
that includes demolishing or upgrading part of the existing stock may result
in attracting those middle class households for which the areas were origi-
nally built.6

High-rise areas – In Western European countries, high-rise housing areas
typically date from the period 1965–1975. They were built because the post-
World War II housing shortage continued and it had now become techni-
cally possible to build high-rise structures relatively cheaply. In many countries
these areas initially housed middle class families, and in many cities they still
have this function. In other cases high-rises from this period has become a marginalized housing sector, housing only those who do not have another choice. The French “grands ensembles” are a case in point (Blanc, 1993; De Villanova, 1997).

**Ethnic enclaves** can often be seen as a specific type of working class areas. An ethnic enclave contains people, self-defined by ethnicity, religion or otherwise, who congregate in order to protect or enhance their (economic, social, political, and/or social) well-being (for a formal definition, see Marcuse, 1997a). They should be clearly distinguished from ghettos: the confinement of the ghetto’s residents is desired by the dominant interests of society. An enclave is not solely a US phenomenon; enclaves can be found all over the world. Two older classic sociological studies illustrate how a particular culture is maintained within a concentrated area. The first (Dahya, 1974) describes a Pakistani community in Bradford, England. Many of the people who left Pakistan and immigrated to this city ended up in the neighborhoods where many Pakistani were already present. In this enclave there was a high degree of mutual support. People helped one another to find work and a place to live. On the labor market, informal contacts were activated to get jobs for the newly arrived migrants, albeit temporary jobs in some cases. On the housing market, the informal contacts ensured that newcomers were able to move in with friends or relatives – in some cases with vague acquaintances – at least temporarily. The second study (Suttles, 1974) describes a neighborhood in Chicago where Italian culture is pervasive. Local residents do their shopping exclusively in Italian stores in the same neighborhood. People help each other fix up their homes. Nearly all the Italians living in the neighborhood go to the same church (which is modeled after a church in Naples) and frequent the same parks. They wear the same kind of clothes and speak the same dialect. This is a classic example of a community. These are ethnic enclaves, quite different from, for instance, the racial ghettos of the United States or the townships of apartheid South Africa.7

**Ghettos of exclusion**

The pattern of changing land uses within the city is a centuries-old pattern; in the industrial period of capitalism, slum formation took place not only in areas of traditional residence for poor people, but also in higher-income neighborhoods whose location became increasingly undesirable for those who could afford better. Hitherto, however, new uses replaced the older ones, new populations moved in where earlier ones moved out. That is no longer always the case. Certainly in the United States entire sections of cities have been abandoned by the owners of their properties and by their residents, and then by their governments. The South Bronx in New York City was perhaps the best-known single example, but others existed in cities
throughout that country. Whether there are indications of a similar pattern in other countries is a matter much debated (see, e.g., Peach, 1996).

The excluded ghetto is the prototypical, if extreme, form of the abandoned city: that part of the city that has, viewed from the outside, only a negative relationship to the social, political, and economic life of the rest. It has of course its own structure and organization, its own economy, largely informal but also formal, and indeed some of its residents are regularly connected to the economy and social and political life of the rest of the city. But the majority are not, and there are regularly tensions within the excluded ghetto between those who are connected and those who are not. The new ghetto is thus not Kenneth Clarke’s ghetto of hope, expectation, and protest, but Wilson’s ghetto of despair, oppression and impairment (Marcuse, 1998). It is in an abandoned part of the city, abandoned not by the people who live there but by those who are in control of the wider city (Wilson, 1987; 1996).

A ghetto in general may be defined as a spatially concentrated area used to separate involuntarily and to limit a particular racially, ethnically or religiously defined population group held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society. But a new urban ghetto is developing, under the polarizing impact of current economic changes; we call it the excluded ghetto. It may be defined as a ghetto in which race or ethnicity is combined with class in a spatially concentrated area whose residents are excluded from the economic life of the surrounding society, which does not profit significantly from its existence.

Drawing on the US experience, the residents of the abandoned city, particularly in the new ghetto of the excluded, play a different role from those of the old ghetto in many respects. Primary is the convergence of class with race, poverty with minority status. Older forms of the ghetto were also racially defined, but remained an integral part of the mainstream economy, with residents of different classes and with a variety of prospects on the labor market. Their residents, when unemployed, were part of a reserve of workers, the “reserve army of the unemployed,” who had expectations of re-entering the mainstream labor force when conjunctural conditions changed. That holds less and less in the new ghettos.

**Final Remarks**

The picture that has been sketched in the preceding sections leads us to expect a new spatial order within cities, with cities increasingly partitioned spatially as a result of the factors earlier described as macro-societal, among which globalization is prominent. Although most inhabitants of the city do cross the borders of different partitions, from home to work, from home to recreational facilities, etc., the general tendency is inward and towards
separation. The causes of this process are different for different areas. In the luxury city, those who live in them have created their environments for their own purposes, and deliberately separated them from the rest of the city. In the exclusionary enclaves of the well-to-do, people surround themselves more and more with walls, neighborhood watches and cameras. This is a “free” choice, but based on fear for crime, violence and a vague idea of “the other” (who is often black). In the suburbs, including the “edge cities,” people are less and less forced to cross city borders, because more and more facilities are to be found within their limited new spaces, separated and as independent as possible of the older central city. And again: no blacks, at least no poor blacks (see also Marcuse, 1997b). In working class areas, flux and instability is widespread, with centrifugal forces strongly suggesting a continuing trend towards socio-spatial separation. And in the new ghetto of exclusion, the inhabitants are under duress; dominant interests neither want nor care about them, and the greater the separation the better. The partitioning of city space implies that the social dividing lines between population groups, between black and white, rich and poor, gentry and working class, have a spatial translation that might very well accentuate estrangement, prejudice, misunderstanding. Cities have always shown functional, cultural and status divisions, but the differentiation is increasing in new ways and is hardening, we hypothesize, sometimes literally in the form of walls that function to protect the richer from the poorer.

The developments mentioned under the heading of “macro-social forces” above are partly independent of each other, but partly intimately connected and mutually reinforcing. Spatial arrangements are both a product of these developments and a contributing cause. The complications of this interplay make urban sociological and geographical explanatory research so difficult (but also so interesting). Unraveling these forces is thus a real challenge, but to our minds an important one, because of what it might reveal about how nations, cities, regions, and perhaps even neighborhoods, can best cope with the influences of macro-societal factors. The pessimistic view that the world as it is, and our cities as they are, are the best that can be hoped for, because “there is no alternative,” we believe to be a misreading of present events. The important question is how to get the best out of the interaction between macro-social developments, public policies, and individual opportunities. To make this possible, the concrete mechanisms by which national and international forces produce specific spatial changes within cities need to be teased out (Marcuse, 1997a). Because these mechanisms are in most cases still unclear, we see the present work as part of an important inquiry for anyone interested in improving life in our cities. It is an inquiry which will of necessity be going on for many years in the future. We hope the pieces in this book will make a small contribution to that inquiry.
Notes

1 Parts of this Chapter have been published in the American Behavioral Scientist of November 1997 (Van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997).

2 It should be noted that we are explicitly not dealing with the fashionable question of the relative position of individual cities in a world hierarchy of cities.

3 The definition adopted here is consistent with those used by, e.g., Saskia Sassen and Manuel Castells, although neither disaggregate as is suggested here, and the latter tends to place greater stress on the role of informational technologies as critical to globalization.

4 But we have to be careful here: the polarization and fragmentation might be between the (very) rich and the (very) poor, it is rather unclear what will happen with the middle groups, with those with incomes neither very high and nor very low. Cities generally have a majority in this middle range (Marcuse, 1989) and it has still to be discovered how their social and spatial proximity to those above and those below will develop. Disaggregating the “middle” into different subgroups, as Marcuse (1989) suggests, is a first step.

5 Although big differences exist between European countries and cities. For example: Turks in Belgian cities are worse off than Turks in Dutch cities, if we compare the overall quality of their housing (Van Kempen, 1997; Kesteloot et al., 1997).

6 But this will definitely not happen automatically, as Van Kempen and Priemus (1997) have pointed out in a paper in which the new restructuring process in the Netherlands has been described and evaluated.

7 Of course, we should be wary of adopting an overly romantic image of the concept of community from the cases described in these studies. Undoubtedly, not all such neighborhoods are ideal places to live. Regarding countries such as the United States and France, Wacquant (1996, p. 126) warns that “one must be careful not to romanticize conditions in the proletarian neighborhoods and segregated enclaves [sic] of yesteryear.”