Writing in the first century BCE, Parthenius of Nicaea, himself a poet, put together a collection of love-stories that he dedicated to Cornelius Gallus, commonly called the creator of the Latin love elegy. Although not all the stories in his collection are set in the so-called mythical period of Greek or Roman history, most of them are, and many of the others happen in faraway, effectively timeless places: the book is without difficulty included in any catalogue of ancient mythography. In his preface, Parthenius describes his gift in modest terms, calling it a “little note-book” that might provide Gallus with matter for his own compositions. In doing so he sets up a relationship familiar in the genre: the mythographical handbook is a work of reference, providing the raw material—the myths—for others to adorn, rework, and interpret. The author of the handbook himself has no such pretensions; he is a humble compiler, a passive recorder of myths just as he finds them.

Of course Parthenius is being disingenuous. His collection offers much to entertain the reader, who he hopes will read the book for its own sake. The tales, when not amazingly recherché (as most of them are), offer novel versions of familiar tales. One smiles at the ingenuity with which the author bolts his oddities on to the framework of mainstream mythology: the amorous mishaps occur in the interstices of Odysseus’ wanderings, as it might be, or Hercules’ labors. Parthenius prodigally deploys every trick of the romantic trade. He offers us callow youths and tender maids, predatory males and lustful wives. There is treachery, deceit, suicide, murder, and incest. There are gods, nymphs, pirates, shepherds, and kings. Baffling oracles are improbably fulfilled, unwise oaths go badly wrong, clever stratagems backfire. Antiquarian thirst is slaked with details of commemorative cults and festivals, and even cities may be founded as a result of these erotic
disasters. The style is simple, as is traditional in mythography, but the narration is nevertheless masterful – full of suspense and surprise.

Yet Parthenius' stated purpose in writing is not totally misleading. Collections like his were useful for consultation. All kinds of readers, and great writers too like Virgil or Ovid, had recourse to them. The difficulty of finding information in ancient books and libraries is hard to overstate, and précis like these would have saved a lot of time and trouble. Even before the advent of a bookish culture, mythography served as a guide for readers to the Greek mythological archive from the genre’s beginnings in the late sixth century BCE. When one realizes just how much mythography there was on offer in antiquity – and one simple purpose of this chapter is to convey a sense of that amount – one appreciates that the demand being met by this supply must have been correspondingly great.

Throughout the history of mythography, however, in all its changing contexts, one motif constantly recurs, either implicitly or explicitly, and that is the stance exemplified by Parthenius’ preface: that myth is something “out there” in the record awaiting the attentions of the mythographer, who is but a neutral cataloguer of the archive. In studying the reception of Greek mythology, as this volume does, one might for that reason exclude mythography, as not being sufficiently, or to any degree at all, interpretative. There are at least two responses to such a view. One is that this attitude to myth is already a kind of reception, even an interpretation, whose implications can be explored (and will be explored later in this chapter). Another is that – of course – interpretation sneaks in willy-nilly, with varying degrees of complicity on the part of the mythographer. For instance, a compiler of Amazing Tales taken from traditional mythology (a “paradoxographer” in ancient terminology, though that genre also encompassed wonders from the contemporary world) is already making a statement about what he thinks mythology is for, and, like modern tabloid writers, challenging readers to think about the boundaries of truth and fiction, and the nature of reality. When and why such books of marvels were put together becomes a question of social as well as literary history. One can also observe the ways different paradoxographers raise the pitch of astonishment by choosing ever weirder details, or how, by combining the unbelievable with the mundane, they encourage the fantasy that you might encounter the miraculous right outside your front door.

Like all ancient historians from Herodotus on, mythographers relied on their imaginations, with varying degrees of sincerity, to flesh out the skeleton of a received narrative. An interpretative stance will often be embedded in such acts. The amount of free invention is sometimes so great as to spring the boundaries of the genre and make the book look more like an ancient novel, which was avowedly fictional from start to finish (as in all generic definitions, boundaries are fuzzy at the edges). In the first century CE, for instance, someone calling himself “Dictys of Crete” wrote a “true history” of the Trojan War, writing as an eye-witness; a sensational treatment, as we can tell from the fragments (Dowden 2012). And some mythographers do overtly peddle interpretations anyway. Rationalizers such as
Palaephatus (Hawes 2011; Nünlist 2012) or Euhemerus (Winiarczyk 2002) and allegorists such as Cornutus (Nesselrath 2009) start by telling the myth, in the manner of ordinary mythography, but go on to offer their view of what the myth really means. Already Hecataeus offers rationalized versions of some myths: for instance, according to him Hercules did not descend to the Underworld to fetch Cerberus, the hound of Hades; he killed a large and pestilential serpent that dwelled in a cave thought to be the entrance to hell. Allegorical readings also originated in the classical era, for instance as a way of explaining the immoral behavior of gods in poetry: they were, properly read, symbols of emotions, ideas, or natural phenomena, and poets like Homer were actually encoding moral lessons and technical knowledge in their stories (Brisson 2004; Ford 2002, 67–89).

Thus it does not take long to discover ways in which mythography is not a neutral act. To get a better sense of the possibilities, let us survey some more examples. The selection will necessarily be severely limited, but the interested reader can find detailed accounts of the history of Greek mythography in the Further Reading at the end of this chapter.

Beginnings and Classical Mythography

Most of the issues emerge with the first mythographer, Hecataeus of Miletus, writing at the end of the sixth century BCE; so we will dwell a while on him. His work, like almost all ancient mythography, survives only in fragmentary quotations in other writers, but even from those meager remains we gain a clear sense of his colorful and pugnacious personality. He wrote two works: one containing a redaction of the genealogies of heroic Greece (the Genealogies), the other a work of geography-cum-ethnography, the Periodos or Circuit of the World, describing major cities and peoples in a clockwise direction around the Mediterranean, with brief information about local traditions and customs (and perhaps a map).

The first issue is one of nomenclature. If “mythography” means “writing up myths” then it is a problem to know what to do with Hecataeus and his immediate successors, who were working before myth was distinguished from history, and (therefore) mythography from historiography. For them, people like Hercules and events like the Trojan War were historical. It is only because their subject-matter was, in later terms, myth, that we call them mythographers. One may question the legitimacy of the label, and it is actually very instructive to think of these early writers as historians like Herodotus, comparing methods and aims: the “father of history” owed them a great deal (Fowler 1996). Moreover, in their day the very act of extracting the bare narratives from the poetry in which they were embedded had massive cultural implications. Although casual contexts for story-telling existed, poetry was the main purveyor of myth, and poetry involved much more than the story: song or recitative, a richly traditional style; music and dance, resplendent costumes – above all a performance, with an audience. To strip all of
these elements out and expose the naked story, to do it in prose rather than performed, and in a book to be read rather than performed, more probably by an individual than by a group, was an act of great intellectual imagination and daring. The wider background is the birth of critical inquiry in sixth-century Ionia, which engendered philosophy and science as well as this scrutiny of the past. The first myth/historiographers became conscious of the enormous power of the past to shape our understanding of the present, and realized that, to study the process critically, one needs first to establish the record. Doing so in itself invited critical examination of that record.

One obvious problem was the multiplicity of versions on offer. Every poet had a different take on every point of a story, whether it was the genealogies of the characters, their motives, the settings, the sequence of events, or links to cults. Every detail, moreover, was laden with religious and cultural significance in the Greek cities. Hecataeus opens his book by saying that the stories of the Greeks were “many and foolish,” but that he would “speak the truth, as it seems to me” (Jacoby 1923–, 1 fr. 1). These last five words are not apologetic (you might have a different version as it seems to you, and that would be all right); they are defiant (my version is the right one, because I am cleverer than you). Hecataeus’ attitude is interesting from several points of view, but for immediate purposes the point is that this intolerance of multiplicity is highly ideological, entailing as it does the belief that there can be only one true version of a story: “the” myth, which the interpreter distills from the morass of competing narratives. Truth is monistic in this world-view, and it must be discovered not invented. The typical stance of ancient mythography is there from the start.

Even when he makes up a completely new story (as he sometimes conspicuously does), Hecataeus ostensibly does so on the basis of the evidence, assessed according to his own criteria of truth and falsehood. The new story is the one that ought to be out there, even if it is not actually attested; the others, he infers, are corruptions of a lost original. Similarly, when he chooses among existing variants, he acts as the final arbiter. A story is either true or false – there are no other categories – and the false ones must be suppressed and forgotten: they never were part of the record. There is an interesting implication in this move. In imposing his vision of what myth ought to be, Hecataeus effectively reverses the relationship between mythographer and myth. Far from being outside the archive looking in, he is attempting to supplant the old files with new ones. He wants his book to embody the archive from the moment of publication on, and he wants to put his successors in the position of outsiders. The attempt was of course futile; Hecataeus merely contributed yet another version to the store. Herodotus, Hecataeus’ successor and rival, immediately took issue with many of his statements (Fowler 2006; West 1991). No one can still the flux, or seal the archive; no one stands outside the archive (Zajko 1998). There is no beginning: the mythographers got their myths from the poets, but the poets got them from
other poets, who got them from other poets... each with their own take on the tradition.

The mythographer’s arrogation may be detected also in summaries of literary works, such as tragedies, which have come down to us from later centuries. These “hypotheses,” as they are known, purport to be outlines of the plots of famous plays, composed for handy reference, but they often provide much more information than one finds in the play itself, covering prequel, sequel, and other events in between (Cameron 2004, 52–78; van Rossum-Steenbeek 1998, 1–84). It is as if this is “the” story, from which the playwright has taken his material; the mythographer has captured it, and the artist has interpreted it. Other writers, one infers, can only offer other interpretations: “the” myth remains constant. It, and therefore the mythographer, were there first, conceptually prior to everybody. The apogee of this line of reasoning is found in the epigram prefixed to the Library of Apollodorus, a summary of all Greek myth written perhaps in the late second century CE: it claims it is not necessary now even to read epic, lyric poetry, or tragedy, because you can find everything you need in this compendium.

The précis-writing industry had already begun in the fifth century BCE; there is evidence, for instance, of prose summaries of poems attributed to Eumelus of Corinth and Epimenides of Crete (Fowler 2013). Acusilaus of Argos, contemporary with Hecataeus, summarized the Hesiodic Catalogue of Women, with tendentious amendments. Most mythography was, indeed, based on archaic poems, supplemented by local oral traditions. In principle there is little difference between summarizing one poem and summarizing/combining lots of poems, except that the latter operation more obviously asserts the independence of the mythographer. The most imposing of these compilations was by Pherecydes of Athens, written about 465 BCE and comprising ten books. Like other early mythographers, Pherecydes organized the vast material genealogically, following the pattern set by the Hesiodic Catalogue. Recounting the descent of founding figures such as Deucalion or Inachus, the mythographer pauses when he reaches a major actor (Heracles, Jason, Achilles, and so on) to tell the myths associated with them before moving on to the next descendant, either continuing in the same line, or backtracking to pick up a different line of descent from the founder. Genealogies had real sociological purchase. Aristocratic clans claimed descent from these heroes. In some parts of Greece tribal government was still the norm, and even in democratic city-states the elite clans remained powerful. Genealogies are subject to constant revision in an oral society, as contemporary conditions change (the past configuration is always inferred from the present: an ousted potentate may be “discovered” to be descended from a bastard). Altering a genealogy could have many implications, including political. Ion of Chios, for instance, amazingly said that his island’s founder-figure Oinopion was not a son of Dionysus, as everybody else thought, but of the Athenian hero Theseus (Ion, eleg. fr. 29 West). Ion was a close friend of Cimon, architect of the Athenian
Empire, and this amendment trumpeted his allegiance to the project. In the small, enclosed world of classical Greece, the panhellenic genealogies were like a map, reflecting power relations, status, and cultural affinities. Kinship remained politically important in the post-classical age (Jones 1999; Patterson 2010), but comprehensive genealogy became less common as a creative way of approaching the mythological inheritance.

In addition to genealogical encyclopedias, histories of individual cities were a very common forum of mythography in the classical period. Scholars have dubbed this genre “local history” in contradistinction with the “great” “universal” history of Herodotus, Thucydides, and others. Arguments about how one genre relates to the other, chronologically and conceptually, have sometimes been unhelpful, but it seems a significant difference that myth looms much larger in the local histories than it does in Herodotus, and not simply because his subject was more recent events. Local history chronicled, among other things, the life stories of primeval heroes, the immigrations and emigrations of peoples, the deeds of the ancestors of the great clans, and the origin of civic institutions and cults. These collectively produced the city’s sense of identity, and the interesting point is that ancient days were preferred to modern as a source of that identity. Recent events could indeed feature in local histories, but they occupied much the smallest portion of the book. And if they did occur (the Battle of Marathon is the prime example, trotted out repeatedly in Athenian propaganda as proof of the city’s greatness, and right to rule others), the account was cast in the same register as those of the remote past; that is to say, the events were mythologized.

If one drives a hard line between “myth” and “history,” or simply distinguishes them in Greek terms as events respectively before and after the return of the sons of Heracles to the Peloponnese after the Trojan War, one might not say that local history was a form of mythography, but rather that it made use of mythography for other purposes, and that only part of the book – the part before the Trojan War – was myth. Mythography can certainly be pressed into service in many contexts, and other instances will be identified later in the chapter. That would not be a correct assessment in the present case, however. Local history is a literary equivalent of a speech-act. The very doing of it validates the content. Without the book the tradition is unfocused, diffuse, at risk of evanescence, lacking celebration. Mythology and history are here combined as mythistory in the service of civic pride. The audience of such works was not only local, for an important purpose was to proclaim the city’s standing in the larger world. The great cities even attracted the attention of foreign historians; the first chronicler of Athens was Hellanicus of Lesbos, writing around 400 BCE.

Needless to say, these writers often sharply disagreed with each other over the true version of myths, each seeking to dictate the terms of the collective understanding. In this perspective mythography, while giving voice to a silent or fragmented tradition in the service of others, also subjugates mythology to those purposes.
Post-classical Mythography

Ironically, Hecataeus set in motion a process that would ultimately lead to the differentiation of myth from history. For it became increasingly apparent that the stories of olden times, with all their gods and supernaturally endowed heroes, were different in kind from stories about the more recent past. Even if the latter could be contradictory or unbelievable, like myths, the difficulties seemed in principle superable, for the right kind of evidence was available to resolve them. The distinction between myth and history was clearly formulated in the fourth century BCE on the basis of work done by philosophers in the fifth century BCE (Fowler 2011). Although it is a distinction easily deconstructed – myth and history are thoroughly entangled with each other, then and now – nevertheless it was stated again and again by writers in many genres and periods, and people clearly thought they knew the difference.

Once doubts about truth were raised, they could not be banished; there is no return to Eden. The desire to believe in the myths remained strong, though, and is visible in the stratagems adopted to save them. One could claim that, read in the right way, myths really were true: this was the approach of rationalists and allegorists, mentioned earlier. Another strategy was to claim that the stories offered moral truths – uplifting examples of heroism or piety for the young to emulate. Such is the stance of Diodorus of Sicily (first century BCE) at the beginning of his universal history (his first six books treat the mythical period), and of the Augustan writer Livy in his history of Rome. Or one could note the links to contemporary religious practices, festivals, and sacrifices for which the stories provided the etiological explanation. Such matters were the stuff of local history, which was a growth industry in the Hellenistic world (Clarke 2008). We have testimonia and fragments of literally hundreds of local historians from these centuries (authors nos. 297–607 in Jacoby 1923-). This appeal to religious significance was a powerful tactic, bestowing truth on the myths by association with the gods whose existence was not doubted. Their worship, so important to human wellbeing, illustrated the living force of myth. Finally, one could note the pragmatic importance of myths for the cultivated life, as understanding literature and art was impossible without them. The point is implied by Parthenius’ preface with which we began, and the use of myth as cultural capital is clear in the entire voluminous output of the Second Sophistic movement from the first century CE to the start of the third, especially the orations delivered on all manner of occasions in cities throughout the Greek world. These virtuoso orators were highly paid superstars. They certainly knew their poets, but like the poets themselves, they resorted to mythography to find their way in the enormous labyrinth of Greek mythology. So did their audiences. Mythography is well represented in the Oxyrhynchus papyri (van Rossum-Steenbeek 1998), which are random survivals from the bourgeois libraries of an unimportant provincial town.
Mythological handbooks such as the *Library* of Apollodorus serenely ignored the problem of the truth of myths, and just told the stories without apology. Because such works were made by scholars out of other books it is easy to think, and has been traditional to think, that the stories in them had become “just” myths, of only literary or intellectual interest to their authors (some “only”). Serious belief in the myths, as in the gods, had supposedly vanished. The same charge used to be laid at the door of Hellenistic poets. But what it means to believe in myth is a very complicated question, to which one can give many answers (Veyne 1988), not all of them necessarily related to veridical accuracy. To regard the attitude to myth of the Hellenistic era’s greatest poet, Callimachus of Cyrene (third century BCE), as sterile and arid was always a failure of imagination on the part of modern critics. His masterpiece was the *Aetia* (Harder 2012), four books of brilliant, inventive etiological myths collected from all over the Greek world (many of them from local histories and earlier mythography, re-versifying what they had de-versified). This was a triumphant making-new, and from a mythographical point of view an electrifying take on the mythological inheritance: a discovery in it of the rare and the beautiful, the intellectually thrilling, the sublime and the comical, the ordinarily human and the transcendent. Not only for his literary technique but for his conception of mythology Callimachus exercised a profound influence on Roman poetry (Hunter 2006).

Species and sub-species of mythography multiplied in the Hellenistic period (Lightfoot 1999, 224–232; Wendel 1935, 1367–1370). There were collections of particular kinds of myths, such as love-stories, metamorphoses, or Amazing Tales (paradoxography); there were books of myths associated with natural or man-made landscapes, such as *On Rivers and Mountains* attributed wrongly to Plutarch (Delattre et al. 2011; Dorda et al. 2003) or *Myths City by City* of Neanthes of Cyzicus (Jacoby 1923–, 84 fr. 6–12), which he must have plucked from a shelf-load of local histories. Some books of myths were deliberately miscellaneous, such as Conon’s *Tales* (first century BCE), unified by no obvious principle of selection (Blakely 2012; Brown 2002). Apollodorus’ *Library* from the Imperial period is the only surviving example of the comprehensive manual, systematically covering all of Greek mythology, but we know of earlier ones. Greek versions of handbooks like that of Hyginus in Latin are represented in papyrus fragments; in these compilations one could find not only genealogies and myths, but catalogues of the most surprising variety: Kings of Athens; sons of Priam; children of gods; Argonauts and Calydonian Boarhunters; mothers who killed their sons, women who killed their husbands, men who killed their daughters, people who killed their relatives; mortals who were made immortal; people destroyed by their dogs; those who committed suicide, sacrilege, incest; the most beautiful, handsome, chaste; and so on. The epistemological and interpretative implications of making lists (including their close cousins, historical chronicles) would be the subject of a separate chapter. There are obvious ideological implications too when lists (of kings, for instance, or priests) are turned into public monuments; many viewers would not even be
literate enough to read the names. The monument is doing much more than conveying information. The resonance of a list, and the names within them, was well understood by the earliest Greek poets (indeed, their predecessors: the *Catalogue of the Ships* in the *Iliad* revises an earlier composition of uncertain date) as well as artists: the painter of the wonderful François Vase of the mid-sixth century BCE, a visual feast depicting seven famous stories, scrupulously labels all 130 figures (Wachter 1991).

Mythography figured in passing in many works written for other purposes. The geographer Strabo (early first century CE) and the travel writer and antiquarian Pausanias (late second century CE) frequently cite mythographers for information. Chronographers needed mythography to construct their grids (inferring from the genealogies the date of Deucalion’s flood, the fall of Troy, and so on) (Higbie 2003; Mosshammer 1979). Writers on religion would have had them constantly to hand. An egregious example is Apollodorus of Athens’ great work *On the Gods* (Jacoby 1923–244 frr. 88–153), which furnished rich material for Philodemus of Gadara (first century BCE) in his *On Piety*; the first part of this Epicurean’s work, resurrected from the Herculaneum papyri, is an exposé of the ridiculous and scandalous stories of traditional mythology. Christian fathers such as Clement of Alexandria used similar sources for their denunciations of pagan myth (Cameron 2004, 48–49). Learned miscellanies typically made room for myths. The first production of this kind was Hippias of Elis’ *Collection* in the late fifth century BCE (Węcowski 2012), which included antiquarian lore and doxography of sages as well as myths; the fourth-century Aristotelian *Peplos* (the “Robe,” a tapestry of titbits: Rose frr. 637–644) was similar. Spectacular examples from later centuries are *The Learned Banqueters* of Athenaeus (ca. 200 CE; Olson 2006–2012) and Aelian’s *Historical Miscellany* (early third century CE; Wilson 1997); in Latin there is the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius (fifth century CE; Kaster 2011).

The mythographers were especially useful to writers of commentaries on poets. Remnants of these commentaries survive in scholia, notes in the margins of medieval manuscripts of the poems. These are rich in fragments of ancient mythography, which the commentators needed to explain a mythological allusion in their texts. There were also mythographical handbooks constructed solely for the purpose of explaining references in a given poet. The existence of such a book for Homer, unimaginatively dubbed the “Mythographus Homericus” by modern scholars, had been inferred from the numerous excerpts in Homer’s scholia; in the twentieth century numerous papyrus fragments of the original turned up (Montanari 1995; van Rossum-Steenbeek 1998, 85–118). There were similar books for Virgil and Ovid in Latin (Cameron 2004), and in Greek, unexpectedly, for the *Sermons* of Gregory of Nazianzus, attributed wrongly to Nonnus the Abbot – this time, a surviving text (ca. 500 CE; Nimmo-Smith 2001).

This (very partial) catalogue may give some sense of the enormous quantity of ancient mythography that once existed, and its extremely varied contexts.
Collectively and individually these works carry implications about mythology and its uses in their time and place. The industry continued unabated in the middle ages and of course continues still.

Closing Thoughts

The point made at the beginning, that mythography treats mythology as something distinct from its own activity, something “out there” to be captured and used, is amply confirmed by the material we have surveyed. But a larger question suggests itself: where or what is “the myth” that the mythographer seeks to reduce? The difficulty of locating this elusive entity lies behind the oft-repeated dictum that there is no myth, only myths: stories told in particular contexts. It is certainly true that myths do not tell themselves. Yet the mythographer must have something in mind—and so do we when we speak, as we cannot stop doing, of “the myth of X.” “The” myth is the hypostasis of all the versions the mythographer has heard, and the color and flavor imparted by the contexts in which he has heard them. His unity, however arbitrarily derived, notionally underlies the inherited multiplicity. Like language, however, myth is a social phenomenon, existing both in the individual and the group. In some sense myth is indeed “out there.” Any individual telling responds to a social nexus, and that is where “the myth” must be.

The process of redaction suggests that the issue is not only one of knowing but one of controlling; of stilling the flux, wringing order from disorder. The mythographer determines that this variant, not that one, is germane to “the” myth. It is obvious, however, that the end result, a bare narrative, is not really “the” myth. The question is, why does the mythographer (and why do we) think it is? The myth is much more than the narrative; it works through the associations and symbolism of its characters and motifs, and always contains a surfeit of meaning. But if we wish to recall “the” myth, in all its manifestations, the hypostasis must have narrative form. Whatever else it is, the myth has to be a story.

Why that is, is a large question far beyond the scope of this modest chapter. The role of narrative in structuring concepts of both external reality and internal self is a topic of important research in psychology, philosophy, and literary studies (a recent summation in Gallagher 2012). As creatures in space and time we find the linear progression of the narrative reassuring; it recalls our earliest ways of making sense of the world. The comfortable succession of “and then... and then,” what the ancient critics called the “strung-on style” (Steinrück 2004), is at home in the mythography in all ages. Children too tell their stories so. Narratives have great explanatory power because they function below and beyond the level of argument: they simply feel right. The story encapsulates, reminds, explains, and controls. The use of mythography goes well beyond the simple sharing of information. In deciding what “the” myth is, more or less creatively, the mythographer gives a steer, and shapes the tradition; shapes, indeed, the very concept of
mythology. Not accidentally “mythography” in the twentieth century acquired the additional meaning of “the study of myths” (Doty 2000). In this perspective mythography is not only germane to the reception of mythology, it lies at its heart. To receive is to write one’s own version of “the” myth.

Guide to Further Reading

The Greek fragments of early mythography are edited in Fowler (2000) with commentary in Fowler (2013); an overview in Fowler (2006). An English translation of larger fragments with brief commentary is promised. For other periods Jacoby (1923–) is the basic reference, which is being gradually updated and supplemented in Brill’s New Jacoby (only available online as of the time of writing). For introductions and overviews of the ancient genre see Cameron (2004), Lightfoot (1999), Smith and Trzaskoma (2013), Wendel (1935). Trzaskoma et al. (2004) contains many mythographical texts. Clarke (2008) is a superb treatment of Hellenistic local history. Of the many annotated translations of Apollodorus, Hard (1997) may be recommended in English; the older Loeb of Sir James Frazer (1939–1946) is a classic, worth consulting not only for the information in its notes but as an example in itself of modern mythography.

References


