CHAPTER FIFTY-SIX

International Conflict Resolution

From Practice to Knowledge and Back Again

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Few other domains of conflict resolution offer as much opportunity and risk as the field of international conflict resolution. Ending wars while helping to rebuild societies in which ideas contend peacefully with other ideas are tasks that appeal to humanity’s highest ideals. Yet such tasks pose daunting challenges. The pathways of contemporary international conflict resolution practice are strewn with failures whose cost in human life is high. We define international conflict resolution in this chapter broadly, seeking to be epistemologically inclusive: international conflict resolution is that body of knowledge, practices, norms, and institutions that seeks the prevention, reduction, and transformation of potential or actual violent conflict within and between states.

In this chapter we examine some of the origins of the broad international conflict resolution field; consider some of the perennial debates about the causes of international conflict and peace; provide an overview of a selection of the tools, norms, and practices of international conflict resolution; and, finally, cast a glance at the contemporary and emerging challenges that foment conflict locally while calling forth global responses.

ORIGINS

Concern with the prevention and resolution of war probably dates to the emergence of war itself. Ancient narratives such as the Mahabharata and the Iliad offer brief glimpses of divine and human mediation (Wanis-St. John, 2012). Contemporary approaches trace their origins to the two European state-centric attempts to create regional orders that would not decay into a war among major powers: the fragmented Westphalian peace that followed the Thirty Years War and the balance of power inaugurated...
by the Concert of Europe system that followed the Napoleonic Wars (Kissinger, 1994). Two more modern attempts to prevent armed conflict globally also emerged from wars that began in Europe: the League of Nations following World War I and the innovative United Nations system following World War II. Despite humanity’s attempts to create stable, peaceful international orders among states, old challenges remain—albeit at reduced levels—as new ones emerge.

The invention of strategic nuclear weapons shaped the evolution of the Cold War and inspired policymakers and theorists, as well as many laypersons, to think about how superpower wars involving nuclear weapons might be avoided and how local conflicts could be at least contained or managed without risking potentially world-ending total war between the superpowers (Wright, 1957). But the ferocity of local wars even during the Cold War, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the broad dispersal of small arms all raised new questions (and rekindled old debates) about the desirability of arms races and the effectiveness of international systems of collective security. These challenges led to path-breaking investigations into how to avoid wars, or keep wars limited (and thus nonnuclear) using deterrence, tacit bargaining, and signaling (Schelling, 1957). But the rationality premise of deterrence troubled analysts who borrowed insights from psychology and deployed them in political science: misperceptions and other cognitive distortions plague the decision-making and political analyses of leaders (Jervis, 1976), leading to conflict. Many grew concerned that failures of deterrence could lead to total nuclear war and that other means had to be found for organizing our world than a mutual balance of terror among superpowers. Arms control and disarmament through negotiation raised new possibilities of international cooperation, even among rivals, through reciprocal vulnerabilities and coordinated management of international crises. Intensive nuclear diplomacy from the 1970s onward helped make Europe less of a potential nuclear battleground for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in case of a superpower war, while also paving the way to the end of the Cold War (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996) and a new era of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.

LIMITS OF UN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Our contemporary UN system was designed to promote international peace while preserving existing states, balancing the major powers and containing nascent nationalisms within postcolonial borders. It by no means eliminated war entirely, although it may indeed have helped mitigate the onset of interstate wars. The UN’s collective security mechanisms were idled at the time
of the body’s creation through the mutual vetoes of the United States and the Soviet Union on the Security Council, which was empowered by the UN Charter to “determine the existence of any threat to peace . . . and to maintain or restore international peace and security” through the use of force (chap. VII, arts. 39 and 44). Once freed from this deadlock, the Security Council could deploy bold new multilateral missions of peacemaking (mediation) and peacekeeping (interposition of neutral UN-commanded armed forces between belligerents) as well as peace enforcement (combat) in order to resolve international conflicts. Over time, the Security Council has determined with increasing frequency that sovereignty cannot excuse governments that either gravely violate the human rights of their own citizens or wage unjustified war on other countries (Pearson, 1957; Durch, 1993, 1996; Goulding, 1993; Abi-Saab, 1978; Higgins, 1980; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Ratner, 1995).

When governments willfully violate the security of their own civilians, the international community reserves some right of multilateral intervention. While new norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are still in formation and lack coherent prescriptive implications, sovereignty can no longer be considered a shield behind which rights can be abused systematically. The line between domestic jurisdiction and international intervention has blurred over time. Secession, regime change, and peace enforcement are no longer taboo topics (although these are by no means panaceas for weak states or violent conflicts). For better or worse, the UN Security Council’s five permanent members are largely immune from the controls of the UN system, and as the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq show, they can and do make war unilaterally on other states. As the two wars in Chechnya demonstrated, they can wage war internally without fear of concerted multilateral intervention.

The causes of war and of peace, which we discuss next, are many and widely debated. Warmaking is no longer the unique provenance of states. It was once safe to assume that armed movements’ goals were almost entirely nationalistic (even when their rhetoric was global). Nonstate armed movements now have various degrees of independence from sponsoring states and presence in multiple geopolitical regions. By the same token, however, peacemaking is also no longer a task left entirely to sovereign states and multilateral organizations. Civil society groups within countries and transnational movements can and do play roles in the resolution of international conflicts. While many of the tools of international conflict resolution are still among the tools of statecraft, some that we discuss here, such as mediation, problem solving, and negotiation, are practiced by experts without diplomatic credentials. States are no longer the only cause of conflict, and the systems we have created to preserve stable global order can no longer be the sole means of creating peace.
CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE

Waltz (1954) contrasted three images of international relations that together help explain international conflict and war: human nature (also called the individual level), the composition and structure of states (also called the state level), and the anarchic state system (also called the system level) within which states exist and compete for survival. Although Waltz's neorealism favored the third image to explain war, the combined effect of his three images is also compelling: leaders and citizens with inherited and learned patterns of human aggression who live in oppressive, weak, or overly aggressive states, interacting with each other in the absence of an overarching restraining global authority, should inevitably be drawn into violent international conflict. Neoliberal political theorists take a more prescriptive view that cooperation and peace can and should emerge even under anarchy and rivalry. Ethologists (de Waal, 1989) and anthropologists (Fry, 2007; Ury, 1995) offer evidence against overly deterministic views of human proclivities to war and argue that humanity has both biological and cultural legacies of peacemaking behaviors. (See table 56.1.)

Table 56.1 Causes of Civil Wars

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Underlying Cause or Condition</th>
<th>Causal Pathway</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive processes</td>
<td>Symbols, exclusive identities taken to extremes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic mobilization</td>
<td>Interactions between ethnic groups and the state</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(e.g., differential political treatment or rights, different rates of development)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Ambiguous: Ease of rebel recruitment? State weakness? Becomes grievances?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disintegration of empires or large, multiethnic states</td>
<td>Contestation of new boundaries, fear of domination by one ethno-national group over another, conflicting promises, unrealistic expectations of nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances</td>
<td>Disparate or unfair political or economic treatment by the state relative to expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic opportunities of warfare</td>
<td>Corruption, organized crime, or sale of valuable resources by warring parties; financing of warring groups by outsiders; weapons trade; pools of young unemployed, failed demobilization and reintegration of combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak states</td>
<td>Lack of legitimacy, lack governing capacity, lack of effective mechanisms for peaceful resolution of differences, inability to manage or defeat rebellion</td>
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Those who examine conflict as the product of individual cognitive processes, as well as intergroup dysfunction, also have contributed greatly to our understanding of international conflict, and thus to its resolution. From psychology and sociology, we have come to understand how symbols are used to mobilize followers, how easy it is to create out-groups by fomenting exclusive identities (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), and how social exclusion and moral exclusivity (Opotow, 1990) ultimately pave the way for violence against out-groups and, thus, war.

Real wars persist and contemporary explanations have delved into the structures of states, as well as the dynamics of intergroup processes and the persistence of grievances real or constructed. Since the middle of the twentieth century, according to data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the number of active civil wars has increased, and the number of interstate wars has decreased. Civil wars spiked in the early 1990s, then declined precipitously over the following ten years, but they remain at about double the number now as in 1950. Meanwhile, purely interstate war seems to be almost—but not quite—extinct (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012). What explains these trends? To answer this, we need to explore some of the causes of contemporary civil wars and some of the causes of interstate peace.

**Ancient Hatreds?**

Two of the popularly held causes of civil wars do not hold up to scrutiny. In considering ethnic and intercommunal conflicts such as those in Bosnia, Israel-Palestine, and Rwanda, it is common to point to ancient hatreds (Barber, 1992; Cusack, 1994), yet none of these conflicts dates back to ancient times. While the existence of the relevant identity groups and differences may be centuries old, the actual conflicts are products of modernity (Crawford, 1998; Shamdasani, 2009). The existence of multiple ethnic groups within a state does not necessarily lead to violent conflict (Boix, 2008; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), though there is some evidence that a medium level of ethnic diversity is conducive to conflict—that is, both very homogeneous and very heterogeneous countries are at lower risk of civil war than are countries with two or three large ethnic groups. This is perhaps because this social composition facilitates organizing and cohesion

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Underlying Cause or Condition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideologies and belief systems</td>
<td>Absolute, uncompromising goals; heightened motivation; support from strong outside actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wars themselves</td>
<td>Increased polarization, economic deterioration, militarization</td>
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around ethnic identity issues (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom, 2004).

There is no single, universally accepted explanation for ethnic conflict, although most scholarly explanations revolve around the interactions among ethnicity, economics, and politics. “Ethnicity becomes a call to action”—and thus a source of possible conflict—“when such a group organizes for political and economic ends” such as an independent state, equal economic opportunity, or rights to religious expression (Nash, 1989, p. 127). Causes of ethnic conflict may include differential rates of modernization, economic competition, the psychological tendency to elevate one’s own group and downgrade others, disparate treatment by colonizers, and other factors (Horowitz, 1985). The emergence of secessionist movements “is determined mainly by domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state,” though the success of such a movement “is determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state” (Horowitz, 1985, p. 230). Ethnicity is “the way power is exercised, especially in the process of allocating the resources of the state. The so-called ethnic conflicts and wars are merely a reaction to bad governance” (Bakwesegha, 2004, p. 55). It is “a loss of trust in the ability of the state to accommodate their interests which often drives minorities into the path of violence” (de Varennes, 2003, p. 153). Political and economic transitions are part of the cause of violence, as ethnic and sectarian wars may erupt when “secular economic decline, neoliberal economic reforms, and institutional transformation have broken old ‘social contracts’” that used to regulate access to economic and political resources (Crawford, 1998, pp. 4–5); indeed, change in political institutions is linked to a higher risk of civil war (Collier et al., 2003, p. 64). These explanations differ in emphasis and detail, but all point to the state and its policies far more than to supposed ancient antipathies or, for that matter, the nature of the international system, as causes of ethnic conflict.

**Poverty and Conflict**

Like “ancient hatreds,” poverty is sometimes assumed to be a cause of civil war (as well as of terrorism). It is true that poorer countries are more likely to experience civil war than wealthier ones (Henderson and Singer, 2000; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998), and both low gross domestic product (GDP) and high income inequality are associated with longer civil war duration (Collier et al., 2004). However, the causal connection between low GDP and war is still contested. One explanation is that recruitment of rebels is easier among the poor, who lack better economic alternatives (Collier et al., 2004). However, there is some evidence that lack of state reach or infrastructure is a stronger cause of civil war than poverty itself or ease of rebel recruitment. In one study, the association
between low GDP and civil war disappears when controlling for state reach (Holtermann, 2012). Jakobsen, De Soysa, and Jakobsen (2013) find that it is poverty itself, and the resulting low opportunity costs for rebels, that drives civil war more than state strength. It is difficult to tease apart economic and political factors. Lower GDP also correlates with many other factors, such as lower education levels, higher birth rates, and lower levels of democracy, which may have some role in causing civil wars. These uncertainties make it hard to isolate the role of poverty in causing armed conflict.

**Empires, Colonies, and Cold War Dynamics**

Many civil wars can be traced to the end of empires such as the European colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Bakwesegha, 2004) and, more recently, the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This in part accounts for the spike in civil wars that followed the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, including conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Armenia-Azerbaijan, and Chechnya. It is not so much that the Soviet Union kept a lid on existing conflicts, but instead, when a new state is born of a disintegrated empire, boundaries are contested and ethnic and religious groups fear control of the state by another group (Posen, 1993). While the end of the Cold War created, for a time, an increase in conventionally fought internal wars in the former Eastern bloc, over time the end of the Cold War helped end more civil wars than it started as the two superpowers disengaged from proxy wars in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010; Kreutz, 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa saw an increase in civil wars as the superpowers removed their support from weak states (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), but energetic peacemaking from the mid-1990s on has helped end many of them.

In the regions formerly ruled by European empires, many contemporary conflicts can be traced back to the colonists’ favoring of one group over another (e.g., Rwanda and Burundi), to actual settlement by colonizers (e.g., Northern Ireland, South Africa), or to conflicting promises made or expectations formed as declining empires confronted nascent nationalisms (Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan-Kashmir). The modern concept of nationalism, in which ethnicity is expected (unrealistically) to match state borders, has played a catalytic role in spurring violent conflict, especially when a group defines its national identity to the exclusion of other identity groups within the same state.

**Grievance**

Political grievances undoubtedly account for many civil wars (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012) and help opportunistic leaders to mobilize followers. Some quantitative studies claim to have refuted the importance of grievances (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Jakobsen and
De Soysa, 2009), but political grievances are difficult to operationalize for statistical research. Measures of the level of democracy, political freedoms, economic inequality, or ethnic fractionalization do not necessarily capture the concept of grievance. When a group feels it is being discriminated against in the distribution of economic or political goods, this constitutes the kind of grievance that can lead to war (de Varennes, 2003; Sisk, 2009; Gurr, 1993; Wallensteen, 2012). This proposition is compatible with earlier theories about relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1962) in focusing not on absolute economic or political well-being but well-being relative to expectations. The civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, as well as the unsteady political transitions in the Philippines and Haiti, provide evidence that grievances are a powerful factor in explaining the mobilization of resistance and state repression in response.

Still, civil wars or rebellions are not as widespread as the existence of grievances, and so other factors are needed to explain civil wars (Collier et al., 2004). Thus, increasing attention has been devoted to the political economy of war—the ability to finance and support a rebellion (or, for that matter, a government’s counterinsurgency), and even the possibility of profiting from violent conflict (Collier et al., 2003). New work on the licit and illicit economies that support conflict actors, local corruption, and the effect of foreign investment in a postconflict region, the need to revitalize local economies and small businesses, and the corrosive impact of organized crime controlled by conflict actors call attention to the fact that both power and resources underlie conflicts and interact with each other (Berdal and Wennemann, 2010). One facet of this is the tangible goods needed for a rebellion, so factors such as valuable natural resources (e.g., oil, diamonds, drug trafficking, human trafficking; Ross, 2003), support from outside states or diaspora communities, abundant weapons from neighboring wars, and large pools of unemployed young men are increasingly seen as causes of civil wars or at least factors that perpetuate them; the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan certainly have all of these sources of support.

**Weak States as Conflict Opportunities**

Another dimension of opportunity concerns weak states, where institutions are incapable of resolving social conflict, mitigating grievances, or suppressing violent opposition (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Paris, 2004; Call and Wyeth, 2008). When a rebellion starts in a strong state, it is more quickly crushed by the government (Cunningham, 2006). More important, perhaps, a rebel group will not find as much support if the state has broad legitimacy. A strong state has effective, legitimate mechanisms for maintaining security and resolving conflicts that are viewed by citizens as legitimate. The absence
of these mechanisms and this legitimacy leaves a vacuum in which groups may pursue their grievances through violence (Call and Wyeth, 2008).

**Ideologies and Beliefs**

Ideologies and belief systems continue to fuel violence. Marxist ideology helped persuade leftist rebels to take extreme risks and sustain their sacrifices (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), and recently, irregular warfare in the Middle East and the larger Islamic world can be traced to militant Islamism (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). It has been claimed that ideological struggles are less amenable to negotiated settlement than other kinds of conflict (Pruitt, 2006). Somewhat to the contrary, it has also been argued that ideological conflicts are more amenable than ethnic conflicts to settlement through reforms or power sharing, because unlike in ethnic conflicts, the loyalties of the population in ideological wars may be won through such political changes (Kaufmann, 1996). Political Islamism bears some similarity to communism in that it has absolutist ideals (worldwide Sharia law in one case, global communism in the other) and is often advanced through irregular, insurgent warfare. The role of states such as Saudi Arabia in propagating radical versions of Islam (Abou El Fadl, 2009) needs to be examined further and compared to the earlier role of the Soviet Union in promoting communist ideology. However, the role of transnational, nonstate actors, particularly Al Qaeda and its offshoots, in promoting Islamist ideology, has no parallel in the Cold War communist movement. It remains to be seen how long militant, extremist Islam will remain a source of violent conflict.

Of course, ideologies drive states as well as nonstate actors to war. The United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was driven at least partly by the ideological preferences of a relatively small group of policymakers (the so-called neoconservatives) who had espoused doctrines of preemptive, unilateral military intervention against unfriendly, nondemocratic regimes (Project for the New American Century, 1997 and 2005). Iraq earned its bad reputation through its weapons of mass destruction programs, its defiance of United Nations weapons inspectors, atrocities committed against Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, not to mention Iraq’s wars with Iran and Kuwait. However, the neoconservative belief in forceful regime change signified a doctrinal departure from the Clinton administration’s efforts to deal with Iraq through multilateral efforts of deterrence and containment.3

**War Breeds War**

Civil wars themselves tend to create the opportunity for more civil wars (Call, 2012; Collier et al., 2003): war increases polarization and hatred, causes massive civilian casualties and displacement, reverses economic
development, floods regions with weapons, and increases the political power of the military. Civil wars also tend to last on average far longer than interstate wars (Collier et al., 2004; Kreutz, 2010), and for unknown reasons, civil wars that started in the 1980s or 1990s have lasted roughly twice as long on average as those that began in the 1960s or 1970s (Collier et al., 2003). Therefore, while the rate of civil war onset has been fairly stable since the 1950s, the rate of termination was generally slower until after the Cold War (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), when peacemaking and civil war termination accelerated (Kreutz, 2010). The tenacity and recurrence of civil wars help explain their increase through the early 1990s.

Explaining the Decrease in Interstate War: Norms, Institutions, and Regimes

We must explain not only why civil wars have increased overall but why interstate wars have decreased. To a considerable extent, the post–World War II UN system of international peace preservation has been successful in reducing the incidence of interstate war, and the use of armed UN peacekeeping missions has been successful in reducing war recurrence (Fortna 2008; Goldstein, 2012). Part of this success is the spread of the norm of territorial integrity—the idea that state borders are inviolable (Zacher, 2001). Indeed, the last successful conquests of territory occurred in 1975, with Morocco’s assumption of control of the Spanish Sahara (which remains disputed) and the victory of North Vietnam and the Vietcong over South Vietnam (Zacher, 2001). Also in that year, Indonesia invaded East Timor and controlled it until it gained independence (after a three-year process) in 2002 (Zacher, 2001). More recent territorial aggressions such as Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990 called forth a unified international response, and many earlier territorial conquests, such as Turkey’s takeover of part of Cyprus, remain disputed. When border and other disputes have arisen (e.g., chemical contamination, navigation, fisheries, maritime delimitation), states have frequently resorted to the International Court of Justice and abided by its determinations instead of attacking each other militarily. Interstate wars are costly and ineffective ways to resolve political differences, as conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq war and the Ecuador-Peru war have shown. Increasingly, regional intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States, the African Union, and the European Union mediate interstate conflicts and deploy cease-fire monitoring, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement missions.

Beyond the UN and regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), interstate peace can be attributed to the increasingly dense network of institutions for a wide range of economic, environmental, political, and
economic cooperation into which states are drawn. Regime theory holds that cooperation is possible even in the anarchic international system through institutions or regimes (Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1982; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Oye, 1985). These are not necessarily actual organizations, though they can be; they are characterized by norms, decision rules, and procedures that help overcome the barriers to cooperation (e.g., inadequate information, uncertainty about intentions, inability to sanction violators). There is now a complex web of institutions to which states belong: IGOs (such as the UN, the African Union, or ASEAN), trade regimes (such as the North American Free Trade Agreement), military alliances (such as NATO), and treaties (such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty). Bearing out the concept of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977), the global system is increasingly like a small town in which actors restrain themselves from hostility in one arena because they are in cooperative arrangements with the same players in other arenas.

It is also widely argued that interstate peace is maintained more easily when states are governed democratically, and enjoy free markets and trade with each other. Liberal peace theory generally contends that interstate commerce promotes peaceful relations between trading states. Some theorists assert that this is caused by the promotion of good relations and a sense of community or, more prominently, the fear of losing gains from trade (Barbieri and Schneider, 1999). Others argue that domestic constituencies and robust democratic institutions constrain liberal states, while norms of dispute resolution and bargaining according to equity and rule of law also strengthen peace (Dixon, 1994; Morgan and Campbell, 1991). Gartze, Li, and Boehmer (2001) explore the enhanced communication and costly signaling that arise between interdependent states, reducing their recourse to militarized conflict. Liberal international trade, in combination with democratic governance and respect for human rights, is assumed to transfer rivalry to the marketplace to be worked out by supply and demand dynamics.

**Ongoing Vulnerabilities to Interstate War**

We should not romanticize or exaggerate the world’s success in reducing interstate wars. Wars still occur and are likely to continue, especially wars involving oil-producing states led by revolutionary regimes (Colgan, 2013). Some countries are far weaker than others, leaving them vulnerable to the interests and designs of greater powers. Weapons of mass destruction are still in circulation; as we write, North Korea is threatening to use nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons remains worrisome. There is also the widespread phenomenon of intervention in other countries’ civil wars (Regan, 2002). One author goes so far as to call this the “delegation” of war to
rebel groups (Salehyan, 2010). While perhaps overstated, this suggests that interstate conflict has perhaps only changed venue from international war to civil war as states pursue their interests by supporting one side in another country’s internal conflict, thus turning them into proxy wars (and likely prolonging them). Nevertheless, due in part to the decline in international war, the overall number of battle deaths per year in all wars combined is less than half what it was during the Cold War (Goldstein, 2012). (See table 56.2.)

The decline of interstate war and the growth of civil war have posed challenges to the practice and theory of conflict resolution. State-centric solutions to violent, militarized conflict are of limited use in civil wars, as we discuss later in this chapter. In addition, regional conflict complexes that involve both interstate wars and internal wars pose yet further challenges.

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<th>Table 56.2 Tools and Practices for International Conflict Resolution</th>
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<td>Prevention</td>
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<td>Precursors, Ripeness</td>
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<td>Sanctions and Inducements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacemaking (mediation to prevent or resolve)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN and Regional Organization Conflict Resolution</td>
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**PEACEBUILDING**: Liberal, External versus Indigenous, Local versus Hybrid (may cut across all approaches, norms, and tools of international conflict resolution, especially prevention and post conflict reconstruction)
The violence in the African Great Lakes region epitomizes this. The genocidal violence in Rwanda in 1994 was certainly exacerbated by prior Ugandan support for Tutsis, and Zairean and French support for Hutus. The post-genocide intervention of Rwanda in the affairs of Democratic Republic of Congo, (Zaire), ostensibly in pursuit of fleeing Hutu genocidaires, helped spur two decades of a regional war that continues to engulf Africa. The difficulties of defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan show that fragile states may continue to be bases for nonstate actors and insurgents that invite neighbors and great powers to intervene.

TOOLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

There are numerous tools used by conflict parties and the outsiders seeking to help them to achieve resolution that can be independent of or interact with the actions of UN and regional organizations. We present them here in the roughly sequential order of prevention, track 2 negotiation and problem-solving workshops, negotiation, mediation, and postaccord peacebuilding. In reality, however, the sequencing is nonlinear. Civil wars in particular are prone to recurrence: an increasing number of civil war onsets are recurrences of recently ended conflicts. By one calculation, this accounts for 90 percent of civil war onsets in the 2000s (Call, 2012). Since civil wars are prone to recur, the line between prevention and postconflict peacebuilding blurs. We also briefly consider the role of development assistance and sanctions.

Assessment, Prevention, and Early Warning

Increasing attention has been devoted to the early warning and prevention of violent conflict, an aspiration embedded in the UN Charter but practiced infrequently (Zartman, 2005). In this arena, there is research to support the adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. In a set of six case studies, Chalmers (2007) estimated the costs of plausible conflict prevention packages including combinations of military force, economic aid, and diplomacy. He concluded that the savings to the international community from avoiding the conflict outweighed the cost of the prevention package, with results even more pronounced if the costs to the conflict countries themselves (not just to the international community) are taken into account. Similarly, an earlier study compared the $200 billion cost of international responses in seven conflicts to the $70 billion cost of prevention action (Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 2001). Political leaders, however, undervalue conflict prevention because it is hard to deploy resources (and to take credit) for preventing something that has not occurred.
In our view that prevention is actually resolution at earlier stages of conflict escalation. The goal in conflict prevention is not to prevent conflict per se but to prevent its violent manifestations. We agree with a broad definition of conflict as a perceived or real incompatibility of goals, with positive change possibly resulting if the conflict is managed effectively (Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012). Viewed in this way, prevention is the application of conflict resolution, settlement, and management tools at early stages of conflict, before escalation to violence, as well as in postconflict situations in anticipation of possible recurrence of armed conflict.

The first challenge of prevention is to identify conflicts in which violence is likely to occur. The mass media usually take interest in dramatic events, so conflicts draw more attention only once violence has erupted. Broadly, there are two approaches to early warning: the first is identifying countries or groups that exhibit the structural conditions that are statistically associated with conflict, and the second involves tracking the more proximate causes of violent conflict or signs of incipient violence. The first approach statistically assesses countries or minority groups that are more prone to conflict risk, such as has been done by Ted Robert Gurr using assessments on the incentives and capacity for rebellion, and by Paul Collier and his associates who use econometrics to predict conflict proneness. For more immediate warning of conflicts, qualitative methods are more valuable and may involve reporting by humanitarian agencies, media, academic area specialists, diplomatic corps, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the International Crisis Group (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2005). Despite the inherent value of early warning, policymakers and analysts are at risk when “detecting” emerging violent conflict. Unwelcome news might result in a shoot-the-messenger response (or denial by decision makers), while fear of getting the analysis wrong may cause the analyst to adopt undue optimism or trepidation about reporting (Jentleson, 2000).

Because of contemporary research on the causes and contexts of violence, formal conflict assessment frameworks are being adopted by governments, IGOs, and NGOs to inform their planning and determine if a particular intervention will ameliorate or exacerbate conflict dynamics. Examples include the US government’s Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, typically used to guide a large workshop to brainstorm conflict dynamics and then to guide a field mission in a country or region. The resulting report informs policy decisions and helps assistance programs mitigate those dynamics and strengthen existing resilience and conflict resolution capacity. Assessments can be used in all phases of conflict but are of particular value in prevention.

An important innovation in prevention is the practice of deploying UN or other peacekeeping forces in anticipation of future hostilities: a preventive
deployment. Such missions, used notably in the Central African Republic and Macedonia, provide critical security and reassurances so that parties can proceed with negotiations rather than militarization (Grizold et al., 2012).

Beyond preventive deployment, conflict prevention practices have advanced considerably. The Internet and cell phone networks are increasingly used for early warning of violence. Examples include the USAHAlIDI project (www.usahalidi.com), the PAX initiative (www.paxreports.org), Frontline SMS, Voix des Kivus, and PeaceNet (Search for Common Ground, circa 2011). These initiatives involve various combinations of collecting text messages and other cell phone data about outbreaks of violence (particularly in connection with postconflict elections), crowd-mapping the data, centralizing or disseminating the data through the Internet, and coordinating with local mediators or peace committees. They have promise for conflict prevention to the extent that small-scale violence might presage larger-scale political violence.

Humanitarian aid and development organizations are increasingly aware of the possibility that the delivery of aid can unintentionally create or exacerbate conflict. For example, aid can be stolen by warring parties to support soldiers or buy weapons, or more broadly, aid can substitute for the provision of civilian needs, freeing public resources to be spent on combat (Anderson, 1999). Some humanitarian NGOs now build conflict sensitivity into their programming (Mashatt, Long, and Crum, 2008; World Bank, 2011). There is a difference, though, between “working in conflict” and “working on conflict”; in other words, conflict-sensitive practices in humanitarian development (working in conflict) are not necessarily peace-building activities (working on conflict) (Atmar and Goodhand, 2002; DAC Network, 2008). Still, conflict-sensitive practices can be viewed as a tool for preventing the emergence or exacerbation of violent conflict.

**Economic Development as Conflict Prevention?** Returning to structural prevention, or identifying which societies are conflict prone based on underlying conditions (Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Violence, 1997), economic development can arguably be seen as a measure of conflict prevention. The link between poverty and civil war needs to be better understood before we can specify whether and how economic development prevents conflict. To the extent that development both alleviates poverty and helps states deliver services, it seems suited to the task of reducing the likelihood of civil war, which leads us to discuss state building as prevention.

**State Building as Conflict Prevention.** Good governance helps manage latent and actual conflict, channeling it into a political process, and thus helps prevent violence (Holsti, 1996). As awareness grows of the link
between weak states and the onset of civil war, state building is now seen as an important component of conflict prevention and peacebuilding: “where governance is legitimate and accountable to citizens, and when the rule of law prevails, armed conflict is less likely” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). State building provides legitimate means of security and conflict resolution and a foundation for economic development. Without strong states, groups seek security, development, or the redress of grievances through alternative channels, including violence (Call and Wyeth, 2008).

However, state building and peacebuilding are not the same thing, and there are inherent tensions and dilemmas between the two. For example, state building is a process that may create political winners and losers (thus potentially stoking conflict), and strengthening a state’s security apparatus could exacerbate repression (Call and Wyeth, 2008). Also, the process of externally aided state building involves dilemmas—for instance, external control undergirded by supposedly universal values are used to build local ownership and legitimacy (Paris and Sisk, 2009). Moreover, while international state-building interventions have typically emphasized the creation of free markets and the holding of elections, these competition-based processes can lead to renewal of conflict unless they are preceded by the buildup of functioning state institutions that provide security and justice (Paris, 2004). Jonas Savimbi’s renewal of the civil war in Angola after he lost an internationally supported election illustrates these dilemmas and tensions. In addition, there is evidence that semidemocratic states are more prone to civil war than either full democracies or dictatorships (Henderson and Singer, 2000), implying that democratization attempts can lead to greater instability at least in the short term. Efforts to strengthen the state, like economic development, have to be done thoughtfully, with awareness of dilemmas and in close coordination with broader peace-building priorities.

**Negotiation to Resolve Violent Conflicts**

*Getting to the Table.* Once an interstate or civil war is underway, it may end through decisive military victory, or, increasingly in the post–Cold War period, negotiation. The first issue is how the parties reach the point of deciding to negotiate with one another—the issue of getting to the table. The most influential theory about timing negotiation initiatives is Zartman’s ripeness concept, which posits that a mutually hurting stalemate, together with a mutually enticing opportunity to escape the stalemate and reciprocal acceptance of each party’s legitimacy, are the preconditions to successful initiation (Zartman, 1989). In short, the parties are likely to be most ready to negotiate if they have reached a painful stalemate on the battlefield; that is, all sides conclude that they cannot win. Some have argued
that this is an overly passive perspective and that the international community must begin the process of peacemaking and urging the parties to the table regardless of “ripeness” (Lederach, 2008; Hampson, 1996). Zartman (2008) recognizes that ripeness is at least partly perceptual and can be cultivated by outside actors. Others argue that different parties to the same conflict may have different outlooks, and either the pain of a stalemate or the prospect of a fruitful negotiation is sufficient to prompt a party to seek negotiation (Pruitt, 2013). Ripeness is especially elusive in civil wars because the asymmetric nature of the conflict causes insurgents to compensate for their lack of resources with commitment to their cause, while the government enjoys a preponderance of power despite less zeal (Zartman, 2005). Mutual delegitimization further imperils perceptions of ripeness, so a further challenge is for conflict parties to recognize each other as having legitimate roles in the resolution of conflict or at least the ability to, in effect, veto a negotiated agreement—thus ameliorating some of the inherent asymmetries (Zartman, 2007). A prescriptive implication of ripeness and readiness is that outside parties can help the conflict parties change their minds about the status quo and get them to accept negotiation (or mediation) in place of violence as the means to their political ends.

Movements and governments that make war on each other face numerous difficulties in perceiving each other as negotiation partners and frequently reject negotiated outcomes publicly—even when they face military stalemate or defeat. Often the first step in negotiations is the establishment of secret contacts—backchannel prenegotiations between the parties or through third-party conduits (Wanis-St. John, 2006; Pruitt, 2008). This method has been used to positive effect to help parties explore the feasibility of substantive negotiations, or to help achieve a broad formula for resolution, which may be crucial for achieving a durable cease-fire (Mahieu, 2007; Sisk, 2009). However, in its secrecy and exclusiveness, there is a danger that it can fail to build a broad enough constituency for peace—a factor in the failure of the 1993 Oslo accords to result in a comprehensive peace in Israel-Palestine (Wanis-St. John, 2011; Pruitt, 2008).

Another route from particularly intractable conflict to the negotiating table is track 2 diplomacy and problem-solving workshops. Deeply rooted conflicts resist attempts to negotiate because they involve the deprivation of nonnegotiable basic human needs like identity and recognition rather than simply interests (Burton, 1990; Azar, 1986). Academics and former diplomats have thus promoted a workshop format that is typically held in secret (or under the guise of an academic conference) and involves either official representatives of the warring parties or people who report to or have influence on them (Fisher, 1997; Burton, 1987; Saunders, 1995; Rouhana and Kelman, 1994; McDonald, 1991; Kelman, 1992; Montville,
Problem-solving workshops have often helped the parties shift from zero-sum to more positive-sum views of the conflict, thus paving the way for negotiation, and have had some success in improving relationships and understanding between conflict parties, as well as in exploring causes and solutions (Fisher, 2005). Two challenges are the transfer of such outcomes to official decision makers and dispersing the outcomes more widely among other officials and civil society generally.

**Negotiation.** Negotiation is “the first line of conflict resolution” (Zartman, 2007, p. 465). International negotiations involve some of the dynamics of the interpersonal and interorganizational levels of negotiation but also involve vast diplomatic bureaucracies, the possibility of military coercion, the influence of transnational and nonstate actors, the absence of an overarching legal framework, and the influence of other international events on any particular negotiation (Hopmann, 1996). In the post–Cold War period, a far higher proportion of civil wars has been settled through negotiation than before (Call, 2012). This could be because of a normative shift by which the international community calls for fighting to halt and negotiation to begin (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999). There are those who argue, however, that total victory of one side leads to a more durable peace (Licklider, 1995), especially if the rebels win (Toft, 2010); others question the methodology behind such arguments (Sisk, 2009). In any case, there is less willingness today to see parties “fight it out” at the expense of civilian populations, so the focus is on making negotiated outcomes more durable (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Walter, 2002).

Civil wars raise questions about who the legitimate parties to negotiation are. This stands in contrast to interstate wars, in which the parties are recognized states. It is generally argued that all major armed groups need to be represented (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008; Hampson, 1996; Licklider, 2001, p. 701; Blaydes and De Maio, 2010; Sisk, 2009), yet there may also be small fringe groups that are excluded (Newman and Richmond, 2006; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008). The excluded groups may be more likely to become spoilers—that is, to sabotage the peace through postagreement violence (Nilsson, 2008). However, parties at the table may also become spoilers (Stedman, 1997). Increasingly, peace negotiations involve not only armed groups but unarmed ones—civil society organizations and political parties—though they often serve in a consultative or observer role rather than as full negotiating parties. Some argue that this trend toward inclusiveness makes agreement less likely to be reached (Cunningham, 2011), but the involvement of such groups seems to add to the durability of resulting agreements (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Blaydes and De Maio, 2010).
Mediation. International mediation—understood here as negotiations conducted with a third party’s help when the parties have difficulty negotiating directly—is widely used in the settlement of civil wars (Rubin, 1981). Mediators may be states, the UN, other IGOs, local or international NGOs, religious organizations (Huda, 2010; Abu-Nimer, Khoury, and Welty, 2007), eminent individuals acting on their own, or a combination of such actors. Eminent individuals often are former high-level officials, such as Jimmy Carter, Martti Ahtisaari, or Nelson Mandela. While the “mediator” is more often a large entity than an individual, there is still usually one key person—such as a head of state or a special representative to the secretary general—who chairs the plenary sessions and heads the mediation team. More recent examples include former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan attempting to mediate the Syrian civil war and former Senator George Mitchell serving as mediator in Northern Ireland. While we have not seen the establishment of a corps of professional international mediators to help resolve violent conflicts as has happened in the domestic dispute resolution field, that may be emerging. The UN created the Mediation Support Unit in 2006, followed by the Standby Team of Mediation Experts in 2008 in an effort to move away from reliance on sporadic, ad hoc mediation efforts (UN Department of Political Affairs, 2013; Wils and Herrberg, 2011). We have seen the development of NGOs such as the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the London-based Conciliation Resources, which conduct and disseminate research on peacemaking and peacebuilding and occasionally serve as mediators. One possible model could entail a prominent individual or appointed representative serving as lead mediator—bringing with him or her the name recognition and credibility based on individual clout or that of his or her organization—but with conflict resolution experts as consultants or staff.

Increasingly there are multiple entities vying to mediate in violent conflicts or different mediators over time in a single conflict (Lindgren, Wallensteen, and Grusell, 2010). This can be problematic, leading to competition, rivalry, and muddled chains of command among mediators and possible forum shopping among parties (Crocker et al., 1999; Lanz and Gasser, 2013). Indeed, mediators can actually become spoilers as they vie for the status or funding that comes with a lead mediation role (Lindgren et al., 2010). But if the mediators or would-be mediators can coordinate according to their comparative advantages and capabilities, the multiplicity of mediators can be a “compelling force for peace” (Crocker et al., 1999, p. 698). For example, the Catholic lay organization Community of Sant’Egidio served initially as a track 2 mediator between the parties to the Mozambique civil war, a process that morphed into the track 1 talks. “Along the way the Vatican, the Italian government, the United States, the United Nations, and
several other interested governments provided support, resources, and, at times, additional diplomatic mediation” (Jackson, 2005, pp. 161–162).

Another conflict resolution method involves multiple states or IGOs helping to mediate: a contact group or a “friends of . . .” group, which are “informal mini-coalitions . . . that provide support for resolving conflicts and implementing peace agreements” (Whitfield, 2010, p. 5). This helps achieve a unified international voice on the need for peaceful resolution. For example, in the 1990–1996 peace process to end the Guatemala civil war, a group of “friends” formed, including Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela, to support the peace process. They collectively persuaded the conflict parties to negotiate toward an eventual agreement (Rosenthal, 2001). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, Guatemala was no longer the site of proxy war between the superpowers. Not all “friends of” groups are necessarily interested in peaceful resolution. The Friends of Syria group, comprising the United States, European Union, and Arab League, is a partisan, pro-rebel group, while Iran and Russia continue to support the Syrian government. This lack of unity among the international community is one reason that the Syrian civil war rages on as of this writing. Others, such as the Middle East Quartet in operation since 2002 and consisting of the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Union, and the UN, appear to have done little to optimize their joint diplomatic capabilities in support of renewed Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.7

It is generally agreed that mediators of international conflicts are not expected to be neutral, in contrast with some domestic mediation contexts (Smith, 1985; Greig and Diehl, 2012); indeed, some argue that biased mediators are actually more effective because their close relationship to one side may make them more credible transmitters of information (Lindgren et al., 2010). A mediator’s close relationship with one party may be helpful for leverage—in particular, government-biased mediators seem more likely to convince governments to make substantial concessions (Rubin, 1981; Touval, 1982; Svensson, 2007). There is evidence that biased mediators may produce higher-quality outcomes because they are less interested in agreement for its own sake and more interested in substantive political changes tied to more durable peace and democracy (Svensson, 2009). The question of bias aside, mediators in international conflicts still need to be trusted to some degree by all parties—a point more difficult to test empirically. For example, both sides in the Philippines-Mindanao conflict trust Malaysia as the mediator, although Malaysia is seen as favoring the Muslim minority in Mindanao. While officially a representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia is trusted by the Philippine government in part because of its membership in ASEAN, which upholds the sovereignty of member states (Hopmann, 2013).
More controversial than the issue of mediator neutrality is that of the style of mediation. Research on the forms of mediation in violent conflicts has generally used a typology of three styles: communicative (or facilitative), formulative, and manipulative (Touval and Zartman, 1985; Zartman, 1997). The communicative approach emphasizes improving communication between the parties—clarifying and transmitting messages and developing rapport with both sides. The formulative approach is more assertive both procedurally and substantively: establishing protocols, structuring the agenda, helping parties save face, and making substantive proposals. The manipulative approach is the most directive of all and may involve making threats or offering rewards to the parties and thus altering the payoffs of different outcomes. Research has generally shown formulative and manipulative mediation to be more successful in reaching agreement but facilitative styles more successful in calming tensions and reducing the chances of a future conflict or crisis (Wilkenfeld et al., 2005; Beardsley et al., 2006; DeRouen et al., 2012; Quinn et al., 2006). The exception is when the two parties are of roughly equal power, in which case the more assertive styles appear more effective in tension reduction as each side is still vying for advantage (Quinn et al., 2006; Wilkenfeld et al., 2005) or the parties are locked in stalemate.

The possibility of nonneutral mediators combined with the possibility of manipulative mediation makes the distinction between mediation and other third-party roles difficult. If a third party is supportive of one side in a conflict and uses military or economic aid to try to bring about a particular outcome, is this mediation or partisanship? We need better ways to “differentiate between managing a peace process versus joining a conflict” (Lindgren et al., 2010, pp. 9–10). A more nuanced understanding of various third-party roles may help (Mitchell, 2008), but the fundamental difference between international mediation (including in civil wars) and domestic mediation (absent civil war) is that in the domestic arena, an overarching legal system offers guidelines and enforcement. A domestic mediator does not use coercion to push the parties into a particular outcome; this is the job of the state. In the international arena, although there is a large corpus of international law, there is no single law enforcement entity (except, loosely, the UN, but only on a case-by-case basis as decided by member states, particularly those on the Security Council).

Therefore, the role of mediator—in the pure sense of an actor who helps the parties reach a voluntary agreement without employing force—easily gets blended with the role of enforcer of international laws or norms. Arguments in favor of mediation “with muscle” (Sisk, 2009) or “coercive” mediation (Touval, 1996) seem to make more sense in the international arena than in the domestic one: measured outside force may be needed to halt the greater violence occurring between the conflict parties. Moreover,
in asymmetric conflicts, military force on the side of the weaker party may arguably be needed to bring about the kind of stalemate that leads to willingness to negotiate (Zartman, 1997). It may be wise, however, to keep in mind the distinctions among different third-party roles in their pure types: one state or IGO may intervene militarily on the side of the weak or provide peacekeeping troops, and the same party perhaps may simultaneously mediate, but these are distinct functions.

Sanctions, Inducements, and the Economics of Peace

Negative inducements, such as economic sanctions, have also played a role in international conflict resolution by denying target states or regimes access to arms, capital, markets for their exports, or assistance (Hufbauer et al., 2008). While arms embargoes can alter the arms import practices of belligerents, they are far less successful in altering the policies of target states (Brzoska, 2008). There is some evidence that economic sanctions reduce the escalatory dynamics of both interstate and intrastate wars, in some cases encouraging the parties in conflict to view negotiation as a more attractive option than violence (Cortwright, 2007). Of course, sanctions can have unintended consequences, such as causing harm to innocent civilian populations (Damrosch, 1993). Positive inducements, offers of assistance, or access to alliances or membership in global or regional organizations can be combined with negotiation to encourage conciliatory behavior. The dynamics of sanctions differ when used on adversaries who fear future conflict versus when used on allies who do not fear future conflict, so their application must be intelligent and judicious lest sanctions have paradoxical effects (Drezner, 1999).

Development aid can play a role in international conflict resolution. As a deliberate strategy of peacebuilding, this typically involves political and civil society development to support local peace initiatives: training in dialogue, negotiation, media relations, advocacy, and other skills can empower communities to resolve their own conflicts and keep them localized and nonviolent. Support for rule of law can help build trustworthy governing institutions while reducing injustice and grievance. The US Institute of Peace (2012), for example, has been working with different ethnic groups in South Sudan whose conflicts over land use for farming and grazing and other issues frequently become violent and attract the interference of the government in Khartoum. The institute has also conducted dialogue training in countries such as Haiti (to support electoral violence prevention) and Nepal (to support security sector reform). Since local and international conflicts are linked, it seems wise to link local and international conflict resolution initiatives. Carefully designed development work can directly mitigate
the causes and manifestations of war. Taken together, positive inducements, sanctions, and development assistance can be mutually reinforcing tools of statecraft that permit interested outside parties to influence the dynamics of conflict without themselves resorting to more coercive diplomatic and military interventions.

**Peace Processes**

In 1978, President Jimmy Carter mediated the termination of the state of war between Egypt and Israel through two accords: A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, which led to a full bilateral peace treaty, and the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, which was meant to lead to a more comprehensive regional peace by resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Quandt, 2005). Although the latter agreement was quickly cast aside, Carter recognized that the long-standing Middle East conflict needed to be resolved at several levels rather than through a single bilateral document concluded at a single summit event. It would need, in fact, a process of negotiation encompassing several stages, agreements, and phases. The Camp David Accords were, after all, the culmination of months of energetic diplomacy by President Carter, as well as by prior US, UN, and other mediation in the Middle East conflict.

Although this may not have been the first use of the term *peace process*, the Camp David talks of 1978 have conferred that terminology on every subsequent attempt to negotiate or mediate peace after a war. Peace processes are simply negotiations and mediations, as well as the subsequent implementation and peace-building tasks that take place over long periods of time.

The use of negotiation and mediation in civil wars is more challenging than in interstate wars. International conflict resolution, once the parties have moved beyond reciprocal denials of legitimacy, involves—in roughly sequential fashion—the cessation of hostilities, agreement on formulas or general principles, interim measures to build confidence, and, if all goes well, a final, comprehensive settlement. When wars were mainly between states seeking security or territory, the terms of peace were relatively straightforward: separation and redeployment of forces, cease-fires, and return of territory or guarantees of security, according to the specifics of the case.

In civil wars, the parties will most likely continue to share the same state, so the main dilemmas concern the modality for creating or returning to a civic, nonviolent, political order. This is bound to be contingent on the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of fighting forces. DDR, in turn, is an issue that is often linked to the willingness of the parties to participate in old political institutions together or create new institutions and rules. Will they
share power? Will they form political parties that contest power through elections? How will power be exercised by winners? No party wants to lay down its arms without assurances of security and some political gain. This gain may come in the form of demands for the safety of rival leaders and forces, amnesties for past violations of the laws of war, and release of prisoners.

A peace process therefore entails a series of stages and activities (Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008) which may or may not be linear: the open or secret prenegotiations in which the parties consider each other’s legitimacy; efforts to consolidate a cease-fire; negotiations to address the root causes of the war, as well as new grievances. Contemporary peace processes are not events that take place at a single point in time because negotiations to end wars can and do falter at any of these several stages of negotiation. Fighting, as we have noted, reemerges easily, particularly in civil wars, and even seemingly well-managed peace processes can have catastrophic outcomes, as the Rwanda case shows, since the genocide took place just after a final agreement had been reached between the government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (Jones, 2001). The Palestinian-Israeli peace process, so promising at its initiation, quickly fell prey to spoilers, antipeace constituencies, and delays and disagreements in the implementation of its various stages (Wanis-St. John, 2011). Many other peace processes, however, such as the one in Liberia (culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003), have finally resulted in durable peace, even after multiple failures and resumptions of war.

A peace process agreement, once reached, sets out a number of critical tasks whose successful implementation is key to the success of the peace process. In the settlement of civil wars, these tasks can be grouped broadly into four categories—political, military, economic, and social—although they are inextricably linked to each other.

Cutting across all of these tasks are the gendered dimensions of both war and peace. Socially constructed roles for boys, girls, women, and men contribute to and are affected by massive political violence. Women are sometimes combatants in civil wars, heads of families affected by war, and victims of deliberate wartime sexual violence. But women are also critical voices that help shape the peace into something more than a victory for warlords (Anderlini, 2007).

The political tasks typically involve new governance arrangements: Will insurgents form political parties? Will power be shared or contested in winner-take-all elections? When will elections take place? What new, fair, and accessible governance institutions will be created that will empower the marginalized and provide services equitably? The military tasks concern the provision of security to civilians (Call and Stanley, 2002), who, after being victimized by war, face threats from violent crime that emerge in the aftermath
of war. It also entails DDR, which requires the collection and decommissioning of arms, verification that parties do not hide or hoard arms, and the creation of new military units that bring together (rather than separate, as is the case in interstate wars) the government and irregular forces while demobilizing abusive or obsolete units. Economic tasks include rebuilding of infrastructure, creation of employment for former combatants, and, perhaps more important, liberalizing access to capital, land, jobs, and other economic goods. The social tasks include the extent and form of reconciliation (Abu-Nimer, 2001) that is to take place among belligerents: transitional justice, new human rights protections for individuals and groups, return of displaced people, psychosocial healing for traumatized survivors, and reconstruction of communities, among others. These tasks are not implemented at the moment of signature of a peace agreement, but take time and, frequently, renegotiation of terms. Each of these peace process tasks has begun generating significant theoretical and policy-oriented literature (Zartman, 2007; Darby and Mac Ginty, 2008; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, 2002; Arnson, 1999, 2012).

Peacebuilding: Liberal, Indigenous, and Hybridized

The term *peacebuilding* is increasingly being used in place of or alongside *international conflict resolution*. Lederach (1997) has been influential in this respect, although Johan Galtung (1976) is credited with coining the term. A broadly accepted definition has not yet emerged, but the general sense is that peacebuilding encompasses international conflict prevention coupled with postconflict reconstruction and state building and/or democratization (Ryan, 2013; Nan and Jeong, 2008) to prevent recurrence of violent conflict. In addition, some who use the term add that *peacebuilding* connotes sustainability of the peace efforts, typically through local ownership rather than outside imposition. A transformative dimension is sometimes promoted, so that structural, relational, and underlying causes of conflict are addressed. Peacebuilding, then, seems to describe most or all of the activities we have presented in this chapter but it temporally locates most of them in the stages that precede and follow violent conflict and spatially views them as processes aimed at not only political settlement and physical security but also deeper social, psychological, and institutional changes that help ensure peace. While *international conflict resolution* may be the more inclusive term, the use of *peacebuilding* as a term of art is gaining in currency.

Peacebuilding, regardless of its broadly construed definition, has come to be appropriated by states and civil societies of the developed world who are accused of imposing their external vision of peace on those who suffered the absence of it. This has led some to contrast the “liberal peacebuilding” paradigm, with “indigenous” or “local” peacebuilding paradigms (Mac Ginty, 2008; Wanis-St. John, 2013). These offer resistance to externally imposed activities
such as war crimes tribunals, democratization, elections, and human rights norms and counterpropose with indifference, forgiveness, ritualized peacemaking, or still other forms of making peace (some of which might be considered “illiberal”). Since both internationally assisted and local or indigenous peacebuilding have virtues and defects, and since both modify each other in practice, Mac Ginty (2011) speaks of hybridized peacebuilding in which space for the locally preferred alternatives helps to modify the heavy foreign imprint of liberal international peace interventions.

**CONCLUSION**

The causes of war, and thus the solutions to it, seem more complex than ever before. There are new causes and new dynamics, as well as the classic catalysts for war. Our approaches to resolving international conflict continue to rely on tried-and-true methods of statecraft and collective security, along with diplomatic and economic interventions (negotiation and sanctions, or carrots and sticks), but these are buttressed by new players such as the UN’s new standby team of mediators, civil society organizations including religious groups that intervene in conflict, emerging norms and practices of assessment, prevention and intervention, and the interaction between externally imposed liberal peacebuilding and localized preferences. Innovations are emerging in the uses of technology to prevent and monitor conflict. We have a clearer understanding of the economic dimensions of war and peacemaking, as well as on the reconciliation and human security dimensions of international conflict resolution. Still, much remains to be done in both practice and theory making to help foster more legitimate, inclusive societies that neither prey on their own citizens nor bring war to others. The resolution of violent international conflict will continue to demand human innovation to both shape the terrain of conflict and adapt to the emerging demands of conflict-affected communities.

**Notes**

1. The chapter subtitle comes from this quotation: “So the cycle runs from practice to knowledge and back again, and that is the only way humanity improves itself in any field” (Zartman, 2007, p. 12).

2. It has also been argued that the spike in civil wars in the 1990s had little to do with the end of the Cold War; rather, the rate of civil war onsets remained constant from about 1945 on, but the rate of termination was slower until the mid-1990s (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This argument is refuted by data showing a marked increase in civil war onsets around 1991–1992, returning to Cold War “normal” by about the mid- to late 1990s (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Kalyvas
and Balcells also show that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to an increase in conventional warfare in those regions but a decrease in insurgencies of the kind that characterized Marxist rebellions.


4. It can be argued that more recent cases, such as Armenia’s annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and Russia’s role in the Georgian separatist conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are also tantamount to violations of the norm of territorial integrity rather than purely indigenous secessions.


6. The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Violence (1997) decomposed structural prevention broadly into three categories: security, well-being (which includes economic development), and justice.

7. The Office of the Quartet Representative has, however, been an effective channel for supporting economic development and institution building among the Palestinians, initiatives that may help if the parties do get back to the table.

8. This framework, though logical and useful, is somewhat unfortunate in that it conflicts with the typology of styles for domestic mediation. The international mediation typology does not distinguish between substantive and procedural aspects of “formulation.” What is called the “facilitative” style in domestic mediation can be quite directive on procedural issues but avoids promoting substantive solutions (Mayer, 2004); a “directive” or “evaluative” style is directive with respect to substance. One therefore wonders, in regard to research that finds the formulative style most successful in international contexts, whether it is the substantive or the procedural direction that is more crucial.

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